Florida International University

FIU Digital Commons
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations

University Graduate School

3-9-2012

(IN)Security of the Chosen People: Theological
Foundations of Shi'a Strategic Culture
Sayed Amir Mirtaheri
Florida International University, s.amir.mirtaheri@gmail.com

DOI: 10.25148/etd.FI12042314
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd
Recommended Citation
Mirtaheri, Sayed Amir, "(IN)Security of the Chosen People: Theological Foundations of Shi'a Strategic Culture" (2012). FIU
Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 579.
https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/579

This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University Graduate School at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.

FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Miami, Florida

(IN)SECURITY OF THE CHOSEN PEOPLE:
THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHI‘A STRATEGIC CULTURE

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
by
Sayed Amir Mirtaheri

2012

To: Dean Kenneth G. Furton
College of Arts and Sciences
This dissertation, written by Sayed Amir Mirtaheri, and entitled (In)Security of the
Chosen People: Theological Foundations of Shi‘a Strategic Culture, having been
approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment.
We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved.
_______________________________________
Nicholas Onuf

_______________________________________
Thomas A. Breslin

______________________________________
Maria del Mar Logrono Narbona

______________________________________
Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor
Date of Defense: March 9, 2012
The dissertation of Sayed Amir Mirtaheri is approved.
_______________________________________
Dean Kenneth G. Furton
College of Arts and Sciences

_______________________________________
Dean Lakshmi N. Reddi
University Graduate School
Florida International University, 2012

ii

© Copyright 2012 by Sayed Amir Mirtaheri
All rights reserved.

iii

DEDICATION
To Maryam and Maseeh
with love.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I would like to express my gratitude to my Dissertation Committee. I have been
truly privileged to work with Dr. Mohiaddin Mesbahi, my Major Professor, in my PhD
program. Throughout these years, I have learned extensively not only from his vast
knowledge and his analytical methods in International Relations, but also from his
extraordinary character and his amazing ability to sympathize with people of different
backgrounds. My limited knowledge of International Relations has been shaped in
important ways by Professor Mesbahi’s analytical and intellectual approach. I cannot
overstate my gratitude for his constant support, kindness and encouragement, and for his
intellectual guidance that has brought this dissertation to fruition. Also, I would like to
express my appreciation to the members of my Dissertation Committee, Professor
Nicholas Onuf, Professor Thomas Breslin, and Professor Maria Logrono Narbona, for
their support, interest and involvement in my work. Working with such distinguished
scholars, great teachers and caring mentors has been an exceptional educational
opportunity for me.
I must also recognize and thank for the help and support I have received from
Professor Aisha Musa, who initially served as a member of my Dissertation Committee. I
am grateful to Florida International University’s Graduate School for awarding me the
Dissertation Evidence Acquisition Fellowship and the Dissertation Year Fellowship
without which writing this dissertation would have not been possible. I must also thank
Carleton University in Ottawa and especially Professor Farhang Rajaee, the Director of
the College of the Humanities at Carleton, for providing me with the access to the

v

University’s library facilities during the final stages of my writing in the summer and fall
of 2011.
I am indebted to the intellectual guidance I have received from Professor Richard
Bulliet, Professor Mohsen Kadivar and Professor Farhang Rajaee in the course of writing
this dissertation. In addition, my sincere thanks go to the staff and faculty of the
Department of Politics and International Relations at FIU for all their help and support
throughout the past six years. In particular, I would like to recognize the kindness and
thoughtfulness of late Professor Antonio Jorge, Professor Thomas Breslin, Professor
Harry Gould, Professor Elisabeth Prugl, Professor Ralph Clem and Ms. Luz Aviles. Last
but not least I am deeply grateful for the help and sacrifices of my parents, my wife,
Maryam, and my brothers, Ahmad and Mohammad.

vi

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
(IN)SECURITY OF THE CHOSEN PEOPLE:
THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHI‘A STRATEGIC CULTURE
by
Sayed Amir Mirtaheri
Florida International University, 2012
Miami, Florida
Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor
This dissertation explores the theological foundations of Shi‘a strategic cultures
within

the

theoretical

framework

of

Neo-Traditionalism

and

rule-oriented

Constructivism. In terms of methodology, it uses historical analysis based on mainstream
Muslim historiographies, and discourse analysis of major classical Shi‘a texts. The
dissertation identifies three Shi‘a concepts of Shahādah, i.e. martyrdom, Taqīyyah –
loosely translated to precautionary concealment– and Wilāyah/Walāyah as the
theological foundations of various Shi‘a strategic cultures. While –mystical– Shahādah
refers to “idealistic” metaphors in Shi‘a Islam based on the story of Shi‘a third Imām,
Taqīyyah essentially refers to “commonsense counsel of caution.” Shahādah provided the
Shi‘a community with a sense of metaphysical security through salvation when the
community was deprived of prospects for social prosperity. It belittled physical pain and
worldly defeat by emphasizing the ideal of fighting for justice. This also led to an
essentially different understanding of Jihād in Shi‘a Islam compared to Sunnī Islam. In
contrast to Shahādah, the doctrine of Taqīyyah was a proactive and pragmatic strategy
chosen by Shi‘a minority and aimed at survival. The doctrine of Taqīyyah highly valued
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the collective and individual survival of Shi‘a Muslims. It socialized them with a cautious
attitude towards politics and towards state. The Aristotelian prudence embedded in
Taqīyyah eventually became Shi‘a modus vivendi for many centuries. Finally, the Shi‘a
ontology of Wilāyah/Walāyah refers to the exoteric and esoteric aspects of the
metaphysical structure of the world through which the Grace of God is bestowed upon
men according to Shi‘a Islam. Wilāyah and Walāyah constituted one of the central points
of distinction between Sunnī Islam and Shi‘a Islam. At the same time, they socialized
Shi‘a Muslims with a sense of authority essential for the protection of a persecuted
community. More importantly, however, they projected Shi‘a community as the
protectors of the “heart of Islam.” This allowed the seemingly contradictory doctrines of
Shahādah and Taqīyyah to coexist in Shi‘a strategic thinking; for a “special community”
were believed to be allowed to resort to special measures for its protection.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The General Context of the Research
More than three decades ago, a throne that had seated kings for thousands of years
crumbled in the face of a Shī‘ah1 revolution in Iran. Amidst the surprise of many
observers, both inside and outside the country, a group of Shī‘ah Muslims had achieved a
noticeable strategic “success.” The Revolution was soon dubbed the “Islamic”
Revolution, which was reasonable to the extent that Shī‘ah Islam is one of the two
popular versions of the religion. Yet, the generic term “Islamic Revolution” tends to
eclipse the inherently Shī‘ī2 character of that Revolution. This Shī‘ī character manifested
yet more in the political system that emerged after the Revolution in complex –and at
times paradoxical– ways. As many scholars of Islam and Iran have noted, the Revolution
in Iran and the following political system are but one of the many potential outcomes of
Shī‘ah history. It is not possible, in other words, to reduce an ancient non-homogenous
tradition to merely three decades of political experience. Yet, the Revolution and the thus
far viable political system that followed it are among the main reasons for the production
of studies such as this one.
The unexpected “success” of Ayatollah Khomeini in establishing an “Islamic
state” becomes more challenging to explain when one compares Khomeini’s political
accomplishments with those of his counterparts in the Sunnī world. Even two decades
1

Throughout this dissertation, I have generally used ALA-LC transliteration system for Arabic terms,
names, titles and phrases. For Arabic words that have been Latinized, I have used the most common –or
one of the most common– English version(s).
2

Shī‘ī is the adjective form of the noun Shī‘ah.

1

after his death, Ayatollah Khomeini’s political “victory” remains unparalleled among the
Muslim aspirants of politicized Islam. Except for the notable exception of the ill-fated
Taliban state in Afghanistan, prominent advocates of “political Islam” in the Sunnī world
have either failed to establish an “Islamic state” or have chosen not to pursue such an
objective. In stark contrast, an obscure Ayatollah toppled one of the oldest royal systems
in the world to establish the first “Shī‘ah Republic.” Meanwhile, in Sunnī Arab Middle
East, secular Arab nationalisms of the Nasser era –with its socialist undertone– were
shattered by the repeated defeat of Arab national armies at the hand of Israeli military
forces. The subsequent religious backlash to that secular project generally failed to
succeed as long as it adhered to its rigid ideological tenets. The lack of “success” was
despite the forceful emergence of Mujahedeen in Afghanistan and their military
achievements. Mujahedeen did take credit for bringing down one of the two superpowers.
Their sympathizers in the Sunnī Arab world, however, failed to bring down a single –and
much weaker– Arab dictator. In contrast, the recent wave of uprisings in the Arab world
during the “Arab Spring” succeeded with much ease and rapidity in toppling down a
series of dictators. The success can be attributed to a variety of complex causes. Yet,
radical forces of “political Islam” seem to be receiving a small share of the credit for the
success. Recent Arab uprisings differed markedly, both in their form and in their
objectives, from the type of social movements that ideologists of older generations
including Khomeini would wish.
Similar to Ayatollah Khomeini, radical Sunnī ideologists fiercely challenged the
conservative and mostly pro-West dictators and kings in various Arab countries, yet to no
avail. The long record of their repeated defeat forced many of them to abandon –or at
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least tone down– political struggle and a few of them to go underground. The resulting
environment did indeed allow for a new younger generation of activists to emerge and
surprise the world in 2010. The failure of Sunnī ideological movements in the past
decades also led to the birth of terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda. These
organizations were, in part, the result of a radicalizing political environment that denied
meaningful forms of political participation –participations that would have arguably
marginalized some of the radical voices.
There is the notable exception of Taliban reign in Afghanistan. A peculiar
combination of superpower engagements during the Cold War and socioeconomic factors
created an environment fertile for a Sunnī radical group to seize power –and to
marginalize almost any other voice in the country. Yet, the experience proved an unviable
one. Taliban was not remotely as competent as their western neighbor in defying the
United States and in maintaining their hold on power. The contrast begs the question of
why Shī‘ah ideologists succeeded in toppling arguably one of the most powerful kings in
the world, establishing a new political order, surviving one of the longest and most brutal
wars of the past century, and withstanding the constant pressure from the international
order.
My dissertation aims at contributing to better understanding of the root causes of
the contrast between Shī‘ah and Sunnī politics. It does so by applying the notion of
strategic culture in the context of Security and Strategic Studies. The notion of strategic
culture tries to captures the foundational socio-cultural themes that shape a country’s, a
nation’s, or a people’s strategic and security behaviors. It asks what historical,

3

geographical, social and political trajectory a group of people have had to endure.3 On the
basis of the answers to this question, strategic culture studies strive to understand and
explain the actions and reactions of the people in question through a “general
framework.” It must be noted, however, that in the present dissertation, strategic culture
is not considered as a substitute for material forces. It is, instead, assumed that such
material factors have been translated into certain cultural practices and belief systems.
These beliefs and practices have in turn affected material realities. The strategic culture
of a people, in other words, may be understood as a “compressed story” of the –lived,
projected and/or imagined– experiences of those people throughout history, as much as
such compression may be possible.
Purpose
The main purpose of my PhD dissertation, therefore, is to better understand the
basic tenets of Shī‘ī strategic cultures. It looks into Shī‘ah theology and history to
understand how the minority Shī‘ah community understood its existence vis-à-vis the
majority Sunnī world; and how such understanding was translated into Shī‘ī strategic
doctrines. These doctrines have had enduring effects in Shī‘ī conceptualizations of the
notions of security and threat.4 Conceptualizations of security among Shī‘ah Muslims
3

Linking the question of strategy to the notion of culture –and that of identity– is one of the results of postCold War questions and challenges in Security Studies. The contributions of the “Copenhagen School” of
Security Studies are particularly relevant here. See, for instance, Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & de Wilde, J.
(1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers; and Williams,
Michael C. (2007). Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security. New
York: Routledge.

4

The author acknowledges that using rather general terms such as “Shī‘ah Islam” and “Shī‘ah Muslims”
might be problematic. There is a considerable diversity among Shī‘ah Muslims and this study does not
assume the existence of a singular homogenous Shī‘ah Islam. Taking such diversity of experiences and
doctrines into account, the research aims at identifying the influential yet common perceptions and
doctrines –partially– shaping political behaviors of Shī‘ah communities throughout history.
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bear a close relation to their treatments of the notion of justice and the institutions of
political power. It is, therefore, consequential in Shī‘ī understandings and
implementations of social movements on the one hand, and those of state and sovereignty
on the other. Given the above context, the study serves as a bridge between the political
theology of Shī‘ah Islam, its political history, and Security Studies literature in
International Relations.
Research Questions and Dissertation Structure
In tackling the question of Shī‘ah strategic cultures, the primary question is which
concepts have been central in shaping Shī‘ahs’ worldview when it comes to their
existence. What constitutes, in other words, the “philosophy of existence” for Shī‘ah
Muslims. Inquiring about Shī‘ī “philosophy of existence” will allow us to better
understand the notions of security, survival, and threat as understood by Shī‘ahs, for it is
this philosophy that provides Shī‘ah Muslims with deeper-than-instinct answers for why
the community needs to protect its survival.
After careful review of historical and theological sources in Shī‘ah Islam, the
study identifies three central concepts upon which Shī‘ī strategic cultures rest. These are
–in the order of presentation in this dissertation– the doctrine of Shahādah (i.e.
martyrdom), the doctrine of Taqīyyah –or so-called “expedient concealment,” and the
foundational notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah.5 The three concepts are not equal in terms

5

The words Wilāyah and Walāyah come from the same Arabic root w-l-y, which has various meanings. The
word Wilāyah usually means “sovereign power,” “rule,” and “authority.” The word Walāyah generally
means “to be a friend,” “friendship,” and “guardianship.” In Shī‘ah theology, Wilāyah and Walāyah
respectively refer to external and internal aspects of the “metaphysical structure” of the universe around
which the world is organized, and through which the Grace of God is believed to be bestowed upon man.
See Chapter V for more discussion.

5

of the emphases laid upon them in Shī‘ah theology.6 The first two, however, appear as
parallel forces throughout history. The two were to balance Shī‘ah Muslims’ aspirations
for their ideals on the one hand and their often dreadful and unfavorable material
conditions on the other. Before a brief discussion of these two, however, it is worth
paying attention to the notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah upon which the first two
doctrines rest.
If one is asked to squeeze the “philosophy of existence” –or raison d’être– of
Shī‘ah Muslims into one concept, there is arguably no better answer than the dual notions
of Wilāyah and Walāyah. Chapter V will include a more comprehensive study of the two
concepts, the literal meanings of the terms, as well as their nuanced differences. For the
purpose of introduction, however, it suffices to say that Wilāyah and Walāyah
respectively refer to the external and internal aspects of a uniquely Shī‘ī ontology.7
Walāyah refers to a “metaphysical structure” through which the Grace of God is
bestowed upon men. Accordingly, there must always exist “infallible” saints who are
carriers of Walāyah and who are the “metaphysical centers” of the universe. Shī‘ah
Muslims maintain that the line of these “holy bearers of Walāyah” goes back to Adam.
After Adam, the most prominent “bearers of Walāyah” were the prophets, though the

6

As will be discussed later, neither Shahādah nor Taqīyyah are central theological notions in Shī‘ah Islam.
In contrast, Wilāyah and Walāyah are foundational notions in Shī‘ah theology; and they are closely
associated with the Shī‘ī principle of imamate. In comparison, Shahādah and Taqīyyah may be considered
as secondary theological notions, which appear on the list of subjects in various theological works of Shī‘ī
authors.

7

It must be noted that Shī‘ah Muslims and –Shī‘ah and non-Shī‘ah– Ṣūfīs are similar in their emphasis
upon the notion of Walāyah. Despite the similarity, however, Shī‘ī articulation of Walāyah and its coupling
with Wilāyah –as well as their clear emphasis on the role played by the immediate family of the Prophet in
connection to both Wilāyah and Walāyah– constitute a unique version of the two concepts. See Chapter V
for more discussion.

6

honor was not exclusive to them. Following the death of Prophet Muḥammad, the “seal
of the prophets” according to Islam, the line of prophecy was broken indefinitely. In order
to compensate for the absence of the prophets as the categorical “bearers of Walāyah,”
Shī‘ah Muslims turned to the Prophet’s direct descendants from his daughter, Fāṭimah
bint Muḥammad.8 Twelve individuals, according to majority of Shī‘ah Muslims, were
recognized as the “bearers of Walāyah” and the channel via which the Grace of God was
–and has been– distributed throughout men. These individuals are called Imām by Shī‘ah
Muslims.9 Without such “bearers of Walāyah,” Shī‘ah Muslims believe, the world would
not exist for the simple reason that its existence hinges upon the Divine Grace.10
At the same time, the highly esoteric and mystical notion of Walāyah was
paralleled with a more mundane notion of Wilāyah, which refers to exoteric authorities.
With such powerful “inner and universal authority” bestowed upon the “bearers of
Walāyah,” it was only reasonable for Shī‘ah Muslims to believe that, more than anyone

8

605 – 632 C.E.

9

For more information on Shī‘ah Islam and the Shī‘ah Imāms, see Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn.
(1975). Shi‘ite Islam. Trans. S. H. Nasr. Albany: State University of New York Press. A useful collection of
articles can also be found in Nasr, S. H., Dabashi, H., & Nasr, S. V. R. (Eds.). (1989). Expectation of the
Millennium: Shi‘ism in History. Albany: State University of New York Press.
10

According to Shī‘ah sources, following the death of the eleventh Imām, the line continued in a
miraculous fashion. His young son, the twelfth Imām, went into “Occultation”; and ever since, he is
believed to continue functioning as the “bearer of Walāyah” indirectly. According to the doctrine of
Occultation, the twelfth Imām, Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan –also known by his epithets al-Mahdī and al-Qā’im
(b. 868 C.E.)– will return at the end of the world. It is by his death that, due to the final closure of the line
of the “bearers of Walāyah,” the world is believed to come to an end. This means that in Shī‘ah Islam, the
central notion of Walāyah is directly connected to Shī‘ah eschatology. A brief discussion of Shī‘ah
eschatology and the doctrine of the “hidden Imām” is offered in Chapter V in relation to the general
framework of this dissertation. For more information, see Sachedina, Abdulaziz A. (1981). Islamic
Messianism: The Idea of the Mahdi in Twelver Shi‘ism. Albany: State University of New York Press;
Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. (1993). Crisis and Consolidation in the Formative Period of Shi‘ite Islam:
Abu Ja‘far Ibn Qiba Al-Razi and His Contribution to Imamite Shi‘ite Thought. Princeton: Princeton
University Press; and chapter 2 in Nasr, S. H. et al (Eds.). Expectation of the Millennium.

7

else, these “holy people” have the right to external authority. In matters of judiciary and
governance, who else could fulfill the duties better than the “bearers of Walāyah,” they
asked. Therefore, the Imāms appeared as the best candidates for ruling Muslim society.
The logical extension of inner Walāyah into external Walāyah proved to be consequential
in Shī‘ī understanding of legitimate political power, and later on its uncomfortable and
half-hearted accommodation of the modern state; for implicit in the attribution of
Wilāyah to the Imāms was the conclusion that any other political power is an unjustified
and, therefore, despotic rule. In fact, the strong anti-political-power drive in Shī‘ah Islam
has its roots in the above theological argument. Some of the implications of this drive
will also be discussed throughout this dissertation and especially in relation to the central
principle of justice in Shī‘ah Islam. More specific implications of the notions of Wilāyah
and Walāyah –for instance in regards to the modern nation-state– are beyond the scope of
this dissertation and other scholars have written extensively on those subjects.11
Before turning to the two doctrines of Shahādah and Taqīyyah and their relations
with the ontology of Wilāyah and Walāyah, it is useful to review the principle of justice
in Shī‘ah Islam in an introductory fashion. Justice seems to have been among the
universal concerns of men. Yet, one may observe an acute attention to the principle of

11

The far-reaching impacts of Shī‘ah political theology on the modern institution of the nation-state
became clear to me through a series of extensive interviews with Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi during Fall
2008.
As the reader will find throughout my dissertation, I have extensively benefited from Professor Mesbahi’s
insightful comments, feedback, and analyses on numerous occasions. This has been the result of my
extensive interviews with Professor Mesbahi between Spring 2008 and Spring 2012, as well as his lectures
in various graduate seminars including his graduate seminars on Islam in International Relations (Spring
2007) and on Security and Strategic Studies (Fall 2007). From this point, I will refer to Professor Mesbahi’s
comments and analyses by using M. Mesbahi, Interviews or M. Mesbahi, Lectures depending on the
category.

8

justice, its value, and its implications among minority communities. Such an attention is
clearly the case for Shī‘ah Muslims. Their emphasis on justice, or ‘Adl, might indeed be a
reflection of their harsh and bleak social history. Being a small minority within an
antagonistic Sunnī majority and living for centuries under the threat of persecution by
Sunnī rulers, Shī‘ah theologians turned to the question of justice for two interrelated
reasons: explanation and hope. They expounded upon the notion of Divine Justice and
elevated it as one of the “five pillars” of Shī‘ah Islam.12 Divine Justice was to provide
desperate Shī‘ah Muslims with a big-picture understanding of the world in which their
current misery and plights were but a passing and temporary phase. The big picture, they
argued, was at the end essentially just and undeniably good –despite “short periods” in
which the evil surpassed the good. Divine Justice also provided Shī‘ah Muslims with a
promise of the ultimate salvation from internal and external calamities. For these reasons,
justice appears heavily in Shī‘ah eschatology to the extent that the end of times is marked
by the “triumph of justice over injustice.” Furthermore, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib13, the first
Shī‘ah Imām and the second most venerated figure in Shī‘ah Islam, is often seen as the
epitome of justice and just ruling by Shī‘ah Muslims.14 Throughout history of Shī‘ah
Islam, ‘Alī has been seen as the role-model for rulers and kings. These kings have often
12

Along with Divine Justice , or al-‘Adl, the “five pillars” are the doctrines of Unity –al-Tawḥīd–, afterlife
–al-Ma‘ād–, prophet-hood –al-Nubuwwah–, and imamate –al-Imāmah. Note that imamate in Shī‘ah
reading refers to the status of the descendants of the Prophet and their possession of Wilāyah and Walāyah.
The term, therefore, has quite different connotations in Shī‘ah and Sunnī Islams.

13

600 – 661 C.E. He is also known by his epithet Amīr al-Mu’minīn. From this point, wherever the single
name ‘Alī is used in this dissertation, it refers to ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib.

14

For a short period of time, ‘Alī reigned as the Muslim caliph. In fact, he is the fourth Sunnī caliph and the
last of the “Four Rightly Guided” caliphs according to Sunnī Muslims. His caliphate was marked by
internal turmoil in the Muslim world and several civil wars, which eventually led to the assassination of
‘Alī by an extremist Muslim group. The assassination paved the way for the rise of the Umayyad dynasty.

9

been exhorted by Shī‘ah community to follow ‘Alī’s example of just rule; even though
the mainstream Shī‘ah belief holds that all rulers will eventually fail to live up to ‘Alī’s
high standards. Shī‘ah narration of ‘Alī’s life and rule becomes so idealistic that it is
difficult to imagine an ordinary person equaling him in piety or in justice. Although the
emphasis on justice in Shī‘ah Islam goes beyond the above examples, they seem to
sufficiently convey the point. Given the importance of justice in Shī‘ah Islam, I have
discussed –directly or indirectly– its implications for Shī‘ī strategic cultures throughout
the dissertation.
One of the central doctrines shaping Shī‘ī strategic cultures is the doctrine of
Shahādah or martyrdom.15 Much has been written on martyrdom in Islam and in Shī‘ah
Islam. The large body of literature has contributed to better understanding of the Shī‘ī
understandings of martyrdom. At the same time, certain mistakes in reading the Shī‘ī
doctrine of Shahādah have caused common misunderstandings. These misunderstandings
have been exacerbated following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result,
there is a tendency among some writers to lump the ancient and complex doctrine of
Shahādah in Shī‘ah Islam together with the modern phenomenon of suicide killing. One
of the root causes of these misunderstandings has been a confusion of Sunnī
understanding of external Jihād –or holy exertion– with its Shī‘ī understanding. Here, the
principle of justice and its priority for Shī‘ah Muslims appear once again. In Sunnī
discourses, the notions of Jihād and martyrdom are associated with the Prophetic tradition
of wars with the “infidels” for the “spread of Islam.” In Shī‘ī discourses, however, Jihād

15

The centrality of the doctrine of Shahādah in Shī‘ī strategic thinking became clear to me through my
interviews with Professor Mesbahi [M. Mesbahi, Interviews, Fall 2008].
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and martyrdom are closely associated with the third Shī‘ah Imām’s16 battle with another
group of Muslims in his efforts to “protest against injustice.” It must be noted that Shī‘ah
jurists have often followed the examples of Sunnī jurists in understanding external Jihād
as fighting with the “infidels.” Yet, their legal writings diverged from Shī‘ī popular
discourses on Jihād for two reasons. One was the geography of Shī‘ah Muslims that
allowed only limited encounters with the so-called “infidels.” For the most part, Shī‘ah
Muslims lived in enclaves surrounded by a larger Sunnī community who were not –at
least technically– “infidels.” As such, the idea of “Jihād with infidels to spread Islam”
was irrelevant. The other reason has been the history of Shī‘ah Muslims’ access to power.
During the formative centuries of Shī‘ah Islam, Shī‘ah Muslims had no or limited access
to power –and sovereignty. The limited access prevented them from any meaningful
engagement in wars with “infidels.” Following the death of the Prophet, it was mainly the
first three Sunnī caliphs –and specially the second caliph, ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb– who
engaged in territorial expansion of Muslim world. The early caliphs, in other words, did
militarily engage the “infidels” and needed judicial codebooks for the conduct of external
Jihād. Mainstream Shī‘ī beliefs, however, held the legitimacy of the reign of the first
three caliphs –as well as their acts of war and peace– in question. In contrast, the short
reign of the fourth caliph and the first Shī‘ah Imām, ‘Alī, was generally colored by
internal conflicts and civil wars to such an extent that no major incidence of engagement
with the “infidels” occurred. Following the assassination of ‘Alī, the rise of the Sunnī
Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties meant a long period of inferiority for Shī‘ah Muslims.
16

The third Shī‘ah Imām is Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī (626 – 680 C.E.), who was also a grandson of the Prophet. He
is known by his epithets Abā ‘Abd Allāh and Sayyid al-Shuhadā’. From this point, wherever the single
name Ḥusayn is used in this dissertation, it refers to Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī.

11

During the aforementioned period, it was generally the Sunnī Muslims who were the
conquerors and the empire-builders.17 In response, Sunnī jurists had to come up with
elaborate and complex codes of conduct concerning external Jihād –with “infidels”– and
concerning its aftermath. Many of these codes were later on found their ways into the
writings of Shī‘ah jurists, even though Shī‘ah Muslims had more limited encounters with
the “infidels.”18
In general, early Shī‘ah jurists’ replicating the codes of external Jihād from their
Sunnī colleagues has had limited relevance to Shī‘ah community; for the prime metaphor
of martyrdom in Shī‘ah Islam came from the death of the third Imām, Ḥusayn.19 As
mentioned before, his martyrdom did not happen in a Jihād with the “infidels.” Instead, it
was a group of fellow Muslims who slaughtered Ḥusayn and his companions and
imprisoned the survivors. What has made Ḥusayn’s battle an “exemplary Jihād” in Shī‘ah
Islam –and his martyrdom a “supreme act of sacrifice”– was his struggle against
“injustice.” Ḥusayn’s martyrdom has left a profound imprint on Shī‘ah collective
consciousness. There is arguably no other single incidence in the history of Shī‘ah Islam
that can be compared with what happened in Karbalā in 680 C.E. For over a thousand
years, Shī‘ah Muslims recognize the anniversary of his martyrdom with processions and
17

See, for instance, Bennison, Amira K. (2009). The Great Caliphs: The Golden Age of the ‘Abbasid
Empire. London: I.B.Tauris & Co. This is, of course, not to dismiss the important Shī‘ī contributions during
this period or the so-called “Shī‘ah century” from 945 to 1055 C.E. [Ibid. p. 45]. See also Piscatori, James.
(1986). Islam in a World of Nation-States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
18

See Faghfoory, Mohammad H. (forthcoming April 2012). Ethic of War and Peace in Shi‘ite Islam. In G.
M. Reichberg & H. Syse (Eds.), Ethics of War and Peace in World Religions. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
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Ḥusayn and a number of his close companions were killed in 680 C.E. in Karbalā [see Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Sayyid
Muḥammad Ḥusayn. Shi‘ite Islam. pp. 196-200; and Nasr, S. H. et al (Eds.). Expectation of the
Millennium. pp. 45-57].
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mourning while remembering the “extreme injustice” committed against the “Master of
the Martyrs.”20
In regards to the study of Shī‘ī strategic cultures, the story of Ḥusayn created an
important conceptual framework. A central question in studying a people’s strategic
culture is whether they have specific conceptualizations of the notion of security in
contrast to others. For Shī‘ah Muslims, Ḥusayn’s martyrdom has served as a metaphor of
security throughout the centuries. The metaphor, of course, is a peculiar and somewhat
paradoxical understanding of security; for by all worldly and material measures, Ḥusayn
failed in his –political or otherwise– quest. Most of his companions were killed and the
remaining members of his family had to go through a long journey of humiliation at the
hands of their captors. Yet, Shī‘ah Muslims found in such utter insecurity and pain
inflicted upon Ḥusayn a foundation for their understanding of security. While Chapter III
deals with this issue in more detail, the gist of the Shī‘ī attitude was to view Ḥusayn’s
martyrdom as the “ultimate salvation” –leading to a sense of permanent and
“metaphysical security” unachievable through any other means. The utmost insecurity of
death at the hand of an unjust oppressor was deemed the source of greatest security. The
above Shī‘ī understanding of security is clearly articulated in the response that Ḥusayn’s
surviving sister, Zaynab bint ‘Alī21, gave to the Umayyad caliph, Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah22.

20

One of the epithets of Ḥusayn among Shī‘ah Muslims is Sayyid al-Shuhadā’ meaning the “Master of the
Martyrs.” Originally, the exalting epithet belonged to Ḥamzah ibn ‘Abd al-Muṭallib, the Prophet’s beloved
uncle and companion, who had been killed in 625 C.E. in the Battle of Uḥud. Shī‘ah Muslims still use the
title of “Master of the Martyrs” in reference to Ḥamzah ibn ‘Abd al-Muṭallib, albeit rarely.
21

d. 682 C.E.

22

d. 683 C.E.
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Following the Battle of Karbalā, when Zaynab bint ‘Alī and other prisoners of war
entered Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah’s court in Damascus, Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah inquired
Zaynab bint ‘Alī about the sufferings and humiliations she and her family had to go
through. In doing so, Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah also implied the fall of the prisoners from the
Grace of God. Reportedly, Zaynab bint ‘Alī responded that “[in what we have endured] I
did not behold anything but of great beatitude.”23
In the centuries following the Battle of Karbalā, Shī‘ah Muslims went through a
long period of external insecurity and socioeconomic pressure. It is not surprising,
therefore, that they saw the story of Ḥusayn as an extreme version of their own difficult
condition; and that they sought relief in remembering the “ultimate sacrifice” of Ḥusayn.
The story, despite its tragic and sorrowful quality, appeared as a story of hope. It
sanctioned a belief that the utmost insecurity will eventually turns into ultimate and
blissful salvation. It was understood as the fulfillment of the Qur’ānic repeated
promises24 that with each period of difficulty, there shall be a time of comfort –even
though such comfort may come after death.
In the formative period of Shī‘ah Islam, therefore, the notions of Shahādah and
Jihād were developed differently by Shī‘ah Muslims compared to their Sunnī
coreligionists. During the same period, a more pragmatic and practical doctrine of
expediency also appeared due to the forces of reality. The doctrine was called the doctrine
of Taqīyyah –often loosely translated to “precautionary concealment.” Compared to the
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The words of Zaynab bint ‘Alī has been reported in various Shī‘ī sources including ‘Allāmih Majlisī,
Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 45, p. 116.
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See the Qur’ān 94:5 and 94:6.
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doctrine of Shahādah, the doctrine of Taqīyyah was a more proactive response to the
hostile environment. The elaborate theological Shī‘ī edifice around the notion of
Shahādah emerged partly as a reaction to a sociopolitical landscape that seemed to offer
no prospect of security for Shī‘ah community. In response, religious leaders of the
community took refuge in the notion of “metaphysical security” epitomized in Shahādah.
This is not to deny the grounds of Shahādah as a “religious act” in –Shī‘ah– Islam.
Rather, it is to argue that the rise of Shahādah –and the accompanying accommodation of
pain and suffering– in collective consciousness of Shī‘ah community was in part a
reaction to social realities.
In contrast, Taqīyyah was a proactive and finely calculated strategy by a
persecuted people. The word has often been translated as “precautionary concealment” or
“cautionary dissimilation,” which is not precise –although they do convey one of the
commonly understood implications of the term. The more detailed discussion of the
meanings and implications of the term will be presented in Chapter IV following the
seminal contribution of the late Professor Hamid Enayat.25 For the purpose of
introduction, however, it must be said that the term Taqīyyah refers to “commonsense
‘counsel of caution’.”26 The underlying principle behind Taqīyyah is close to Aristotelian
prudence.27 As such, Taqīyyah was a call for caution, deliberation, and sound judgment

25

26

See Enayat, Hamid. (1982). Modern Islamic Political Thoughts. Austin: University of Texas Press.
See Ibid. p. 175.
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The notion of prudence at the heart of the doctrine of Taqīyyah became clear to me through my personal
communications with Professor Mohsen Kadivar during September 2010. I am also indebted to Professor
Farhang Rajaee for an insightful conversation regarding the notion of prudence in Aristotle’s political
philosophy and in Taqīyyah [F. Rajaee, personal communication, July 7, 2011]. For an insightful discussion
of prudence within a different religious context, see Bireley, Robert. (1990). The Counter-Reformation
Prince: Anti-Machiavellianism or Catholic Statecraft in Early Modern Europe. Chapel Hill: University of
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among members of a persecuted minority. The doctrine valued the survival of the Shī‘ah
community as well as Shī‘ah individuals. Furthermore, the drive for survival went
beyond natural instinct and was, implicitly or explicitly, linked to Shī‘ah “philosophy of
existence” –i.e. Wilāyah and Walāyah. If one can view one’s community as a “chosen
community” in the sense of receiving the Grace of God, one can feel a strong religious
duty to protect the community’s survival too.
The introduction of the doctrine of Taqīyyah by Shī‘ah Imāms had immediate
consequences for the Shī‘ah community and its security. According to Shī‘ah Muslims,
the principle of prudence was observed by ‘Alī in his long period of political silence
during the reign of the first three caliphs, whom mainstream Shī‘ah Muslims came to
regard as illegitimate successors to the Prophet. Yet, it was after the catastrophic events of
Karbalā and the slaughters of their third Imām that Shī‘ah community began to reflect
more on the notions of prudence and expediency. The Battle of Karbalā evinced, inter
alia, the extremely precarious hold of Shī‘ah community on survival. If the highly
venerated and respected grandson of the Prophet were not spared, who would, Shī‘ah
Muslims asked. Thus, at the same time that Shī‘ah community began to nurture a
passionate love for Ḥusayn and his “ultimate act of worship,” they also devised a strategy
of survival. The strategy was further elaborated upon by the subsequent Shī‘ah Imāms.
More important than their words, however, the principle of prudent action was
manifested in the behaviors of these later Imāms. Unlike their predecessor, Ḥusayn, they
often treated matters of politics with extreme caution.28 They even treated the avengers of

North Carolina Press.
28

Although this claim generally applies to most of the Shī‘ah Imāms who followed Ḥusayn, there are few
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Ḥusayn with alertness refusing to openly and actively support their military campaigns.
The extreme caution allowed Shī‘ah community to revive after the devastating blow it
had endured in Karbalā. The community grew in number and later Shī‘ah Imāms,
especially the fifth and the sixth Imāms,29 managed to disseminate a large corpus of
theological, legal and juridical teachings. These teachings later on served as one of the
foundations of Shī‘ah jurisprudence.
Not surprisingly, the doctrine of Taqīyyah proved to be a double-edged sword.
The extraordinary possibilities embedded in it called for a balancing force against
potential misuse. The central question was the “proper” application of Taqīyyah, or what
may be called “principled Taqīyyah.” In Shī‘ah theology, there are several provisions
regarding the religiously sanctioned practice of Taqīyyah. The most important balancer
against the forces of expediency released by the doctrine of Taqīyyah, however, has been
the example of the Shī‘ah patriarch, ‘Alī. He is generally praised by Shī‘ah Muslims as a
“man of principle,” a saint who refused to “compromise his values” for the sake of
expediency and practical calculations. Additional discussion on ‘Alī’s legacy of
“principled action” and its resulting paradigm in Shī‘ah Islam can be found in Chapter IV.
Following Chapter V on Wilāyah and Walāyah, Chapter VI offers the concluding remarks
for this dissertation by putting together the doctrines of Shahādah and Taqīyyah within
the central Shī‘ah ontology of Wilāyah and Walāyah.

exceptions. Arguably the most important exception to this generalization is the seventh Imām, Mūsā ibn
Ja‘far, also known by his epithet al-Kāẓim (744 – 799 C.E.), who was more politically active and, as a
result, spent many years in the prison of the Abbasid caliph.
29

These are Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī, also known by his epithet al-Bāqir (677 – 732 C.E.) and Ja‘far ibn
Muḥammad, also known by his epithet al-Ṣādiq (702 – 765 C.E.).
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Theoretical Framework and Methodology
Following the above overview of the structure of this dissertation, I will briefly
identify the theoretical framework of this research based on the prominent schools of
thought in International Relations. Theoretically speaking, this dissertation has a hybrid
framework. It tries to follow a combination of “neo-traditionalist” (or “neoclassical”)
Realism30 on the one hand and rule-oriented Constructivism31 on the other. The two-sided
framework allows me to take into account both the role of ideas and the forces of
realities; for it appears to be problematic to give prominence to one at the expense of the
other –at least when it comes to Shī‘ah history. Whether ideas are more influential in
shaping the reality or vice versa may depend on the specific time and place the two
collide. Nevertheless, a combination of Neoclassical Realism and Constructivism seems
to provide the flexibility needed to understand the complexities abundant in Shī‘ah
political theology. The combination accommodates how the social reality of being a
minority was translated into certain ideas and doctrines in Shī‘ah Islam –e.g. the original
elaboration of the doctrine of Shahādah or the proactive response in the doctrine of
Taqīyyah. It also explains how certain ideas and doctrines in Shī‘ah Islam have changed
the social reality –e.g. the impacts of the notion of prudence at the heart of the doctrine of
30

For more information on “neo-traditionalist” or “neoclassical” Realism, see Lobell, S. E., Ripsman, N.
M., & Taliaferro, J. W. (Eds.). (2009). Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; Cozette, Murielle. (2008). What Lies Ahead: Classical Realism on the Future
of International Relations. International Studies Review, 10, 667-679; Rose, Gideon. (1998). Neoclassical
Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. World Politics, 51(1), 144-172; and Vasquez, John A. (1998). The
Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
31

See Onuf, Nicholas. (1989). World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International
Relations. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. See also Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. (Spring 2002).
Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or Rereading. International Studies
Review, 4(1), 73-97.
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Taqīyyah or, in modern times, the consequential revival of and revisions in the doctrine of
Shahādah. As such, Neoclassical Realism/Constructivism seems to be an effective
theoretical framework to understand the swirl of ideas and reality in Shī‘ah history as
well as the inevitable complexities and, at times, contradictions.
Neoclassical Realism may be considered as the return of Classical Realism
following the relative decline of reductionist Neorealism in International Relations.
Neoclassical Realism revives the emphasis on a more reflective mode of research in
which human nature, history, and their interactions are taken seriously. Such an
Augustinian-Niebuhrian sensitivity makes it possible to appreciate the complexities
surrounding human existence and human conditions.32 For its ability to accommodate
complexities, Classical Realism is potentially capable of conducting “Phenomenological
studies”33 of religions and religious beliefs in international relations. Conducting such a
task seems to be more difficult within the rationalistic framework of Neorealism or that
of Liberalism. Many examples, including Morgenthau’s reference to certain religious
aspects of international relations and the notion of “tragedy,” indicate Classical Realism’s
dormant capacities in this regard.34 In addition to its reflective mode of research, the
study of ethics and the engagement of normative questions in Classical Realism35 provide
32

See Niebuhr, Reinhold. (1932). Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics. New
York: Charles Scribner’s.
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See the following Chapter for more discussion.
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See, for instance, Morgenthau’s trilogy of human nature including the “biological,” “rational,” and
“spiritual” aspects, as well as his pessimism regarding the potential of rationality and the promises of
modernity [see Morgenthau, Hans J. (1946). Scientific Man vs Power Politics. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press].

35

See, for instance, Carr, E. H. (2001). The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of
International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
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the necessary, albeit primitive, foundation for the study of religion in international
relations. The question of norms relates to the second element of my theoretical
framework, namely norm-oriented Constructivism.36
Despite important potential of Classical Realism in terms of understanding
normative questions, this school of thought has yet to offer a systematic framework for
addressing such questions. The challenge of addressing normative questions is where the
contributions of Constructivism in general and rule-oriented Constructivism in particular
are significant. Except for Neorealism, there is arguably no other school of thought in
International Relations that offers a solid “theoretical system” as rule-oriented
Constructivism does.37 The Constructivist theoretical system is based on a well-thoughtout set of concepts and a clear pattern of interaction among those concepts. When it
comes to the study of religion in International Relations, therefore, I share with
Kubálková that rule-oriented Constructivism is more capable of understanding religion
compared to other Constructivist or non-Constructivist schools of thought.38 As explained
36

I use norm-oriented Constructivism and rule-oriented Constructivism interchangeably. In an analytically
insightful review of Constructivism, Burch differentiates between the two and names the works of scholars
such as Ruggie and Finnemore as examples of norm-oriented Constructivists and those of theorists such as
Onuf and Kratochwill as examples of rule-oriented Constructivists. One perceivable difference is the notion
of identity, which Onuf is reluctant to use. Though insightful, however, the distinction does not seem to be
decisive. Within rule-oriented Constructivism, norms can still be accommodated as less formal rules. In
addition, resorting to the notion of identity is not always necessary to explain the effects of norms/rules on
social agents as Onuf’s notion of “rule/Rule” seems to deliver a similar function. In any case, I borrow
from both rule-oriented and norm-oriented versions of Constructivism in my research. See Burch, Kurt.
(2002). Toward a Constructivist Comparative Politics. In Daniel Green (Ed.), Constructivism and
Comparative Politics (pp. 60-87). New York: M. E. Sharpe; Ruggie, John G. (1998). Constructing the
World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization. New York: Routledge; Finnemore, Martha.
(1996). National Interests in International Society. New York: Cornell University Press; Onuf, Nicholas.
World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations; and Kratochwil,
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International Relations and Domestic Affairs. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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Palgrave Macmillan.

20

before, it is also the closest theoretical framework in International Relations to the
Phenomenological approach I am pursuing in my research. I will not use Neorealism and
Liberalism due to their inherent positivism and behavioralism, which render them less
capable of understanding religious phenomena. I also will not use Wendt’s Structural
Constructivism due to the disabling ambiguity of the notion of “structure” at the heart of
his theory.39 It is not, in other words, clear to me how one can devise a research question
using Wendt’s rather nebulous notion of structure.
Since the topic of my research is the evolution of the notion of security in Shī‘ah
history and Shī‘ah theology, I use historical analysis of the overall changes in material
conditions of Shī‘ah Muslims in parallel to discourse analysis of their theological works.
Historical analysis is the favorite method of Classical/Neoclassical Realism while
discourse analysis is more at home with Constructivism. Indeed, theological discourses
both reflect and affect material conditions. Therefore, the two methods are in constant
dialogue here and are not dealt with separately. I will use discourse analysis to review the
relevant concepts in selected texts40 of Shī‘ah Islam –including the primary sources such
as the Qur’ān and the Ḥadīth collections, as well as the secondary sources such as
exegesis on the Qur’ān and jurisprudential treatises by prominent Shī‘ah Fuqahā (i.e.
jurists). The historical analysis will be used to better understand the relevant practices in
the history of Shī‘ah Islam.
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See Wendt, Alexander. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. New York: Cambridge University
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In terms of specific texts used in this research, the works of some prominent
Shī‘ah Fuqahā have been of particular importance.41 These figures include –but are not
limited to– Muḥammad ibn Bābawayh (Shaykh al-Ṣadūq), al-Sharīf al-Raḍī, Shaykh alMufīd, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī, Aḥmad ibn Idrīs alḤillī, Muḥaqqiq Ḥillī, ‘Allāmih Ḥillī, Muḥammad ibn Makkī (Shahīd al-Awwal),
Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī, Shahīd al-Thānī, Muḥaqqiq al-Ardabīlī, Mullā Muḥsin Fiyḍ
Kāshānī, al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Fāḍil Hindī, Ja‘afar Kāshif al-Ghiṭā’, Mullā
Aḥmad Narāqī, Shaykh al-Anṣārī, and Ṣāḥib al-Jawāhir.
From a certain perspective, the present dissertation is a humble addition to the late
Professor Hamid Enayat’s Modern Islamic Political Thought. While Professor Enayat
addressed some central questions in Political Theory of Shī‘ah and Sunnī Islam, I hope to
contribute to our knowledge of Shī‘ah Islam by addressing some related questions in the
field of Strategic Studies. Indeed Enayat briefly addresses notions such as Shahādah and
Taqīyyah in his important work. He does so, however, within the framework of political
theory and political ideas. Given its relevance and importance, his foundational work has
been reviewed and discussed in Chapters II, III, IV and V.42 On the basis of his initial
thoughts and contributions, I will try to shed some more lights on the strategic
consequences of these political doctrines, their historical and theological backgrounds,
and their essential and strategic connection to the notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah.
41

I am indebted to Professor Mohsen Kadivar for his help in identifying the key figures among classical
Shī‘ah jurists and theologians in regard to the subject of this dissertation [M. Kadivar, personal
communication, September 22, 2010].
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contribution. Through a number of conversations regarding this dissertation in 2011, Professor Rajaee
helped me to better understand the essential relationship between the present research in the field of
Strategic Studies and Professor Enayat’s foundational work in the field of Political Theory.
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CHAPTER II
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
Given the multidisciplinary nature of the research question in my dissertation,
different bodies of literature have been examined. In particular, I review the literature on
religion produced by the International Relations discipline as the literature for which my
research is a case study. I then explore parts of the Security Studies literature within
International Relations to further contextualize my study. In fact the notion of strategic
cultures comes from this subset of International Relations literature and the study of
strategic culture in Shī‘ah Islam lies within an emerging strategic culture literature. The
main interlocutors of my research are, therefore, those scholars in the field of strategic
culture studies in International Relations discipline. In a larger context, however, my
study belongs to Political Science literature and not that of Religious Studies, although
some of the relevant Religious Studies literature on Shī‘ah Islam must be engaged. The
related Religious Studies literature, however, have been used within the theoretical
frameworks of International Relations. In fact, one of the contributions of this dissertation
is to convey and represent some of the Religious Studies literature on Shī‘ah Islam to
scholars of International Relations in an accessible fashion.
It is also important to emphasize that my dissertation is strictly narrowed to the
study of the majority Twelver Shī‘ah Islam and not other versions of Shī‘ah Islam such as
the Ismā‘īlīs or Zaydīs. In other words, whenever the term Shī‘ah is used in this
dissertation, it refers to Twelver Shī‘ah unless otherwise specified. Some of the general
results of my study, however, may be cautiously extended to other branches of Shī‘ah
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Islam. In addition, in order to better understand specificity of the Twelver Shī‘ī doctrines
and practices, references may be made to relevant arguments in other –Sunnī or Shī‘ah–
branches of Islam whenever necessary.
International Relations: Religion and Secularism
There is a challenge associated with any study of religion conducted within the
framework of the modern Social Sciences. The challenge arises from the fact that these
sciences are generally secular in their paradigms. As one of the products of the
Enlightenment, the modern Social Sciences followed the powerful convictions of that age
about the fate of religions. The influential thinkers of the Enlightenment understood
Christianity and, by extension, other religions of the world as fading phenomena
belonging to the past. Religions were, at worst, collections of pre-modern man’s distorted
view of the world he lived in or, at best, a necessary stage of man’s “progress” towards
modernity. As a result, the rise of the Enlightenment had rendered this pre-modern stage
an obsolete one. The modernist faith arguably relied on two assumptions about the
function of religions and on the two associated developments in Europe. The first
projected function of religions was to provide men with explanation of the world. With
the emergence of the European scientific revolution in the centuries that preceded the
Enlightenment and with the success of the experimental modern sciences in explaining
the world, it was only reasonable for the Enlightenment philosophers to question the
ability of religions in explaining how the world worked.43 The second presumed function
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of religion was to serve as a foundation for individual and collective identities. With the
Church in disarray after the Reformation and the rise of powerful nationalism and the
modern nation-states, this function was also fulfilled by other non-religious entities.
Nationality began to supersede religious ties in defining men’s allegiances. These two
developments, i.e. scientific revolution and the rise of the modern nation-states, led to the
relative demise of Christianity in Europe. Yet, despite the prediction of the “progressive”
Enlightenment thinkers, the rest of the world did not follow the suit. Not only have
religions not disappeared from our social scenery, some of the major events of the second
half of the twentieth century can only be understood as a comeback of religions to the
fore. As a result, many scholars of modern Social Sciences have begun to reconsider
some tenets of the prevailing secular worldview. Despite the scholarly efforts to
accommodate the revival of religions, the academic Social Sciences are not yet a fully
open environment for studying religious phenomena. Study of religions is even more
challenging when it comes to International Relations, arguably the most secular of all
Social Sciences. As mentioned above, the relative demise of Christianity and the
disappearance of God as a point of reference in Europe from the sixteenth century
onward has been one of the permissible causes of the rise of the modern nation-states. In
fact, some scholars of International Relations consider the modern nation-states as
modern secular gods and nationalism as a modern secular religion.44 Therefore,
International Relations emerged as a secular discipline by default due to the secular
nature of the object of its study. The historical trajectory, in turn, renders studies on
religion in International Relations particularly challenging.
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Despite all the difficulties, there appeared a surge in a new type of literature on
religion in International Relations after the end of the Cold War. As Berger argues, this
emerging literature questioned “[t]he [validity of the] proposition that modernity
necessarily leads to a decline of religion.”45 As a result, many International Relations
scholars involved themselves in the discussion of religion while not quite comfortable in
doing so. Wallerstein’s analysis is a sample outcome of such a situation. While
acknowledging the gap in the scholarship and the necessity of inclusion of religion, he
appears to maneuver around the difficult how questions.46 The wary accommodation of
religious phenomena in International Relations might be an indication of still-deep
attachments to secularized paradigms. In fact, Berger claims that there are two exceptions
to the “desecularization” of the world today. One is Western Europe and the other is
students with “Western-type higher education […] in the humanities and social
sciences.”47
The now undisputed argument about the necessity to take religions into account
does not provide us with much insight anymore. The more difficult question is how to
take religions into account. Here, most of the literature in International Relations seems
to be ambiguous in its approaches. An example of this ambiguity may be found in the
analysis put forward by Fox and Sandler.48 The authors argue for the necessity of adding
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religion to Realism for religion has an important legitimizing function for governments
and for their policies. Furthermore, religion plays a significant role in local conflicts, and
in contrast to the Enlightenment presumptions, it is still a fundamental source of
“identity.” Yet, the lack of a clear vision on how to include religion in the study of
international relations seems to have led to the authors’ acknowledgment of the
methodological and epistemological deficiencies. They conclude that their book “leaves
us with as many questions as answers”49 in regards to the study of religion. Fox and
Sandler’s conclusion is in no way uncommon as many of the works on religion in
International Relations indicate similar methodological and epistemological uncertainties.
A part of the problem in secular studies of religion arises from traditional secular
convictions. Hurd, for instance, claims that, “[t]o seal its claim to moral superiority,
secularism denominates ‘religion’ as the domain of the violent, the irrational, the
undemocratic, [and] the ‘other’.”50 Hurd also provides a brief historiography of the
concept of the “secular” in the West and argues that secularism is intertwined with the
notion of “taking possession.” According to Hurd, “in the Westphalian era, the term ‘to
secularize’ referred specifically to the laicization of church lands.”51 As such, secularism
has had, from its origin, certain totalitarian potential and tendencies. In a similar vein,
Esposito examines some cases of historical ties between secularism on the one hand and
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suppression and dictatorship on the other.52 Built upon her assessment of secularism and
its “aggressive” nature, Hurd questions the secularist hegemony in International
Relations.53
At the same time, one must not ignore or underrate certain secularist innovations
to accommodate study of religious phenomena within the secular framework of the
modern Social Sciences. Casanova, for instance, offers a nuanced understanding of the
challenges secularization is facing in the West.54 He aims to understand and
accommodate the role of religion in the public sphere within the framework of modern
secularization project. To do this, secularization itself must be revisited, Casanova argues.
He differentiates between three elements of the concept. The first element is the
Enlightenment premise that religious beliefs and practices are declining as a result of lack
of validity and thus relevance. The second element of secularization is what one may call
the French perspective, or laïcité, which emphasizes the public-private dichotomy. Laïcité
then brushes religion and religious practices to the latter sphere. The last is the AngloSaxon approach that revolves around the separation of political authority, i.e. the state, on
the one hand and the religious authority, i.e. the church, on the other. According to
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Casanova, the first element has been falsified in many parts of the world –though it is
arguably still valid in Western Europe.55 The second element, on the other hand, fails to
understand religions’ public roles. It is, therefore, the last element that is the central pillar
of modern secularization according to Casanova. It is also this last element that offers a
viable solution in secular study of religions and public religiosity. Following the AngloSaxon interpretation of secularization, one may defend the public role of religions while
remaining faithful to the basic tenets of secularization.56
Geertz’s approach is also an example of secularist novelty to study religion
without abandoning secular premises. By defining religion as a “cultural system,” Geertz
is opening the possibility of Huntingtonian treatment of religion where religion is
subsumed in a rather nebulous notion of civilization or culture. Geertz defines religion as
“(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful,
pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3)
formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4)
clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the
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moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.” 57 (emphasis in the
original)
The definition is cautiously articulated so that it allows Geertz to “take religions
seriously” while remaining within the boundaries of secularism. In particular, the notion
of religious symbols being “clothed” in “an aura of factuality,” which seems to be the
implicit consensus in the secular academia, is pronounced here following the reference to
the “long-lasting” power of such symbols.
Given the above general context, the diverse jargon of the emerging literature on
the subject of religion in International Relations may be organized within four
conceivable frameworks. These, in the order of divergence from the basic premises of
modernism, include the Enlightenment, Identity, Phenomenological and Traditionalist
approaches.
The first possible analytical framework is the classic modern stance. The
Enlightenment approach asserts that religions are to fade away –at least from the public
sphere. As such, religions gradually become of lesser significance in social analyses. It is
an Auguste Comte approach in which it is assumed that humanity is “growing out of
religion.” The Enlightenment approach seems to have been the mainstream perspective
towards the study of religion in International Relations until recently when the events of
the last couple of decades forced many scholars of International Relations and Political
Sciences to search for alternative analytical frameworks.58 The search has led to the
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emergence of a literature in International Relations that follows the Identity approach and
–to a lesser extent– the Phenomenological approach.
The second analytical framework is the Identity approach in which religion is
acknowledged as a subjective force with certain objective manifestation such as rituals.
This subjective force partially shapes the identity and thus behavior of social actors
interacting with it. The Identity approach is arguably close to Durkheim’s sociology of
religion in which religion is a socially constructed reality serving to orient individuals
and societies.59 In the Identity approach, religion is often seen as a phenomenon similar to
ethnicity. Religion could be used, for instance, as an instrument at the disposal of political
actors to legitimize their actions or to mobilize the masses. By avoiding deep engagement
of religions, the Identity approach dodges some difficult questions. In particular, it
overlooks the theoretical challenge that the rise of religions has posed to the discipline of
International Relations. In International Relations, therefore, the Identity approach
towards religion remains essentially “functionalist,” i.e. sensitive to political functions of
religion in international politics. Religions are seen as one of the compartments of the
“identity structure” and as such, they can be measured and analyzed by associated and
manifested behaviors. Arguably one of the most influential pieces on International
Relations and religion, The Clash of Civilizations, follows this approach.60 Huntington
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borrows the term from the prominent “Orientalist,” Bernard Lewis.61 Lewis employs
civilizational conceptualization62 to understand the Muslim world. In fact, The Clash of
Civilization may be seen as an example of the “Orientalist” literature63 in International
Relations. More nuanced versions of the Identity approach can be found in the literature
in which religions are seen as the foundation of normative power for certain actors. In
Shi‘a Revival, for instance, Vali Nasr takes such an instrumentalist approach towards
religion.64 Within the Identity approach, it is a frequent solution to view religion as an
ideology, so that religion can be treated in the same way that nationalism has been
analyzed. The appeal of the Identity approach is that the reduction of religion to ideology
obviates the necessity of difficult theoretical and methodological innovations. The same
concepts and methods that have been employed in understanding ideologies, or ethnicity,
can now be applied to a new “case,” namely religion. The Identity approach seems also to
be the favorite approach for scholars who tend to think within the (neo)Realist frame of
thought in International Relations. For this group of scholars, accommodation of non61
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material forces is not always unproblematic. Furthermore, the Identity approach is
compatible with the Constructivism of the type Wendt advocated;65 for this version of
Constructivism engages the concept of identity and that of culture.
In addition to Wendt’s Constructivism, scholars writing within the Identity
approach sometimes engage Classical Realism as a potentially capable theoretical
perspective to understand religion in international relations. Writing in the aftermath of
September 11 terrorist attacks, Keohane begins with the argument that “[w]e need to
synthesize insights from classical realism, institutionalism, and Constructivism, but we
also need to take alternative worldviews—including religious ones—more seriously.”66
His analysis shows the angle via which an Identity approach tackles the question of
religion. Keohane justifies the use of Classical Realism in studying religious worldviews
because, according to him, Classical Realism “takes very seriously the human desires to
dominate or to hate.”67
Thomas explores religion and international conflict by viewing religion as, inter
alia, “a form of ideology,” “a form of identity,” “a form of ‘soft power’,” and as –rather
ambiguous notions of– “civilization or culture area.”68 One may argue that the broad and
uncertain analytical framework behind these many descriptions characterizes the Identity
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approach. The next step is to discuss “[t]he religious challenge to international society”69
caused by the confrontation of “strong religions” versus “weak states.” Hence, Thomas’s
analysis may be considered as a mainstream example of the Identity literature on religion
in International Relations.70 Once again, the author calls for “taking religion seriously”
and declares that the twentieth century was “the last modern century.”71 This is in line
with Gellner’s implicit dismissal of “non-fundamentalist” religiosities as inconsequential
while making a scathing attack against “nihilist” postmodernism.72 Gellner paints a world
in which three forces of “religious fundamentalism,” “rationalist fundamentalism,” and
“relativist postmodernism” compete with each other. His analysis of Muslim
“fundamentalism” offers some fresh, albeit debatable, insights. Yet, it is the convenient
comparison of categorically disparate phenomena such as religions and “scientific
methods”73 that appears problematic in Gellner’s work. In his argument against the “end
of modernity,” Thomas also follows such clear-cut categorizations and convenient
comparisons. Thomas claims that the weakening of modern sociopolitical structures is
caused by a deepening identity dilemma;
“Ernest Gellner has argued that since the period of colonial
occupation the developing countries have been confronted with a
69
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dilemma: should they emulate the West and spurn their own culture
in order to gain equality in power, or should they affirm their own
cultural and religious traditions but remain materially weak?”74
In line with Asad’s criticism of Geertz’s notion of “religion as a cultural system,”75
Thomas believes that in response to the above identity dilemma, religiosity has changed
in certain parts of the world. For instance, a new –privatized– religion has been
“invented” in order to serve modern nation-states through shaping “the identity of the
community.”76 It must be mentioned, however, that along with his mainly identity-based
argument, Thomas examines the ethical cores of major religious traditions in the world as
well. These ethical cores, according to Thomas’s phenomenological observation, have
noticeable potential for shaping international relations. The phenomenological analysis
leads Thomas to write about religions’ potential roles in promoting peace or fighting
poverty.
A similar oscillation between the Identity approach and the Phenomenological
approach77 can be found in Thomas’s other works.78 The author recognizes the crisis of
modernity and the role played by the quest for “authenticity” in response to that crisis.
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Thomas views this quest as one of the forces behind the worldwide rise of religions. To
the extent that Thomas’s analysis strives to “rethink” the interaction of religion on the one
hand and international cooperation, diplomacy, international conflicts, development, and
democracy on the other, the work tilts towards the Phenomenological approach. The
content of this rethinking, however, is not far from the Identity approach; for the
emerging turn towards faith, Thomas argues, is the result of the “search for authentic
identity, meaning and economic development.”79 The significance of religions in
international relations, therefore, remains tied to the provision of transnational identity
and soft power.
A number of scholars writing within the Identity approach have focused on the
study “fundamentalism” instead of religions. One prime example of this is the Chicago
Fundamentalism Project. Defined as an attempt by “true believers [...] to arrest the
erosion of religious identity,” fundamentalism is understood by Almond and Appleby as a
response to securitization of religion.80 Reporting the findings of the Chicago Project,
Almond and Appleby review a variety of arguably disparate phenomena under the same
rubric of fundamentalism. The authors acknowledge the limitations of using the term
“fundamentalism.” Yet, they go on to explain the increasing visibility of different
religions by resorting to the notion of “enclave culture.” The conceptual reduction allows
Almond and Appleby to associate various, otherwise dissimilar, challenges together.
Moreover, by building their analysis of religions in international relations around the
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notion of “enclave cultures,” Almond and Appleby formulate the problématique of
religion for International Relations as an enclave one. They seem to take for granted
secularization as the status quo order of the world “attacked by strong religions.”
Antoun also uses the term fundamentalism to identify an “orientation” that fights
against the “ideology of modernism.”81 Here, fundamentalism appears as an identity
bastion. Antoun analyzes his anthropological observations in Jordan to pinpoint what he
believes are the essential characters of fundamentalism, namely traditioning, totalism,
activism,

scripturalism,

search

for

purity,

selective

modernization,

controlled

acculturation, and perception of history as good-evil struggle. Similar to the
cultural/civilizational approach of Huntington, however, the definition appears to be
nebulous and the conceptual boundaries of the notion of fundamentalism remain underdefined in some of these characteristics.
As noted above, some scholars of the Identity approach tend to ideologize
religions. Juergensmeyer, for instance, argues that the world is experiencing a rise of
ethnic “religious nationalism” against secular states. This is partly a result of the crisis
and failure of secular versions of nationalism in fulfilling ethno-national demands.82
“Religious nationalism” in turn leads to a “new Cold War” according to him.83 This type
of nationalism is the “ideology [that] combines traditional religious beliefs in divine law
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and religious authority with the modern notion of the nation-state.”84 The turn to religion
was, according to Juergensmeyer, an attempt “to build a “postcolonial” national
identity”85 at the time when the newly born countries strived for an enduring foundation
for the definition of the self. On the basis of the above analysis, Juergensmeyer concludes
that the problem is not a religious but a political one. The treatment of religion as
primarily a competing ideology continues to shape Juergensmeyer’s later works on
religious violence. For instance, he employs a rather contradictory notion of “cosmic
war”86 waged by terrorists and emphasizes its “theatrical power” in impressing the
terrorists’ audience.87 Along with his Identity approach, Juergensmeyer does sometimes
engage phenomenological observations. He does so in particular to understand the
mindset of those involved in acts of religious violence. These phenomenological
observations also allow him to identify some of the socioeconomic contexts of such
violent acts. For instance, he believes that social isolation and loss of agency are among
the forces shaping the socioeconomic contexts of terrorism.88 Juergensmeyer’s working
compromise between the Identity approach and phenomenological observations
eventually leads to his rather counterintuitive conclusion that “[t]he cure for religious
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violence may ultimately lie in a renewed appreciation for religion itself”89 or, in other
words, in employing religions’ potential to contain their potentially harmful tendencies.
The third approach is the Phenomenological one, which studies religions with
methodological “empathy.” The notion of methodological empathy is related to Weber’s
notion of “empathy.”90 It highlights the necessity of understanding the religious
“perspectives” in order to understand religious behaviors and identities. The
Phenomenological approach is also in line with the phenomenological movement in
philosophy.91 One assumption of the Phenomenological approach is that, unless studied
from within, religions cannot be fully understood and explained. Therefore, the
Phenomenological approach takes religions seriously in their own terms but only because
religions have been taken seriously in their own terms by their followers. The
Phenomenological approach strives to understand, as much as possible, what it means to
be a dedicated Muslim, Buddhist, Christian or Hindu. It strives to, in other words,
understand the lived experience of a believer. Compared to the Identity approach, the
Phenomenological approach allows a deeper appreciation of the difficulties involved in
the study of religion and also a better understanding of the new possibilities and
limitations emerging from the rise of religions in international affairs. That is why some
of the more nuanced works on religion in international relations92 belong to the
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Phenomenological approach. The Phenomenological approach is more akin to those
scholars who write and think within the Constructivist school of thought in International
Relations. In fact, Wendt’s notion of “culture” as “shared knowledge affecting identity
and behavior” can also be used in Phenomenological studies, albeit Wendtian
Constructivism seems to be more suitable for the Identity approach discussed above.93
The Phenomenological approach seems to be more comfortable using Onuf’s systematic
Constructivism.94 Here, religion can be seen as a normative system or, as Onuf puts it, a
system of rules.95
Kubálková advocates the development of the subfield of International Political
Theology.96 She maintains that, given the emphasis put by religions on texts and
interpretations, Onuf’s linguistic and rule-oriented Constructivism is the proper analytical
framework for the development of International Political Theology. Besides this
intriguing suggestion, however, her discussion of International Political Theology
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remains, for the most part, on the abstract level. Viewing religion as a speech act,
Kubálková uses a post-positivist secular language to define religion as a “system of rules
(mainly instruction-rules) and related practices, which act to […] explain the meaning of
existence including identity, ideas about self, and one’s position in the world, […] thus
motivating and guiding the behaviour of those who accept the validity of these rules on
faith.”97 Kubálková’s definition, for its emphasis on the function of religions in defining
identity and in guiding behavior, is close to the Identity approach. Yet, the abstract level
of International Political Theology renders Kubálková’s conceptual contribution flexible
enough to be employed by those scholars who conduct phenomenological studies of
religions.
Within the Phenomenological paradigm and in one of the insightful pieces written
on religion in International Relations discipline, Laustsen and Wæver employ the
Copenhagen School of Security Studies to analyze securitization of religion.98 Their
argument begins with taking the orientation common in Identity approach literature on
religion, namely with the inquiry about the link between religions on the one hand and
questions of threat and security on the other. Religion is one of the “sectors” in which a
securitizing agent can perform a securitizing speech act. Acknowledging the limitations
of the identity-based and “functionalist” definition of language, Laustsen and Wæver
argue for the necessity of defining religion in the ways it appear to the believers, i.e. a
phenomenological definition. They use various notions and analyses by Kierkegaard,
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Bataille, and Smart to substantiate such phenomenological definition of religion; and they
argue that such definition must take into account the “doctrinal,” “ritual,”
“mythic/narrative,” “experiential/emotional,” “ethical/legal,” “social,” and “material”
dimensions of the Sacred.99 According to the authors,
“religion has three main dimensions. It has faith as the guiding
principle of discourse. This faith is only possible due to a distinction
between immanent and transcendent, and this distinction is finally
reinterpreted as a distinction between sacred and profane. On the
one hand, the transcendent is interpreted as that which is given by
divine speech, purity, timelessness, supernatural powers, goodness,
benevolence/forgiveness/salvation, and sublimity. […] On the other
hand, the earthly realm is interpreted as characterised by ‘writing’,
impurity, selfishness, constraints by time and space, the ordinary,
evil, egoism/revenge, and the representable/copies. All seven
dimensions propose a way of overcoming this separation of the
earthly and the divine. These mediating practices are scriptures,
rituals,

myths,

miracles,

ethics,

care/community,

and

iconography.”100
The above definition of religion is indeed a broad and comprehensive one. Despite the
phenomenological originality put into this definition of religion, Laustsen and Wæver
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return to the Identity approach when exploring the security linkage between language and
religions. Because of the sacredness of the Sacred, the authors argue, securitization of
religion is almost automatic when a threat to a religion is perceived by the adherents to
that religion. On the other hand, the language of “fundamentalism” is almost inherently a
securitizing language. Finally, Laustsen and Wæver end up with a rather “reductionist”
assertion that the “three main ways religion can be involved in international politics”
include:
“1. A religious group is considered to be a threat to the survival of
the state. 2. Faith is seen as threatened by whoever or whatever ‘nonreligious’ actor or process (states, technology, industrialism,
modernism, etc.). 3. Faith is seen as threatened by another religious
discourse or actor.”101
In other words, there seems to be a disconnect between the authors’ extensive effort to
define religion in phenomenological terms in the first part, and the analysis of
securitization of religion in the second part of their argument. The definition seems to
remain almost insignificant in the analysis.
As noted above, the use of the term “fundamentalism” has not been limited to the
scholars writing within the Identity approach. Karen Armstrong, for instance, uses it in
reference to “embattled forms of spirituality.”102 Combined with her Phenomenological
approach in studying religion, the above conceptualization of “fundamentalism” allows
Armstrong to contextualize the phenomenon within the broader trend of the rise of
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religions. It must be noted, however, that the Phenomenological approach began with the
larger question of the crisis of secularization.103 Therefore, the Phenomenological
approach tends to treat “fundamentalism” as only one of the extreme manifestations of a
deeper and more consequential transformation happening in the social world. As a result,
the Phenomenological approach sometimes views the role played by religion for
believers as one of protection. Religious beliefs, religious rituals, and religious
communities are assumed to function as a “Sacred Canopy”104 shielding the believers
against subjective horrors of modernity –for instance nihilism and the crisis of meaning
of life and that of suffering– as well as protecting them against objective pains and
sufferings abundant in life. This role implies certain social dynamics and political
consequences at the time when secularization appears to be in retreat.105
The methodological “empathy” towards religion among some Phenomenological
scholars has also led to the emergence of a literature on the “constructive” side of the rise
of religion. Gopin argues optimistically about the potential of common values among
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world religions.106 These values include “empathy,” “pacifism,” “sanctity of life,”
“compassion,” and “discipline.”107 Such commonalities, Gopin argues, could serve as a
foundation for conflict resolution and peacemaking.108 In the same vein and with a
“leftist” twist, Falk argues for the potential benefits in the resurgence of religion in
controlling the unleashed forces of globalization; and, by invoking the example of
Gandhi, in helping to create a global ethical order, a “humane global government.”109
Unlike scholars writing within the Identity approach, those working within the
Phenomenological framework have, thus, begun to question the validity of secularist
dogmas in the Social Sciences. Despite this questioning, however, they rarely make a
radical departure from the secular premises of the Social Sciences. In fact, Enlightenment
“functionalism” can still be recognized in the Phenomenological literature. A common
theme here is the call to engage religious creeds emphasizing social justice and human
dignity for the betterment of the world. Religions appear as useful instruments towards
achieving secular objectives. At the bottom line, both the Identity approach and the
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Phenomenological approach can become “instrumentalist,” the former by seeing religion
as a destabilizing instrument available to potentially anti-status-quo political actors; the
latter by viewing religion as a potentially beneficial instrument at the disposal of statusquo political leaders or mainstream reformers. It must be noted that the discussion of the
potential benefits of engaging religions in the Phenomenological literature has sometimes
been balanced with the acknowledgment of the evidence of the dangers posed by
religious revival to world security and prosperity.
Seiple and Hoover follow the Phenomenological approach in investigating the
nexus of security and religion.110 The contributors to this edited volume cover, among
other aspects, the potential social values of religion –especially those within the
Abrahamic family– in contributing to issues such as promotion of peace or human
dignity. The notion of “religious freedom” is a recurring theme in the book and it has
even been tied to national, regional, and international security. Jean Elshtain goes as far
to argue for “military intervention […] guided by, not narrow realpolitik, nor by naïve
humanitarianism, but by religiously grounded philosophy of justice as equal regard”
(emphasis in the text).111 Along similar lines, Johnston and Sampson have edited a
collection of articles on conflict resolution mechanisms and potential offered by world
religions.112 The Phenomenological approach as presented in Johnston and Sampson’s
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volume stands in stark contrast to the Enlightenment approach. It acknowledges various
historical and social roles played by religion and asserts that such roles should be
welcomed in the future. Cases of contributions of religion to conflict resolution,
peacemaking, and peacekeeping are presented as the evidence, according to the authors,
for such an embrace. Eventually, the authors of this edited volume try to re-introduce the
“religious dimension of statecraft,” which implies that besides war, great powers, balance
of power, diplomacy, and international law, one should add religion as the sixth pillar of
the “international society.”113
Oscillating between the Identity and the Phenomenological approaches, Norris
and Inglehart use statistics and argue that religiosity is correlated with the level of
perceived security –or insecurity.114 Security, according to Norris and Inglehart, is
defined in terms of basic human security, which means access to the essential means of
survival and a minimum level of welfare. Taking refuge in religion, therefore, is a
reaction to the perceived insecurity of a world that is filled with poverty, hunger, and
disease. In a sense, despite their secular undertone and their consequential dismissal of
the meaning-of-life crisis in the secularized world, Norris and Inglehart come close to
explaining one of the key functions of religion, namely to offer a shelter from
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unavoidable contingencies of life. Their argument in International Relations parallels
Berger’s argument in Sociology of Religion.115
The last approach comes from Traditionalism, or Perennialism, in Religious
Studies. Traditionalism has by and large been marginalized in Social Sciences literature.
The prominent Traditionalists such as René Guénon, Frithjof Schuon, Ananda
Coomaraswamy, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Titus Burckhardt, Martin Lings and Huston Smith
are unique in modern academia for they take religions seriously on their own terms.116
Furthermore, they treat religions or, as they often called them, religious Traditions not
only as a subjective force shaping actors’ identity and behaviors, but also –and more
importantly according to these authors– as an objective reality. In other words,
Traditionalists stand in sharp contrast to the cardinal premises of the secularized modern
Social Sciences and indeed modernity itself. For the most part of history, according to
Traditionalists, humankind believed in the existence of parallel unseen universes along
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with our visible and tangible world. Mankind also moved ahead, according to these
scholars, and developed a variety of discourses to explain the relationship between the
various universes. On the basis of these discourses and doctrines, man also “discovered”
a variety of practices and techniques to engage the metaphysical forces of the other
worlds. These techniques were sometimes in such a way that their employment would
leave certain visible and tangible marks on the “physical” world.
Modern Social Sciences have in general remained silent about the possibility of
the existence of such unseen metaphysical structures in the world. In contrast,
Traditionalists call for the necessity of opening up to such a possibility. They insist that
religions are built around a “real system” that lies beyond human capacity to be fully
understood. Evidently, the current ethos of modern Social Sciences is reluctant to take
such drastic strides away from the convenient secularized academia. The reluctance
might be one of the reasons why Traditionalism, despite more than a century of extensive
academic scholarship, remains rather marginalized in the modern academia in the West.
At the same time, the core shortcomings of the secular Social Sciences in the study of
religions, Traditionalists argue, lie in their hesitation, or inability, to accommodate a
Traditionalist perspective.
According to Traditionalists, the disagreement between the secular foundations of
the modern Social Sciences on the one hand and religions on the other relates to the
Christian background of these Sciences. They argue that an implicit assumption of the
modern Social Sciences projects Christianity as the generic religion and its history and
fate as the generic history and fate of other religions. The decline of religious observance
in Western Europe, therefore, was interpreted as the inevitable future of other religions.
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According to Traditionalists, by remaining caught in Western Europe’s experience in
regards to religion, the modern Social Sciences have become structurally and
psychologically less able to understand the revival of religion. In particular, these
Sciences have missed the relative inconsequentiality of the fall of Christianity in Europe
for different religious traditions in other parts of the world or even for Christianity in
other places. The rather unique stances taken by Traditionalists on issues related to
religious traditions have deterred some scholars from engaging in a serious conversation
with them. As a result, the Phenomenological approach seems to be the closest modern
Social Sciences can get comfortably to a more or less comprehensive study of religion.
Besides these four general approaches, there exists also a body of literature in
International Relations that aims at tracing modern secular institutions such as the state
back to its religious roots –and particularly to the religious doctrines of the preEnlightenment era. The well-known literature on the Christian roots of Just War theory
and secular jus in bello and jus ad bellum and the Augustinian legacy as well as the
reference to and the revival of the Natural Law tradition in International Relations are
some prominent examples of such literature.117 There is also the Schmittian literature on
political theology, which interprets sovereignty as an institution of secular divinity. This
literature also takes “the concept of the political” to a whole new level in which “the
political” is deemed as an existential backbone of man’s identity.118 Following this
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Schmittian tradition, Carlson and Owen deal with post-9/11 sovereignty and the roles
religion could play in armed conflicts, military intervention, globalization, justice and
human rights.119 The dichotomy of the sacred versus the sovereign is explored in the
book. This dichotomy, according to Carlson and Owen, is one of the most significant
aspects of the rise of religions and religious commitments. Both the modern, Western
nation-state and the sacred are self-referential and both demand, according to the authors,
complete loyalties from those paying allegiance to them. The result is an almost
automatic conflict between the two. Appleby calls the same dilemmatic situation as
“Serving Two Masters.”120 The competition between religious God and the secular gods,
i.e. modern nation-states, provides certain potential for “constructive”121 and
“destructive” impacts of religion on international politics.122 One basic question,
nevertheless, is whether the underlying tension between “totalism” of religion on the one
hand and the “totalitarian” foundation of the modern nation-state on the other is
sustainable and containable or not. In any case, this literature, although it engages
religion, cannot be properly considered as a literature on religion in international
relations. Instead, it functions as an exploration of the sometimes disputed religious roots
of secular International Relations and international relations. As such, this particular
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literature does not extensively contribute to our understanding of the revival of religions
in the world and its implications.
In terms of studying religions in International Relations, one particular “barrier of
entry” has been the more recent entanglement of religion and security. The introduction
of many contemporary International Relations scholars to the question of religion has
been through the phenomenon of terrorism. The entanglement, therefore, of International
Relations’ study of religion with Security Studies literature has been almost by default. In
particular, the Security Studies literature on threat perception, non-traditional sources of
violence, and fourth-generation warfare has colored the study of religions in the
discipline. This in turn has exacerbated the complexities involved in the task of studying
religions. The resulting “reductionism” has been paralleled with the tendency among
some International Relations scholars to be as “limitationist” or minimalist as possible in
the study of religion. The minimalism has encouraged research agendas that follow
applied and selective approaches in order to predict the potential consequences of the
revival of religions for international security. Such research approaches have sometimes
had to compromise the totality of religions as systems of thought and modes of living in
favor of immediate concerns for national and global security.
On the basis of the survey of literature on religion in International Relations, my
study on the theological foundations of Shī‘ī strategic cultures basically follows the
Phenomenological approach as explained above. It attempts to understand as much as
possible the fundamental concepts that have shaped Shī‘ī perceptions of security and
threat as these concepts have been understood by Shī‘ah Muslims throughout history. The
Phenomenological approach has been chosen because the Enlightenment approach and
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the Identity approach seem to have serious shortcomings in studying religions. These
methodological and conceptual shortcomings have rendered them less capable of proper
analysis of religions and their roles in today’s world. As for the Traditionalist approach,
there exist several difficulties that render a Traditionalist research in International
Relations especially challenging. In particular, there is no extensive Traditionalist
literature in Political Sciences, Sociology, and International Relations at this point that
one may engage and to which one may contribute. Nearly all of the currently existing
Traditionalist literature lies within the realm of Religious Studies. As yet, it is not clear
how the Traditionalist scholarship can be systematically and consistently employed in
other branches of the Social Sciences. Nevertheless, this study benefits from some of the
Traditionalist insights in the study of Shī‘ah Islam. In particular, the presented study of
the Shī‘ī notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah in Chapter V would have not been possible
without insightful contributions made by Traditionalist scholars who have written on the
esoteric foundations of Shī‘ah Islam. To summarize, although this study generally follows
the Phenomenological approach, it also borrows to the extent possible from
Traditionalists in their study of religions in general and Shī‘ah Islam in particular.
Security Studies: Islam and Strategic Culture
In addition to the general literature on religion in International Relations, this
study belongs to a sub-set of literature within Security Studies. In this part, the present
study on strategic cultures in Shī‘ah Islam will be contextualized in the narrower
literature on strategic cultures. As mentioned before, this literature is emerging within the
Security Studies in International Relations and strives to understand “the relationship
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between culture and strategy.”123 It asks how culture and cultural institutions affect and
shape the strategic perceptions and responses of culturally different actors. There is,
therefore, an assumption underlying this literature that claims strategic doctrines and
behaviors124 are not completely universal. In this context, to the extent that religions have
been a building block of various cultures,125 this study of strategic concepts in Shī‘ah
Islam would be a direct contribution to the literature on strategic cultures in International
Relations.
The notion of strategic culture goes back to the Cold War era when a number of
scholars suggested that some of the Soviet strategic behaviors might have ideological or
cultural roots.126 Snyder defined strategic culture as the “sum total of ideals, conditional
emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of the national
strategic community have acquired though instruction or imitation and share with each
other with regard to nuclear strategy.”127 The impacts of the Cold War structure of
international relations may be recognized in Snyder’s state-centric definition and the
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focus on “nuclear strategy.” Nevertheless, the definition acknowledges the possibility of
different strategic styles based on non-material forces.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ideologically bifurcated global
system, the notion of strategic culture could now be employed in studying the behaviors
of various (state or non-state) actors. The post-Cold War world also appeared to be less
ideologically organized. As a result, the term “culture” in strategic culture was employed
in reference to a broader range of human phenomena including religious belief systems.
This broader employment of strategic culture may be found in the post-Cold War
conceptualization of strategic culture by one of the so-called “first generation” theorists
of the notion. Gray maintains that culture is the “context” of various strategic
behaviors.128 The “strategic cultural context for strategic behavior,”129 in other words,
directly and indirectly informs actors and institutions. The more flexible130
conceptualization of strategic culture has paved the way for a new generation of studies.
These include, for instance, Johnston’s study of Chinese strategic culture;131 Katzenstein
edited volume on culture and national security;132 Kier’s study of French and British
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culture-doctrine nexus between the World Wars;133 Krause’s edited volume on the role of
cultural factors in disarmament and arms control;134 Duffiled’s study of the post-Cold
War non-Neorealist security strategy of Germany;135 Glenn et al.’s edited volume on
national strategic cultures in India, Nigeria, Japan, Australia, Russia and Germany;136
Sondhaus’s study of national “ways of war”;137 Mufti’s study of Turkish “Republic”
strategic culture;138 and a number of studies on European Union’s emerging –or
projected– strategic culture.139
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Buzan et al. offer a new framework for studying the notion of security. This
framework involves a “securitizing agent,” for example states, international
organizations, or religious authorities that, through a successful speech act, establishes
the perception of an existential threat. This threat is articulated within one or more
“security sectors,” including political, military, societal, cultural, environmental or
economic. The main thrust of a securitizing speech act is to claim that the source of the
threat is existentially endangering a valued “referent object” such as a country, a culture,
the environment, a religion, or an ethnic group.140 Therefore, the process of securitization
has to engage some cultural and social elements in order to be successful. The cultural
dimension of securitization is why, according to these authors, war as the ultimate
measure or response to the securitization of an object also involves some cultural and
social aspects. War is deemed as a totalizing phenomenon that engages all muscles of the
parties involved. The totalizing nature of war implies some culturally specific as well as
some universal aspects.
The particularity of each collective act of violence may arise from particular
cultures involved in the act. At the same time, all collective acts of violence show some
common features. For example, certain common elements in all strategic cultures have
appeared due to the pragmatic concerns for functionality. Throughout history, various
cultures have copied each others’ strategic behaviors and doctrines. For instance, LiddellHart’s “indirect approach” that emphasizes speed and maneuverability became one
element of a “thin universal strategic culture” in the last century.141 The Sun Tzuean and
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economical element of surprise aimed at destroying enemy’s physical and mental
equilibrium was soon copied and adopted by various cultures around the globe. In a
similar vein, blitzkrieg became a universal element of strategic cultures due to its success
during the Second World War. Mearsheimer goes further to argue that most modern
conventional wars have shown three common and general strategies: attrition to exhaust
the enemy, limited aims strategies, and, indeed, blitzkrieg.142 In addition to these common
strategies, the evolution of warfare from the first generation to the fourth generation has
produced universally adopted practices and doctrines.143
Most of these generic aspects of strategic cultures are rooted in technological
development, strategic inventions, and functionality. The first generation warfare brought
with itself a generic military culture of ranks and military-civilian distinctions. The
monopoly of state in using systemic violence to achieve political objectives was also
strengthened. The second generation of warfare brought by itself the practice of indirect
fire, psychological and radio warfare rooted in technological development or strategic
innovation. The third generation introduced universal elements of mechanized warfare
(technology), new methods of using military technology such as blitzkrieg (strategy), and
the increased role of surprise and speed. The fourth generation of warfare, however, has
been more problematic. It challenged the monopoly of states in employing systemic
violence and, in doing so, partially shaped a new universal strategic culture.144
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As militarily and technologically weaker actors began to accommodate elements
of the fourth generation warfare, the stronger players also developed counter-strategies
such as counter-revolutionary and counter-guerrilla warfare.145 Again, one unintended
consequence has been the spread of similar doctrines and practices around the globe,
including the blurring boundary between civilians and military personnel, between zones
of conflict and those of peace, and between military campaigns and political processes of
nation- or state-building.146
Another more or less universal aspect of strategic cultures emerged in the last
century has been the extremely totalizing image of war.147 War was deemed as a practice
that engaged various aspects of a society’s life from military to politics, economics,
financial networks, culture, education and, in cases where religion was involved, the socalled “cosmic level.” The religious element projected an “essentialist” fight between the
forces of good and the forces of evil. Within this context, an alternative generic strategic
culture appeared. Mesbahi calls this alternative a generic strategic culture of
“resistance.”148 The examples of universally adopted techniques and doctrines of
resistance ranged from Mao’s manual for guerrilla-warfare and techniques of hit-and-run,
to Lawrence’s prescription for defeating the enemy without engaging its main force, to
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Castro’s techniques of revolutionary warfare. All these techniques transcended cultural
and geographical differences and generated a generic strategic culture of resistance.
Indeed, each local revolutionary group changed and modified certain aspects of these
guidelines in order to accommodate geographical, cultural, political, and economic
contingencies. Nevertheless, certain generic elements remained in place.
Along with these transformations, some developments also happened in the nature
of war that, in turn, affected various strategic cultures universally.149 Examples of these
transformations include introduction of electronic warfare, joint campaigns, encryption
techniques, and development of various “Special Forces.” Yet, most of these generic –and
technical– elements of strategic cultures were unintended consequences of technological
developments, strategic innovations, or functional successes. In contrast, one of the first
major attempts in modern time to create a generic strategic culture by design happened in
1648 C.E. in Westphalia. Following decades of religious wars, the Treaty of Westphalia
monopolized the states’ right to resort to violence. The Treaty also fortified a universal
notion of nonintervention by sanctioning the concept of sovereignty. War appeared as one
of the resources exclusively at the disposal of the newly-born institution of modern state.
It became Clausewitzian –or purely instrumental– war, or the “continuation of politics by
other means.” Westphalia marked the end of the mercenary strategic cultures of the
Middle Ages, the “absolutist” strategic cultures of the Reformation, or the elaborate and
ceremonial strategic cultures of the demising European nobilities. The new generic
strategic culture was evolved and further solidified in 1713 C.E. by the Utrecht Treaty in
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which “balance of power” was recognized as a pillar of European politics and a
foundation of peace in Europe. As mentioned before, in this European strategic culture,
war was deemed an accepted leverage to keep the “balance” in place.
Napoleon contributed to the next major development in the generic strategic
culture. Mesbahi argues that Napoleon turned the Hobbesian notion of state on its
head.150 It was no longer the state’s responsibility to provide its subjects or citizens with
security. Instead, it was the citizens’ responsibility to protect and secure the state. As
many scholars of strategic cultures have noticed, the Napoleonic wars brought the notion
of “nations in arms” to the center of an increasingly universal strategic culture. According
to Mesbahi, this development totalized –or “absolutized”– the notion of war within
various strategic cultures.151 The transformation also glorified the practice of war in a
sharp contrast to the Clausewitzian “instrumentalist” conceptualization of the practice.
Yet the enormous costs of engagement in a prolonged state of war involving the whole
population proved to be unsustainable. This led to re-appreciation of the notion of
balance of power in European strategic cultures as the foundation of peace. Many
Western strategists and thinkers of Classical Realism such as Kissinger, Carr, Kennan,
and Morgenthau saw war as more or less something devoid of any majesty and awe.
Another consequential development took place during the Paris Peace Conference
in 1919 following the First World War. An implicit universal notion appeared that, at least
on the level of propaganda, projected war as a criminal act. The language adopted by the
League of Nations almost equated war with aggression. This was to usher in an important
150
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change of language within the universal strategic culture; for various strategic cultures
around the globe followed the anti-aggression language that had aimed at de-normalizing
war –albeit without any substantial change in strategic doctrines and behaviors.152
Carr famously attacked the conceptualization of war within some of the more
sanguine liberal strategic cultures. In his The Twenty Years’ Crisis, Carr argued that the
League of Nations had mistaken the absence of war for a stable and sustainable peace.153
The League had wrongly assumed, in other words, that the status quo was acceptable to
all. Carr also denied that non-violence was a permanent possibility. He asserted that the
proposed “international law” would simply remove war as an instrument at the disposal
of states to protect their security and to maintain the balance of power without providing
any effective substitute. It was the adoption of this new strategic culture by some
European powers that led, according to Carr, to the Second World War. Therefore, Carr
and other Classical Realists argued for a cautious “re-normalization” of war as an
undesirable yet necessary instrument. Following the Second World War, most strategic
cultures around the globe seemed to have accepted a similar image of war as the
“ultimate instrument of foreign policy” or the so-called “last resort.” In unusual
symbioses, therefore, different and inconsistent elements of the Clausewitzian
“instrumentalist” notion of war, the Napoleonic totalized notion of war, the liberal anti-
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war discourse, and the Classical Realists’ war-as-the-last-resort notion began to appear in
various strategic cultures.
Meanwhile, nuclear weapons disturbed the universal and local strategic cultures.
Many strategic analysts believed that the nuclear technology had led to a qualitative
change. In contrast to almost all other elements within different conventional strategic
cultures, a nuclear war could not have a meaningful objective, they argued. Brodie and
others developed a new strategic paradigm for the nuclear age. They declared that such
weapons made total wars obsolete.154 The change called for a major adjustment in various
strategic cultures. At the same time and on a more practical level, the doctrine of nuclear
deterrence appeared to be more powerful compared to conventional deterrence. On the
more philosophical and moral level, however, a taboo soon began to emerge around
nuclear weapons. The weapons’ massive scale of destructive power made them a different
and disturbing category. Caught between pragmatic concerns and grave moral
consequences, many strategic cultures responded hypocritically to the nuclear age as onthe-surface condemnation of the expansion of nuclear weaponry became more or less a
universal practice. It must be mentioned, however, that there is a counter-argument
against the half-normative, half-pragmatist treatment of nuclear arms. Waltz, for instance,
claims that a certain “sobering” and universal effect is embedded in the process of
becoming a nuclear power. Not surprisingly, Waltz’ problematic claim has come under
serious attacks by his critics. 155
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As we review the universal changes that took place in various strategic cultures, it
is worth paying some attention to the consequences of the Vietnam War. In particular,
Vietnam gave birth to a modern just war theory that, in turn, shaped the discourse and
paradigms of various strategic cultures. Michael Walzer developed a secular version of
jus ad bellum and jus in bello. He employed the old analogy between individual and state
and their corresponding rights.156 The foundation of his just war theory, therefore, was no
longer Christian Natural Law tradition and the affiliated notion of “obligations.” Instead,
the modern articulation of the notion of natural rights, which had been popularized by,
inter alios, John Locke, served as the theoretical foundation for Walzer’s theory. Since all
states must provide a minimum level of security for their citizens, Walzer argued that war
of self-defense is inherently legitimate. At the same time, he qualified this claim by
including the principle of proportionality and that of distinction between civilian and
military targets. The two principles soon became the pillars of just war discourse in
various strategic cultures. This was yet another layer of legal turns in strategic paradigms
that tried to distinguish between “aggression” and “self-defense.” In nearly all the wars of
the past couple of decades, the parties involved have accused the other side to be the
aggressor while justifying their own actions on the ground of self-defense.
Beyond these generic elements borrowed and adopted by various strategic
cultures, there have been exclusive elements in a number of local strategic cultures. These
specific items and discourses arise from unique cultural settings and historical
trajectories. It is the study of these culturally specific features and their roots that has
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been the research focus of strategic culture literature. For instance, Japan and Germany
embarked on an aggressive social re-construction of their strategic cultures following the
Second World War.157 Both countries aimed at transforming their respective strategic
cultures from a militaristic one towards a culture built around “trading states.”158
Similar to the cases of Germany and Japan, it is possible to distinguish several
other national strategic cultures in today’s world. For instance, Israelis developed an early
strategic culture rooted in religious imageries and theological discourses. Mesbahi argues
that the image of weak David played a crucial role in shaping young Israel’s strategic
culture when the newly-born state perceived itself as weak and vulnerable under
existential threat.159 Although the decisive military successes of Israeli army in the 1960s
and the 1970s decreased the relevance of the Davidian image, Israeli strategic culture has
remained distinct in many aspects as Israel continues to see itself in an exceptionally
hostile environment. China under Mao also developed a distinct strategic culture.
Johnston argues that Maoist China combined elements of Confucianism, Sun Tzu’s
teachings, and Marxism with lessons from Chinese historical experiences. Underlying
this symbiosis was the Cold War image of the world as a zero-sum battlefield between
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Capitalism on the one hand and Communism on the other.160 The resulting Chinese
“offensive realism,” according to Johnston, did not develop based on structural
calculations. Instead, it was rooted in the multi-faceted cultural background of Maoist
China. In a similar vein, Lenin developed a Marxist version of just war theory. Believing
that Communism cannot survive in one country and that expansion of Marxism is a
necessity, Lenin argued for a distinct strategic culture that condoned violence if it
facilitated the emergence of universal Communism. According to Mesbahi, this
ideologically

specific

strategic

culture

was

in

line

with

Lenin’s

forceful

“volunteerism.”161 An assertive “volunteerist,” Fanon also believed that violence is an
inherent and “just” part of anti-colonial resistance.162 A similar line of thought gave birth
to several nationalistic and socialist strategic cultures that viewed violence as inevitable
means towards a justified goal.
Finally, the United States has also developed a unique strategic culture. Similar to
other specific strategic cultures, the United States’ strategic culture is a symbiosis of
various distinct discourses and paradigms added to the generic elements of strategic
cultures.163 In particular, the United States has adopted and combined discourses of
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“exceptionalism,” “utopianism,” “legalism,” and “isolationism” in its formulation of
foreign policy, and thus in the creation of its strategic culture.164 In the twentieth century,
Gaddis argues that the Pearl-Harbor experience restarted the forces of expansion,
“unilateralism” and hegemony in American strategic culture. These responses, he claims,
are the generic reaction to a surprise attack in American strategic culture.165 Others
emphasize the role played by the Vietnam War that ended the post-World War II strategic
paradigm in the United States and led to what Roskin calls the “Vietnam generational
paradigm” of non-intervention.166 The unexpected end of the Cold War, according to
Mesbahi, contributed to an era of “triumphalism” in the United States’ dynamic strategic
culture.167 It was in the context of this updated strategic culture that the first Persian Gulf
War was framed as a legitimate response by the community of states (under the United
States’ leadership) to Iraq’s violation of international law. The second Persian Gulf War,
however, illustrated a significant transformation that had taken place in American post-
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9/11 strategic culture. It showed a departure from the principle of non-intervention in
American strategic culture.168
The various strategic cultures that have appeared around the globe have not been
completely unique. They indeed have been consciously and unconsciously influenced by
the universal strategic doctrines and practices. We have already recognized these
universal elements as a thin universal strategic culture in which various branches of local
strategic cultures have their roots. In this context, Islam has also partially shaped various
strategic cultures in different Muslim societies. For instance, some scholars argue that
within the Muslim version of just war theory, it is speculated that Muslims may be the
unjust party involved in war.169 Other elements of Muslim religious beliefs, theological
doctrines, and jurisprudential rulings have historically shaped Muslim strategic cultures.
Meanwhile, a family of distinct strategic cultures appeared in Shī‘ah Islam. The
emergence of these cultures was the result of a variety of causes including the historical
trajectory of Shī‘ah community and their level of access to political power. In particular,
the experience of Shī‘ah Muslims living for a long time as a minority group has colored
these strategic cultures. On the other hand, Shī‘ah Muslims’ understanding of Islam and
their version of the religion provided the theological foundation for these unique strategic
cultures. The result of this symbiosis of history and theology has been Shī‘ī strategic
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perspectives that show noticeable differences compared to those of the majority Sunnī
Muslims.
Vali Nasr and Roy Mottahedeh both notice the centrality in Shī‘ah history of the
killing of the third Shī‘ah Imām, the Prophet’s grandson, in Karbalā in the seventh
century.170 The event gave more visibility to Shī‘ahs as a religious community conscious
of its minority status within the larger Muslim community. As a result, notions such as
resistance, pain, suffering, and martyrdom embodied in the story of the Prophet’s
grandson were established in Shī‘ah theology and, later on, in Shī‘ī strategic cultures. As
will be discussed later, however, the foundation of Shī‘ī strategic cultures goes further
back to the time of the Prophet. The root of these distinct strategic cultures is in the way
‘Alī, the first Shī‘ah Imām, and few other companions of the Prophet understood the
Prophet’s message. It is true that one of the central pillars of Shī‘ī strategic cultures has
been the notion of Shahādah171 embodied in the dramatic events of Karbalā. It is also true
that the historical experience of the Shī‘ah community as a persecuted and harassed
minority following the Battle of Karbalā led to the rise of cautionary doctrines such as
Taqīyyah172 in Shī‘ah theology and Shī‘ī strategic cultures. Yet, these two elements of
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Shī‘ī strategic cultures, namely Shahādah and Taqīyyah, could have not coexisted without
the ontology of Wilāyah and Walāyah.173 The roots of the Shī‘ī notions of Wilāyah and
Walāyah go back to ‘Alī and his companions’ understanding of the core message of the
Prophet. The centrality of Wilāyah and Walāyah in the Shī‘ah-Sunnī split has sometimes
been neglected by reduction of the split to a matter of political succession to the Prophet.
However, a proper understanding of Shī‘ī strategic cultures is not possible without
revisiting the notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah. Among these three central notions of Shī‘ī
strategic cultures, the literature on Shī‘ah Islam has often focused on the first, namely the
doctrine of Shahādah. The focus has been, partly, the result of the emergence of Iran’s
“Islamic state” and the following eight-year war between Iran and Iraq. In fact, Mesbahi
argues that during the long War, martyrdom became a powerful element of the Iranian
strategic culture. He goes further to argue that, during the War, the “backbone of Iran’s
national security” became the doctrine of Shahādah.174
In contrast to most of the cases of strategic cultures reviewed above, Shī‘ī
strategic cultures are not necessarily “national” strategic cultures. Instead, these strategic
cultures informed the collective attitudes of various Shī‘ī communities and their –
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religious and political– leaders when it comes to the issue of survival. The fact that the
early Shī‘ah community was the victim of persecution for a long period of time meant a
constant preoccupation in the community about their survival. This preoccupation
brought into the fore the type of questions that lie at the heart of any strategic culture. The
resulting metaphors and strategies of survival then constituted the content of Shī‘ī
strategic cultures.
It must be re-emphasized that the nationally, religiously, or ideologically specific
strategic cultures are often embedded in the thin generic strategic culture discussed
above. Specific cultures have been eclectic in picking and choosing certain generic
elements; and they have developed unique packages of “norms and values” as well as
“strategies and models”175 regarding the notions of security, threat, survival, and the use
of force. Therefore, to talk about specific Shī‘ī strategic cultures does not mean to neglect
or deny generic elements that Shī‘ī actors may have adopted in their strategic doctrines
and practices. Similar to any other local strategic culture, Shī‘ī strategic cultures include
various universal elements. Many of these universal elements have been rooted in
historical experiences and doctrinal innovations. Examples include the Clausewitzian
“instrumentalist” approach to war, the Napoleonic absolutized image of war, the liberal
anti-war paradigm, the Realist accommodation of war as the last resort, resistance and
revolutionary warfare as well as various elements of the universal notion of just war.
Despite these universal factors, however, Shī‘ī strategic cultures have their unique themes
rooted in Shī‘ah Muslims’ historical experience and in Shī‘ah theology. My dissertation
is, therefore, a contribution towards understanding the theological foundations of these
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specific strategic cultures while paying attention to the accompanying historical
developments.
Shī‘ah Studies: Shī‘ah and Orientalism
The rising significance of religions in today’s social and political environment has
led to the engagement of Religious Studies literature by scholars in other branches of
Social Sciences. In terms of Islamic Studies in general and Shī‘ah Studies in particular,
this has sometimes meant a rather uncritical reading of a literature partly shaped by
“Orientalism.” Despite important contributions that “Orientalist” scholars have made to
our understanding of Muslim world and Muslim history, the school of thought has certain
limitations. These limitations may become particularly consequential when the
“Orientalist” perspective is being applied to the study of Islam in other branches of Social
Sciences such as International Relations. When it comes to the study of Shī‘ī strategic
cultures, having a phenomenological perspective is essential in the study of the subject.
Among all the limitations of the “Orientalist” school of thought, the most relevant to the
subject of this dissertation is that “Orientalists” explicitly or implicitly project Shī‘ah
Islam as “Shī‘īsm” and/or as an ideological “sect.” In fact, this conceptualization of
Shī‘ah Islam has a close affinity to the Identity approach discussed above. It, therefore,
shares some of the general limitations of the Identity approach in the study of religion.
Madelung, for instance, offers a review of the early religious schools and “sects”
in Islam.176 He juxtaposes “Shī‘īism” and “Khārijīsm”177 as two early Islamic
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movements.178 Such categorization of Shī‘ah Islam is consequential and leads to the
treatment of Shī‘ah (Imāmī) Islam as a “sect.” In fact, this Shī‘ah-as-a-sect approach has
not been uncommon within Oriental Studies. The formulation was used, later on, to
partially fill the knowledge deficit in International Relations about Islam in general and
about Shī‘ah Islam in particular. The popularity of the “Orientalist” reading of the Shī‘ahSunnī split among International Relations scholars has been partly because these scholars
seem to be analytically more comfortable in using political notions such as sects. The
familiar language would obviate digging into more difficult questions of theology and
religion. The result has been the emergence of a mainstream “Orientalist” International
Relations literature on Shī‘ah Islam. As the corollary to this, terms such as “sectarian
violence” have appeared in Security Studies to understand Shī‘ah-Sunnī dynamics within
the Identity approach.
One of the most influential founding fathers of Oriental Studies in the West is
Ignác Goldziher. The extent of meticulousness and diligently wrought fine details in his
177
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works should be seen as the signature of the early generation of Oriental Studies in
Europe.179 The scrupulous examination of ancient Muslim texts, which was the hallmark
of these early Oriental Studies, was more or less lost in the works of later generations of
“Orientalist” scholars. Writing more than a century ago, Goldziher’s list of research
interests and questions may appear outdated. His exhaustingly objective style, however,
is still of major benefit for anyone who wishes to study Islam, especially within the
Identity or Phenomenological frameworks. At the same time, the early Oriental Studies
sophistication contrasts to some “reductionist” generalizations that became the feature of
the works of “Orientalists” such as Bernard Lewis. Despite his nuanced scholarship,
however, Goldziher still views Shī‘ah Islam –or what he calls “Shī‘īsm”– as a sect. It is
implied, therefore, that Shī‘ah religious doctrines have been formulated and articulated a
posteriori by Shī‘ah Muslims to theorize an essentially political dispute. Goldziher even
goes further and concludes that Shī‘ah Islam is a diversion from the Islamic orthodoxy;
and that it potentially contradicts the basic conceptualization of God in Islam.
Based on the “Orientalist” historiography, Madelung turns his attention to the
politics of the Shī‘ah-Sunnī split and deals with the historical debate over the succession
of the Prophet.180 Unlike the mainstream “Orientalist” literature, Madelung offers a rather
sympathetic account of the early history of Shī‘ah Islam; and his historiography comes
close to that of mainstream Shī‘ah Muslims. He presents ‘Alī as an “idealist” and a true
believer caught among some “consummate, coolly calculating” power-seeking political
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actors.181 In his historiography, however, the consequential and doctrinal differences
between Shī‘ah Islam and Sunnī Islam, which are necessary for proper understanding of
the later developments, are overshadowed by the focus on politics. Issues such as
political authority, legitimate sovereignty, and justice on the exoteric level of the Shī‘ahSunnī split are underscored at the expense of esoteric questions of Wilāyah, Walāyah,
Divine Justice, and metaphysical hierarchies. The implicit consensus, therefore, has been
that Shī‘ī theological edifice was a later development providing a justification or
explanation for the early political split of the Shī‘ah Muslims from the majority of the
Muslim community. ‘Alī’s exoteric and esoteric formulations of Islam in his words,
teachings, and actions are generally overlooked. These exoteric and esoteric differences
between Shī‘ah Islam and Sunnī Islam are, however, among the root causes of the
qualitatively different politics of Shī‘ah Muslims compared to that of the Sunnīs.
Some scholars have tried to address this deficiency in the literature. Amir-Moezzi,
for instance, argues that the early history of Shī‘ah Islam was heavily esoteric.182 The
Shī‘ah Imāms183 were viewed by their followers as divinely guided spiritual authorities
with supernatural knowledge. They were believed to be the raison d’être of the universe
and the channel through which the Divine Grace is bestowed upon man. In this esoteric
environment, Shī‘ah Muslims perceived themselves as a special community responsible
181
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for protection of the sacred institution of Wilāyah and Walāyah.184 Towards this goal,
Taqīyyah185

was also seen as the duty of Shī‘ah Muslims. It must be mentioned,

however, that this self-perception was challenged by a minority group within the Shī‘ah
community, the proponents of the doctrine of ‘Ulamā al-Abrār –i.e. “the Pious Scholars.”
These minority Shī‘ah theologians maintained that the Imāms were specially learned and
highly pious, yet regular, human beings.186 Yet, the majority of Shī‘ah Muslims gradually
believed in a special esoteric place of their Imāms in the metaphysical and spiritual
hierarchy of the universe. The special status of the Imāms was later on translated to
certain theological doctrines including that of the “infallibility” of the Imāms or ‘Iṣmah.
These later theological doctrines have had a less esoteric undertone according to AmirMoezzi. Even though the early Shī‘ah esotericism gave way to, in Amir-Moezzi’s words,
a “theological-juridical-rational Imamism,”187 it always played an important role in
Shī‘ah version of Islam. The esotericism accompanied Shī‘ah exotericism and, in fact,
influenced Sunnī esoteric traditions as well. The strength of esoteric themes in Shī‘ah
Islam has been such that they have made a powerful and ironic return in modern times
within an unusual context of modern Iranian politics.188
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At the same time, the exoteric question of justice began to surface partly in
response to the Shī‘ah community’s minority status. Justice is indeed a universal theme in
various Muslim political philosophies. Therefore, the question of justice appears in
various places in Rosenthal’s review of the medieval political philosophies in Sunnī
Islam.189 The work covers prominent Muslim theologians, jurists, scholars, and
philosophers such as al-Fārābī (d. 950 C.E.), Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037 C.E.), al-Māwardī (d.
1058 C.E.), al-Ghazzālī (d. 1111 C.E.), Ibn Rushd (d. 1198 C.E.), Ibn Taymīyah (d. 1328
C.E.) and Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406 C.E.). A central theme in the book is the relevant
discussions in Fiqh, i.e. [Muslim] jurisprudence, which served as the theological
foundation for the institution of caliphate. It is important to note that the caliphate is a
quintessentially Sunnī institution and Shī‘ah Muslims seldom refer to it. In Sunnī
political philosophies, the institution was deemed necessary for two related reasons.
These were to “defend the faith”190 and to “command the faithful.”191 A dual system of
Mulk-Dīn appeared where the bearers of Mulk, i.e. the rule, should observe and respect
religion, or Dīn. The Mulk-Dīn system led to a somewhat “constitutionalist” approach
towards the institution of caliphate in which the sovereignty of the caliph was not selfreferential. The notion was further corroborated by a Ḥadīth, or tradition, of the Prophet
that described Dīn, i.e. religion, and Mulk, i.e. political authority, as “twins.” While this

189

See Rosenthal, Erwin. (1962). Political Thought in Medieval Islam: An Introductory Outline.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
190

Ibid. p. 8.

191

Ibid. p. 26.

77

dual system remained at the core of Sunnī political philosophies,192 the challenge of
reconciliation between reason and Dīn/Sharī‘ah remained a primary matter of
philosophical speculations among Sunnī Ḥukamā’, or theosophers. In these speculations,
the question of justice often appeared as a secondary concern. Rulers’ obligations to
promote justice usually followed the central obligation of the sovereign to uphold
Sharī‘ah. In other cases, the two obligations were deemed as identical: “[t]he caliph is the
defender of the faith, the dispenser of justice.”193 The above pattern shaped Sunnī
political philosophies for the most part of the Medieval Age.194
Lambton examines Iranian medieval theories and practices of government
especially during the (Sunnī) Saljūq period.195 The mainstream Sunnī framework during
this period was the theory of imamate.196 The theory was manifested in the divinely
constituted office of the caliph following the examples of the four “Rightly Guided
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Caliphs” and the Prophet.197 Trusted in the institution of imamate was the custodianship
of Sharī‘ah that rendered the state “Islamic.”198
The crisis and eventual fall of the institution of the caliphate199 and the rise of the
institution of the sultanate200 affected Sunnī political philosophies. The historical
transition was reflected in a dual quest to theorize a viable Muslim political structure. The
sultanate was to preserve “Islamic” character of the society on the one hand and to
maintain its political unity in the face of outside enemies on the other. The sacredness
long attributed to the institution of the caliphate, however, made the transition difficult.
Some Muslim philosophers strove to –at least theoretically– save the caliphate. They
tried to synthesize the institutions of caliphate/imamate and sultanate in one framework.
It was an effort to emphasize the continuity of a “sacred” office that went back to the
Prophet himself. Nevertheless, many including ibn Taymīyah had to give in to the
abolition of the institution of the caliphate. Ibn Taymīyah even accepted the possibility
according to religious law of having more than one Imām, i.e. political leader, among
Muslims and rejected the religious obligation and necessity to uphold the institution of
the caliphate. The accommodation of the reality and the fear of chaos went so far that it
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reached an unusual pitch. Al-Khunjī argued that the Imām, i.e. the political leader, was
“the bearer of power, whether he was righteous or unrighteous.”201 Al-Khunjī’s extreme
stance has become, rather unduly, a common theme in Shī‘ī critiques of Sunnī political
philosophies ever since; for as a minority, Shī‘ah Muslims had developed quite different
theories of political legitimacy based on the “righteousness” of the bearer of power.
Lambton then follows the familiar categorization of Muslim theories of
government into those developed by Muslim philosophers and influenced by ancient
Greek political philosophies and those put forward by Muslim jurists and characterized
by the centrality of Sharī‘ah.202 In between the two categories lies the so-called “Mirrors
for Princes” literature, or Sīyāsat-Nāmih. These medieval pamphlets of recommendations
for rulers often include philosophical, moral, practical, and juristic arguments.203 In
contrast to mainstream Shī‘ah political thought, the question of legitimacy of caliphate is
largely brushed away in Sunnī theories of state. A common theme was to resort to the
necessity of the state for provision of a Sharī‘ah-based order. Viewing Shī‘ah Islam as a
“sect,”204 Lambton argues that “Shī‘īsm” originally initiated as “simply a political
legitimist movement.”205 The author also makes the rather sweeping claim that “[n]o
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Muslim political theory of state […] asks the question why the state exists.”206 Yet, she
acknowledges that the removal of the Abbasid caliph during the Mongol invasion posed
much less of a challenge to Shī‘ah Muslims compared to their Sunnī coreligionists.207
The easier accommodation of the fall of the caliphate was in fact a result of Shī‘ahs’
having been more comfortable in questioning the legitimacy and the necessity of the
state. One of the earliest theoretical questions that Shī‘ah jurists strove to answer was
how to deal with what they perceived as a “fundamentally illegitimate political
structure.” The perceived illegitimacy was rooted in Shī‘ī categorization of all political
powers during the Occultation208 as the illegitimate “usurper” of Imāms’ authority.209 The
Shī‘ī stance led to a variety of doctrines including Taqīyyah elaborated and expanded by
prominent religious figures such as Shaykh al-Mufīd210.
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The difficulties and confusions caused by the absence of Imām’s authority during
the Occultation led to the gradual emergence and prominence of Shī‘ah Mujtahīds.211
They assumed some of the functions of state in administering the Shī‘ah community. The
Shī‘ī position vis-à-vis the institution of the caliphate also rendered the question of Ẓulm,
i.e. tyranny, an important theme in Shī‘ah political thought. As Lambton notes, Ẓulm was
universally perceived as “the great evil”212 by Shī‘ah jurists. Lambton also recognizes
certain potential paradoxes within Shī‘ah political philosophies, which caused some
ambiguity in the legitimacy of political power during the (Shī‘ah) Safavid period213 in
Persia as the Shī‘ah Shahs and the Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā214 competed with each other in
identifying their respective spheres of authority.
Keddie has written a detailed account of Iran’s modern history.215 The account is
built on the long-term interest of Keddie in the dynamics of religion and politics in Iran.
The book reviews the uneasy relations between the religious ‘Ulamā and the royal court
during the Safavid and Qājār216 dynasties. She also looks into the evolution of the
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financial structure around the offices of the high-ranking ‘Ulamā.217 The financial
structure, in turn, resulted in the independence of ‘Ulamā from the state –in contrast to
their Sunnī counterparts. The rising power of the ‘Ulamā eventually led to their
involvements in the Constitutional Revolution218 in Persia, the Oil Nationalization
movement of 1953, and finally in the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran. While Keddie’s
book is rich in presenting the relevant historical data, it does not offer an analytical
framework to understand the grand dynamics of political thought in Shī‘ah Islam.
Such an analytical approach can be found in another work by Keddie where the
author investigates the forces of resistance, revolution, and stability in Iranian Shī‘ah
Islam.219 The type of dualism Keddie tries to illustrate, i.e. between revolutionary
potential in Shī‘ah Islam and the “quietist” necessities of maintaining a stable political
structure, is particularly important; for a parallel dualism may be found in Shī‘ī strategic
cultures as well. In fact, a part of this dissertation is to show a similar “idealistpragmatist” dynamic manifested in the doctrines of Shahādah and Taqīyyah. While
claiming a “revolutionary nature”220 in Iranian Islam, Keddie does not explore the
theological and doctrinal roots of it. Instead, she emphasizes the institutional privileges,
the organizational structure, and the financial independence of the Shī‘ah clergy as the
217

This financial structure was developed due to various religious alms paid to elite ‘Ulamā. In Shī‘ah
Islam, these alms included “Khums” –i.e. one-fifth of idled property to be paid annually–, “Zakāt” –i.e. the
traditional Muslim alms paid on selected items– and “Waqf” –i.e. religious endowments. To organize the
financial transactions between the merchant class and the ‘Ulamā, an intricate and ever-growing bazaar‘Ulamā network emerged.
218

1905 – 1907.

219

See Keddie, Nikki. (1995). Iran and the Muslim World: Resistance and Revolution. New York: New
York University Press.
220

Ibid. p. 5.

83

force behind this “revolutionary nature.”221 The mainstreaming Uṣūlī School of Shī‘ah
jurisprudence,222 Keddie maintains, provided high-ranking Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā, or the Marāji’,
with a powerful status. They could now play an active role in matters social and political.
The peculiar organization of ‘Ulamā and their economic independence, however, was
rooted in Shī‘ī strategic discourses on political power as well as the social reality of
having been a minority for a long time.
Keddie also investigates the examples of modern “political revival” in the Muslim
world.223 This wave of “political activism” began to emerge in the past two centuries as a
response to colonialism and imperialism. The tobacco “movement,” which was the
precedent to Persia’s Constitutional Revolution, has been of central historical and
symbolic importance. Keddie reviews the 1891-2 tobacco boycott in Persia and the
central role played by the alleged fatwā –i.e. religious rulings– of a Mujtahid, Grand
Ayatollah Shīrāzī. The fatwā created a mass boycott that eventually turned out to be a
successful political action.224 The boycott is symbolically important for it was among the
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first times when the power of the ‘Ulamā vis-à-vis the state and the colonial powers came
to the light. In addition, the success of the boycott led to the rise of the Shī‘ī doctrine of
Nafy-i Sabīl –i.e. Refusal of [others’] Way [to dominate Muslims].225 This doctrine
encouraged Shī‘ah Muslims to remove any way by which non-Muslims might dominate
Muslim nations. It also functioned as a religious creed for obtaining “independence.”
In a similar context, Keddie traces the influence of Shī‘ī doctrines on Jamāl al-Dīn
al-Afqānī,226 in shaping his response to imperialism. The Shī‘ī notion of Ijtihād227 proved
to be essential for al-Afqānī though he usually represented himself as a Sunnī Muslim.
According to Mesbahi, al-Afqānī’s alleged role in soliciting the famous boycott fatwā in
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the tobacco “movement” illustrates his capacity to think strategically.228 Al-Afqānī
managed, in other words, to employ the dormant power of the Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā to advance
his political agenda. Meanwhile, one may find the trace of the quintessentially Shī‘ī
doctrine of Taqīyyah in his life229; for al-Afqānī proved to be a versatile man who had an
incredible level of flexibility and prudence in accommodating different settings both
within and without the Muslim world. In fact, al-Afqānī is, according to Keddie, one of
the first Muslims in modern times who practiced the strategy of Taqīyyah not only as a
survival strategy but also as a means to exert political influence. This is why scholars
such as Mesbahi believe al-Afqānī to be historically an important Shī‘ah strategist.230
The notion of Ijtihād and the doctrine of Taqīyyah illustrate some of the strategic
potential of Shī‘ah Islam. It also reminds the relevance of theology in shaping social
phenomena. The rather “essentialist” Identity approach embedded in the “Orientalist”
literature sometimes makes it difficult to analyze such strategic potential of theology.
Without taking into account the role of religious ideas in shaping Shī‘ah history,
including ideas about political power, justice, and security, it is not possible to understand
why, for instance, modern Iran has had such an active political dynamics in the past
century including the Constitutional Revolution of 1905, the Nationalization of Oil
movement of 1953, the “White Revolution” of 1963, the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the
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Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, the Reformist movement in the 1990s, the rise of Iranian neoconservatives in the 2000s, and the recent “Green movement” of 2009.231
Amir-Arjomand offers an informative examination of Shī‘ah history.232 During
the period in which the Shī‘ah Imāms were present233, Amir-Arjomand notices certain
periods of “political quietism” by the Imāms.234 The rather long periods of “political
quietism,” in turn, provided a strong religious justification for acquiescence of Shī‘ah
Muslims to non-Shī‘ah rulers. During the “major Occultation,” or al-Ghaybah al-Kubrā,
with the important exceptions of some Shī‘ah rebellions, “political quietism” became the
Shī‘ah modus vivendi. The “quietism” was also an expedient strategy that contributed to
the survival of Twelver Shī‘ah Muslims. Amir-Arjomand views the doctrine of Taqīyyah
as an indication of de-politicization of Shī‘ah Islam due to the prevailing social realities.
By paying attention to Shī‘ī tradition of “political quietism,” Amir-Arjomand tries to
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balance Keddie’s argument regarding revolutionary potential in Shī‘ah Islam.235 It is with
the combination of the two traditions that one may explain as distinct political actors as
Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Sīstānī236 within the same analytical framework.
In terms of historical developments, the Shī‘ī Safavid dynasty rose from the more
“activist” tradition in Shī‘ah Islam.237 Within the increasingly successful Safavid political
system, a mutually beneficial arrangement emerged between the Safavid royal court on
the one hand and the Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā on the other. The amicable relations began with the
declaration of Shī‘ah Islam as the religion of the state in Persia in 1501 C.E. by Shāh
Ismā‘īl I238. The Iranian Shī‘ah Islam was further strengthened by the migration of a
group of elite Shī‘ah Fuqahā239 from the Jabal al-‘Āmil region in Ottoman Syria240 to
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It seems, however, that Amir-Arjomand interprets “political quietism” of Shī‘ah Muslims as an
indication of secularization of Shī‘ah Islam. This is not an unproblematic interpretation for it is inconsistent
with the later developments in Shī‘ah history. The extent of Shī‘ah “political activism,” especially in the
modern era, shows that secularization never really took roots among Shī‘ah Muslims. This, indeed, does
not mean dismissing the practical and political significance of “quietism” in Shī‘ah Islam and its
consequences. Eventually, however, the loose separation of political and religious authorities during the
Safavid and the Qājār periods proved to be unsustainable as the institution of monarchy gradually lost its
power and the institution of ‘Ulamā gradually increased its influence.
236

Ayatollah Sīstānī (b. 1930) is the current Za‘īm, or Head, of the Shī‘ah seminary in Najaf, Iraq. His
approach towards politics appears to be close to cautious “pragmatism” or “quietism” of the traditional
Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā.
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It is important to acknowledge the Sunnī Sufi roots of the Safavid dynasty in addition to its Shī‘ī ones.
In fact, some scholars have suggested that the adoption of Shī‘ah Islam as the religion of the new-born
Safavid state might have had something to do with the political calculations vis-à-vis the Sunnī Ottomans
[see for instance Abisaab, Rula Jurdi. (1994). The Ulama of Jabal ‘Amil in Safavid Iran, 1501-1736:
Marginality, Migration and Social Change. Iranian Studies, 27(1-4), 103-22]. Despite these alleged
political calculations, one cannot ignore the strong religious reverence, if not adherence, of the founders of
the Safavid dynasty towards Shī‘ah Islam.
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The word Fuqahā is the plural for the word Faqīh, which means jurist or the scholar of jurisprudence.

240

Jabal al-‘Āmil is a mountainous region located in today’s Lebanon; for centuries the region had been a
Shī‘ah enclave. When the Safavid rose to power in Persia, they needed a strong theological and intellectual
articulation of their political legitimacy vis-à-vis the well-established institution of the sultanate in Ottoman
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Persia.241 The long list of the ‘Āmilī ‘Ulamā in Safavid Persia include some very
prominent Shī‘ah theologians, philosophers, and Mujtahids such as Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī
also known as Muḥaqqiq al-Thānī (d. 1533 C.E.), Zayn al-Dīn al-‘Āmilī also known as
Shahīd al-Thānī (d. 1558 C.E.), Shaykh al-Bahā’ī (d. 1621 C.E.), Mīr Dāmād (d. 1631-2
C.E.), and Muḥammad al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī (d. 1692 C.E.).
Amir-Arjomand believes that the complex Safavid system led to the separation of
the realm of religion from that of politics.242 The assumption of total separation of
politics and religion is, however, problematic. Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī, for instance, obtained
special privileges during the reign of Shāh Ṭahmāsp. His religious authority and Shāh
Ṭahmāsp’s obedient reverence towards him was often translated to political influence.
Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī was granted the title of “Mujtahid al-Zamānī”243 referring to his
status as the Mujtahid who represented the hidden Shī‘ah Imām, Muḥammad al-Mahdī, at
the time. The official title survived after Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī and was given to prominent
Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā throughout the Safavid period. The office of Mujtahid al-Zamānī signified
Empire. Formulated as the continuation of the sacred institution of the caliphate, the Ottoman sultanate
posed a major legitimacy challenge to the young Safavid rule. To address this challenge, the Safavid found
in Jabal al-‘Āmil the much-needed Shī‘ī intellectual powerhouse. It must be mentioned that the emergence
of Jabal al-‘Āmil as a prominent center of Shī‘ah education was in part due to the relative demise of Ḥullih,
the traditional center of Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā in Iraq. Therefore, the Safavid court invited the high-ranking Shī‘ah
‘Ulamā of the remote Jabal al-‘Āmil to migrate to Persia’s capital city of Isfahan. Many of these ‘Ulamā
accepted the invitation. As a result, a major center of Shī‘ah scholarship and intellectual production
emerged in Safavid Persia during the reigns of Shāh Ismā‘īl I, Shāh Ṭahmāsp (d. 1576 C.E.), and Shāh
‘Abbās I (d. 1629 C.E.).
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See for instance Abisaab, Rula Jurdi. (2004). Converting Persia: Religion and Power in Safavid Empire.
New York: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd.
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Amir-Arjomand, Said. The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam.
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It has been argued that the title of Mujtahid al-Zamānī is the Safavid equivalent of modern title of Grand
Ayatollah. Given the association of Mujtahid al-Zamānī with the highest religious office in the Safavid
court, however, this does not seem to be the case for, unlike Grand Ayatollah, the title of Mujtahid alZamānī often signified a single highest-ranking religious authority.
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the political legitimacy of the Safavid Shahs through their projected association with the
hidden Imām, i.e. the ultimate source of political legitimacy in Shī‘ah Islam.
While the assumption of a complete separation of politics and religion is
questionable, the Safavid system did provide the religious authorities with a breathing
space to flourish. They now benefited from the political and financial support of an
increasingly powerful state. In a matter of decades Sunnī Persia turned Shī‘ah and
arguably the most powerful Shī‘ah state in history was born. In parallel, an increasingly
influential class of Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā with complex institutions emerged. After a relatively
short period of marginalization under Nādir Shāh (d. 1747 C.E.) of the Afshār dynasty244
and during the short-lived Zand dynasty245, the Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā regained their legitimizing
power with the rise of the Qājār dynasty in 1785 C.E. At the same time, while the court’Ulamā relations retained certain financial dimensions, the latter gradually established its
relative financial independence from the former.
During the same period of Shī‘ah history the Uṣūlī School of thought gained the
upper hand in their competition with the Akhbārīs. While the difference between the two
theological strands of Shī‘ah Islam cannot be said to be a clear-cut one, there are certain
and potentially consequential distinctions. The Uṣūlīs grant, in general, a higher status to
independent reasoning in religious rulings. They advocate Ijtihād as a systematic use of
human reasoning faculty in studying authentic religious sources in order to issue fatwās
to address new questions and challenges. In contrast, the Akhbārīs protested what they
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1736 – 1796 C.E.
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1750 – 1794 C.E. Note that neither the Afshār dynasty nor the Zand dynasty succeeded in claiming the
whole Persian territory leading to the overlap of their reigns over different parts of Persia.
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believed to be an unacceptable intervention of human understanding in modifying
“eternal and sacred laws” of God. The Akhbārīs obtained some momentum in the early
Safavid period as a result of the teaching of Muḥammad Amīn al-Astarābādī (d. 1627
C.E.). Al-Astarābādī severely criticized the mainly Uṣūlī Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā of the past.246 He
preached stricter and more literal adherence to the traditions of the Prophet and those of
the Shī‘ah Imāms. The Akhbārīs did not approve of Ijtihād and gave a minimum role to
reasoning.
In contrast, the Uṣūlīs believed in an ever-expanding role of Ijtihād. The
increasing importance of Ijtihād also meant that Fuqahā were to play yet more significant
role in Shī‘ah society. It was the Fuqahā who were believed to be equipped with the
necessary knowledge and skills to use their reasoning in extraction of new religious laws.
They developed an elaborate Science of Principles –i.e. ‘Ilm al-Uṣūl– to guide jurists in
systematic generation of new bodies of Shī‘ī laws. They also created the institution of
Marja‘īyah during the Qājār period. A Marja‘ was a qualified Faqīh who had mastered the
Science of Principles and had obtained a firm grasp of Shī‘ah religious sources, including
the Qur’ān, the traditions and Ḥadīth of the Prophet, and those of the Shī‘ah Imāms. A
Marja‘ was allowed to extract new laws for his followers and the Shī‘ah community
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The noticeable majority of prominent Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā have been Uṣūlī. The list include influential figures
such as Shaykh al-Mufīd, Shaykh al-Ṭūsī also known as Shaykh al-Ṭā’ifah (d. 1068 C.E.), Muḥaqqiq Ḥillī
(d. 1277 C.E.), ‘Allāmeh Ḥillī (d. 1325 C.E.), Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī, Shahīd al-Thānī, Ja‘far Kāshif al-Ghiṭā’
also known as Shaykh al-Akbar (d. 1813), Shaykh al-Anṣārī (d. 1864 C.E.), Ākhūnd Khurāsānī (d. 1911),
and ‘Allāmeh Nā’īnī (d. 1936). Prominent Akhbārī ‘Ulamā included Muḥammad Amīn al-Astarābādī,
Mullā Muḥsin Fiyḍ Kāshānī (d. 1680 C.E.), ‘Allāmeh Majlisī (d. 1699/1700 C.E.), and Muḥammad al-Ḥurr
al-‘Āmilī. It must be re-emphasized, however, that the categorization is for analytical purposes and not a
strict one. For instance, ‘Allāmeh Majlisī may be considered as a moderate Akhbārī as he was also under
the influence of some tenets of the Uṣūlī School of jurisprudence. See Nasr, S. H. et al (Eds.). Expectation
of the Millennium. pp. 280-6 for more discussion of Uṣūlī-Akhbārī divide.
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could direct their religious questions to him. Marāji‘247 became sources to be followed as
well as points of reference for the community. This was a consequential transformation in
Shī‘ah history as it further institutionalized the authority of the Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā in their
relations to the laity. Indeed, the development was not possible without the rise of the
Uṣūlīs for the Akhbārīs rejected the institution of Marja‘īyah altogether.
Amir-Arjomand’s other contribution covers the next centuries of Shī‘ah history in
Iran up to the Islamic Revolution of 1979.248 The more extensive and forceful efforts to
marginalize the ‘Ulamā in social, educational, juridical, and political matters began under
the Pahlavī dynasty. In particular, Amir-Arjomand investigates the causes of the
Revolution. The hypothesis about the relative secularization of Shī‘ah Islam suggested in
his previous works, however, leads him to dismiss the powerful non-“quietist” dynamics
of Shī‘ah Islam. Amir-Arjomand emphasizes the “success” of the Shah’s modernization
project. At the same time, he notices that Khomeini’s Revolution was a watershed in
political philosophy of Shī‘ah Islam in terms of theorizing and implementing a
“legitimate state” during the “Occultation of the Twelfth Imām” –or fī ‘aṣr al-ghaybah.249
247

The word Marāji‘ is the plural for the word Marja‘.
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See Amir-Arjomand, Said. (1988). The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
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Another informative collection of articles is Amir-Arjomand, Said. (1988). Authority and Political
Culture in Shi‘ism. Albany: State University of New York Press. This is an edited volume in which the
essays by the editor and by Etan Kohlberg are particularly of interest, although not all the arguments are
beyond debate. One point in case is Amir-Arjomand’s assumption –presented in his other works too– that
Ayatollah Khomeini illustrates a revolutionary departure from Shī‘ah tradition of political philosophy. This
is in line with Amir-Arjomand’s assertion about the relatively successful secularization of Shī‘ah Islam
during the Safavid and the Qājār periods. While it is true that Ayatollah Khomeini articulated a major
change in Shī‘ah political theology and especially in the scope of Wilāyat Faqīh, one can argue that he
merely used traditional Shī‘ī concepts and doctrines such as Ijtihād, Wilāyah, and Walāyah in
unprecedented ways [see Chapter V for more discussion of Wilāyah and Walāyah]. Therefore, the tradition
Amir-Arjomand is referring to might be, as Shī‘ahs sometimes use this analogy, the Ḥusaynī, i.e. the
“activist” or revolutionary, tradition in contrast to the Ḥasanī, i.e. the “quietest,” tradition of Shī‘ah Islam.
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For the first time, the Uṣūlī notion that Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā can succeed the Shī‘ah Imāms in
certain capacities was taken to its logical extreme. Khomeini argued that Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā
are not only the religious authority in the absence of the Imāms, but also a legitimate
political authority.250
Hairi has written a historical account of the consequential era of the Constitutional
Revolution from 1905 to 1911.251 It reviews the intellectual origins of the Revolution and
the role played by the ‘Ulamā for or against “Constitutionalism” –then perceived as a
modern template for political structure of the state. The book also includes a review of
the foundations of Shī‘ah political theology such as the issue of the succession to the
Prophet, the “infallible” Imāms –or the doctrine of ‘Iṣmah–, the Occultation and the
institution of Marja‘īyah.252 As noted before, The Constitutional Revolution was an
important prelude to the Islamic Revolution of 1979. It also surfaced some of the
difficulties Shī‘ah theologians had to tackle when it came to engagement in modern
politics. The split among the ‘Ulamā in response to the Constitutional Revolution was
exemplified in the pro-Constitution Akhūnd Khurāsānī253 (d. 1911) in Najaf and pro250

For a primary source on Ayatollah Khomeini, see Algar, Hamid. (1981). Islam and Revolution: Writings
and Declarations of Imam Khomeini (1941-1980). Berkeley: Mizan Press.
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See Hairi, Abdul Hadi. (1977). Shiism and Constitutionalism in Iran: A Study of the Role Played by the
Persian Residents of Iraq in Iranian Politics. Leiden: Brill.
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As mentioned before, the institution of Marja‘īyah –or “Marja‘ al-Taqlīd,” i.e. the “Source to be
Followed,”– is a rather recent development that gained prominence during the Qājār period. The
establishment of the office is sometimes attributed to Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥusayn Najafī in 1846 C.E. [see
Faghfoory, Mohammad H. Ethic of War and Peace in Shi‘ite Islam]. During the Safavid period, however,
the high-rank ‘Ulamā were called “Nuwwāb Imām,” which is plural for “Nā’ib Imām” meaning Imām’s
vicegerent. The idea of ‘Ulamā being the vicegerent of the Imāms was popularized in particular by
Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī. He also put this notion in practice by leading the Friday Prayer, a religious role
previously believed to be exclusive to the Shī‘ah Imāms.
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Akhūnd Khurāsānī is one of the most influential Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā of modern times. His contributions to
‘Ilm al-Uṣūl, i.e. the Science of Principles, has been monumental as his works are among the standard

93

monarchy Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī254 in Tehran. Hairi reviews Tanbīh al-Ummah wa
Tanzīh al-Millah written by ‘Allāmih Nā’īnī (d. 1936), one of the prominent students of
Akhūnd Khurāsānī. The book is arguably the most important religious text of the era
dealing with the issue of political power in Shī‘ah Islam. ‘Allāmih Nā’īnī acknowledges
the limitations of the constitutional system, including “its parliamentary political
structure,” compared to the ideal Shī‘ah political structure, i.e. a system in which the
political power is in the hand of the “infallible” Shī‘ah Imām. ‘Allāmih Nā’īnī makes his
case mostly based on Shī‘ī theological arguments but also by some borrowings from antityranny literature of the period. He refuted Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī’s pro-monarchy stance.
Nevertheless, even ‘Allāmih Nā’īnī maintains the Mujtahids’s right to “veto” any “antiIslamic” legislation. Hairi concludes that while Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī “understood that
constitutionalism cannot be brought into conformity with Islam,” ‘Allāmih Nā’īnī was
“confused with wrong or vague interpretations of modern concepts … [such as] the
meaning of liberty and equality in democracy.”255
It is true that Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī’s opposition to the establishment of the
Parliament in Persia after the Constitutional Revolution was partly related to the paradox
of sovereignty and self-referentiality of modern nation-states in Shī‘ah Islam.256 Yet, the
textbooks in various Shī‘ah seminaries today. Akhūnd Khurāsānī also played a significant political role in
the Constitutional Revolution. By sanctioning the Revolution, he protected the “Constitutionalists” against
being labeled as non-Muslims. His contributions to Shī‘ah political philosophy, however, remain
understudied. One of the recent studies to address this deficiency has been produced by Mohesn Kadivar in
Farsi [see Kadivar, Mohsen. (2007). Sīyāsat-Nāmih Khurāsānī. Tehran: Kawīr Publications].
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Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī was executed in 1909 by the verdict of a pro-Revolution court presided over by
another Shī‘ah clergy.
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M. Mesbahi, Lectures, Fall 2007, and M. Mesbahi, Interviews, Fall 2011.
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“confusion” mentioned above was universal as both Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī and ‘Allāmih
Nā’īnī had to deal with similar theoretical challenges. The confusion later on manifested
itself in the fact that, in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini implemented some of ‘Allāmih
Nā’īnī’s ideas, such as the veto power of a council of Mujtahids, and adopted a similar
anti-tyranny257 tone. Yet, it was Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī who became the iconic figure
among the revolutionaries after the Islamic Revolution. He was praised by Ayatollah
Khomeini258 despite the fact that Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī had been adamantly against the
idea of parliamentary legislation or women’s suffrage. Both of these were endorsed by
Ayatollah Khomeini. Unlike Khomeini, Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī was also a prominent promonarchy figure. This indicates Ayatollah Khomeini’s hovering between “pro-modern”
ideas of ‘Allāmih Nā’īnī –in his endorsement of the partial sovereignty of the
Parliament– on the one hand and the “anti-modern” position of Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī in
his rejection of certain “non-Islamic” aspects of modern states on the other.
The theoretical difficulties of modern politics for Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā, therefore, cannot
be easily reduced to conclusions such as “incompatibility” or “compatibility” of Islam
and modern nation-state. Instead, the complex dynamics that such theoretical and
theological challenges have put in motion must be recognized; for there is no single or
simple “Shi’i theory of government”259 as Hairi suggests.
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A rather common term to refer to the notion of “political tyranny” in modern political discourses of
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This must be added, however, that Ayatollah Khomeini’s praises for Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī mostly
occurred before the Revolution of 1979 and in the early years after the Revolution. It has been suggested
that as Ayatollah Khomeini struggled with the practical requirements of statecraft, he distanced himself
from arguably uncomplicated political ideas of Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī [M. Mesbahi, Lectures, Fall 2007,
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Hamid Enayat’s Modern Islamic Political Thought is one of the most important
contributions to the study of modern political thought in the Muslim world. The book
includes two sections particularity relevant to this research, namely a brief discussion of
the doctrine of Taqīyyah and a more extended discussion of the doctrine of Shahādah in
Shī‘ah Islam. The basic definition, history, and modern revisions of the two concepts
have been briefly explained. Enayat views the martyrdom of Ḥusayn as a powerful and
dramatic experience with potential rhetorical power for modern Shī‘ī politics. The event,
furthermore, should be contextualized in the central paradigm of justice in Shī‘ah Islam.
Such an approach would allow to understand the enduring legacy of the massacre of
Karbalā in reshaping the notion of Jihād in Shī‘ah Islam compared to the same notion in
Sunnī Islam.260 The resulting Shī‘ī doctrine of Shahādah and Jihād enabled, for instance,
the Iranian state to successfully brand its war with the neighboring Muslim country, Iraq,
as Jihād without denying the Muslim-hood of the Iraqi nation. This was in contrast to
Iraqi state’s nationalistic propaganda against Iranian “‘Ajams.”261 In addition to the
discussion of Shahādah, Enayat discusses the doctrine of Taqīyyah within his study of
political theory in Shī‘ah Islam. Even though the section dedicated to Taqīyyah is a short
one, it provides a foundation for the study of the doctrine in Shī‘ī strategic cultures here.
This is why in Chapter IV of this dissertation, which discusses the doctrine of Taqīyyah, I
will start with Enayat’s analysis of the subject.
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In the following Chapter, a more detailed discussion of Shahādah is offered and the differences between
the Shī‘ī and Sunnī understandings of the notion of Jihād are also explained.
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The word ‘Ajam means non-Arab and when used by contemporary Arabic speakers, it sometimes have
derogatory connotations.
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The inclusion of Shī‘ah Islam along with Sunnī Islam in Enayat’s book renders it
a significant contribution to a literature that has often focused on Sunnī Islam. Enayat
makes this important contribution with a refreshing perspective in studying –Shī‘ah–
Islam:
“The distinguishing features of Shī‘īsm in relation to Sunnīsm should
be sought not only in its fundamental principles, but perhaps more
importantly in its ethos, in the tone of historically developed attitudes
which have informed and infused the Shī‘ī stance on the
controversial issues of Islamic history, society and dogma. […]. In
trying to understand this ethos, one has to deal with ‘historical
Shī‘īsm’, namely, a Shī‘īsm which has taken shape in the actual
living experience of specific groups of Muslims […].”262
Dissertation Contributions
As reviewed above, this dissertation engages three bodies of literature, namely
studies of religion in International Relations, studies of Shī‘ah Islam in Religious Studies,
and studies of strategic cultures in the sub-field of Security Studies in International
Relations. Within the first body of literature, the dissertation belongs to the
Phenomenological approach, although it also employs some of the Traditionalist insights
about Shī‘ah Islam. These Traditionalist contributions will be particularly important in
Chapter V on the notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah.
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Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. p. 19. It must be mentioned that, in this dissertation,
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his work is an example of the contemporary “Orientalist” literature
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As for the studies of Shī‘ah Islam within Religious Studies, this dissertation
avoids contemporary “Orientalist” reductions and simplifications by employing the
Phenomenological approach. In particular, it disagrees with the reduction of Shī‘ah Islam
to a political “cult,” a “sect,” or an ideology. Instead, it treats Shī‘ah Islam as a selfreferential understanding of Islam. In fact, one of the central contributions of this study is
to bridge the gap between phenomenological studies of Shī‘ah Islam in Religious Studies
on the one hand and Security Studies of Shī‘ah Islam on the other. While insightful
studies of Shī‘ah Islam have been conducted in recent decades, most of them have
remained within the framework of Religious Studies. It is the intention of this study to
bring parts of that knowledge in a systematic fashion and in a familiar language to the
students of International Relations. The main audience of this research is, therefore, the
scholars of Security Studies in International Relations. More specifically, this dissertation
is a direct contribution to the growing body of literature on various strategic cultures.
Two points must be re-emphasized in this regard. First, the notion of Shī‘ī strategic
cultures does not refer to pure paradigms of security. As mentioned above, a Shī‘ī
strategic culture contains some uniquely Shī‘ī elements embedded within a universal
culture of security. Secondly, this study of the theological foundations of Shī‘ī strategic
cultures is itself a foundational study. In other words, it does not engage and analyze
specific manifestations of Shī‘ī strategic cultures throughout history. Instead, it strives to
understand the generic paradigms of such manifestations. Therefore, this study will serve
as a framework for future analyses of various Shī‘ī strategic cultures in different places
and times.
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Finally, my study is essentially an extension to the late Professor Hamid Enayat’s
Modern Islamic Political Thought. In recent decades, there has arguably been some shift
of interest from political thought studies towards Strategic Studies when it comes to
Shī‘ah Islam. This dissertation engages the doctrine of Shahādah, the doctrine of
Taqīyyah, and the ontology of Wilāyah and Walāyah with this shift in mind. It engages
the doctrine of Shahādah and Aristotelian prudence at the heart of Taqīyyah primarily to
understand their strategic implications. It also employs the notions of Wilāyah and
Walāyah as key concepts to better understand Shī‘ah Islam. In analyzing these various
concepts, this dissertation benefits from the studies on Shī‘ah political thought. Yet, it
keeps its focus on strategic implications of such thought. At the same time, it does so with
a phenomenological sensitivity or, in Hamid Enayat’s words, with an eye on the “actual
living experience”263 of Shī‘ah Muslims.
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CHAPTER III
SHAHĀDAH: METAPHOR OF AN IDEAL
Introduction
On October 10th of the year 680 C.E.,264 Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī, the grandson of the
Prophet Muḥammad,265 was killed in the Battle of Karbalā in today’s Iraq. Along with
him, nearly all of his reportedly seventy male companions were slaughtered and their
families were taken as prisoners. Ḥusayn had been on his way to the city of Kūfah266 to
allegedly establish his rule.267 En route to Kūfah, Ḥusayn and his companions were met
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The date coincided with Muḥarram 10th of the year 61 in Muslim calendar. As will be explained, this day
has obtained a significant religious symbolism in Shī‘ah Islam.
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At the time, Ḥusayn was the third Shī‘ah Imām following his father ‘Alī and his brother Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī
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Ḥusayn left his hometown of Medina due to an increasing political pressure mounted against him and his
followers. They refer to Ḥusayn’s escape to Mecca to take refuge in the “Holy City” from caliph Yazīd ibn
Mu‘āwīyah’s persecution; and they notice that Ḥusayn left Mecca for Kūfah only after he realized that
Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah would not observe the traditional Muslim belief in the sanctity of the city of Mecca
[see Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī, Vol. 2, pp. 241-2]. In fact, it seems that Ḥusayn himself was
not optimistic that the Kūfīs would honor their invitations. This is probably why some of Ḥusayn’s
companions suggested withdrawing into inaccessible mountains of Yemen. Feirahi argues that Ḥusayn, who
had expected an eventual military engagement with the army of Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah, preferred the
geostrategic region of Iraq, which was at the heart of the Muslim world, to the distant mountains of Yemen
[see Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. pp. 228-9]. Those who believe that Ḥusayn was
forced to leave Mecca for Kūfah also refer to a reported sermon he gave once he encountered the first
divisions of Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah’s army. In the sermon, Ḥusayn emphasizes that he –and not Yazīd ibn
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by an army of Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah. Ruling from Damascus, Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah was
the self-proclaimed heir to his recently deceased father Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān,268 the
first caliph of the Umayyad dynasty.269 Unlike Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān, who had been
a master of realpolitik270 and a cunning challenger of ‘Alī and Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī271, Yazīd
ibn Mu‘āwīyah lacked the necessary political skills and the support network. He also
failed to keep at least the appearance of piety and faithfulness that had been associated
with the office of the caliph. As a result, Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah faced stiff political
opposition to his caliphate and had to rely on more brutal measures to establish his rule.
In particular, it was necessary for him to extract by force or otherwise a pledge of
allegiance from influential figures throughout the Muslim world.
When demanded to offer his pledge of allegiance to Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah in
Medina, Ḥusayn refused to recognize the legitimacy of the young “extravagant” son of
Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān. The refusal was, of course, only the latest of a long series of
tensions between the two families of the ‘Alawīs, i.e. the sons of ‘Alī, and the Umayyad,
Mu‘āwīyah– is the legitimate “bearer of Wilāyah.” He then continues that if the enemy does not recognize
his Wilāyah, he is ready to “return to Medina” without recognizing Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah’s caliphate [see
Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 4, p. 303; see also Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah walNihāyah, Vol. 6, pp. 257-60; and Abū al-Ḥasan Mas‘ūdī, Murawwij al-Dhahab wa Ma‘ādin al-Jawhar, Vol.
2]. This offer was rejected leading to Ḥusayn’s eventual martyrdom. Despite these recent “revisionist”
historiographies of the event, it has been the mainstream narrative of the journey presented above that gave
birth to some unique turns in Shī‘ī strategic cultures. This is why Feirahi argues that the martyrdom of
Ḥusayn in Karbalā became the “driving force of all non-Shī‘ī (such as Zubayr’s) and Shī‘ī movements […
that] eventually brought Banī Umayyad [caliphate] down” [see Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat
dar Islām. p. 231].
268

d. 680 C.E.
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661 – 750 C.E.
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For some interesting accounts of Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān’s political ingenuity and originality, see
Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. p. 206.
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From this point, wherever the name Ḥasan is used in this dissertation, it refers to Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī.
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i.e. the sons of Umayyah. ‘Alī himself had fought Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān in the
inconclusive and controversial Battle of Ṣeffīn272. When ‘Alī had been elected as the
fourth caliph, he had commanded Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān, then the governor of the
province of al-Shām273, to relinquish his power.274 Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān refused
this command and, instead, challenged ‘Alī’s right to caliphate. He soon became the
leader of anti-‘Alī political forces and the tension culminated in the Battle of Ṣeffīn. The
inconclusive battle led to a period of bifurcated political rule in the Muslim world
towards the end of ‘Alī’s life.
Following the death of ‘Alī, his eldest son Ḥasan assumed the position of
caliphate for a short period of time. Only after a military encounter with Ḥasan and
Ḥasan’s concessions to a peace treaty in the face of certain defeat,275 Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī
Sufyān secured his caliphate. The truce, however, did not put to rest the deeper
theological and political disagreements between the descendants of the Prophet276 on the
one hand and the emerging Umayyad court on the other. The Battle of Karbalā, therefore,
came in the context of such history of hostility between the sons of ‘Alī in Medina and
272

657 C.E.
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This is today’s Syria as well as parts of Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq.
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The decision of ‘Alī to remove Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān from his governorship post has often been
viewed as an example of the former’s lack of interest in “pragmatism” and “political expediency” by Shī‘ah
Muslims. A more detailed discussion of ‘Alī’s particular political approach can be found in the following
Chapter under “Principled Action and Expediency: The Legacy of ‘Alī.”
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The encounter took place in 661 C.E. near the city of Kūfah. According to mainstream Shī‘ah
historiography, it was the widespread mutiny of the Kūfīs in Ḥasan’s army that forced him to withdraw
from the battle. Ḥasan eventually accepted the unfavorable terms of a peace treaty with Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī
Sufyān. At the time, Ḥasan believed that “whatever spares blood is better than whatever causes it be shed”
[see Madelung,Wilferd. The Succession to Muhammad. p. 323].
276

‘Alī and his sons are often called Ahl al-Bayt by Shī‘ah Muslims. The term literally means the “People
of the House [of the Prophet],” for ‘Alī’s first two sons were the Prophet’s grandchildren.
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the sons of Umayyah in Damascus.
The Foundations of Shī‘ī Doctrine of Shahādah and Its Implications
Along with the assassination of ‘Alī277, the event of the slaughter of the Prophet’s
grandson in Karbalā brought the notion of Shahādah278 to the Shī‘ah Muslims’ selfnarrative.279 The notion of Shahādah had been developed during the life of the Prophet.
The Prophet had engaged in a series of wars against the “infidels.” The wars had resulted
in the death of a sizeable number of the Prophet’s companions that, in turn, demanded
theological elaboration on their spiritual status and fate. A number of verses280 in the
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As mentioned before, ‘Alī was assassinated in 661 C.E. in Kūfah by a member of Khawārij, a fanatic
and literalist Muslim movement. A brief introduction of this group can be found in Chapter II.
278

The Arabic word Shahādah comes from the Arabic root sh-h-d (i.e. ) شھد. According to Wehr’s ArabicEnglish Dictionary, sh-h-d means, inter alia, “to witness”; “to experience personally”; “to be present”; “to
undergo”; “to testify”; “to die as a martyr”; and “to utter the Moslem profession of faith.” The root sh-h-d
and its derivatives appear more than seventy five times in the Qur’ān. The term has been used in the Qur’ān
with a multitude of meanings. Martyrdom is not, however, its primary meaning in the Qur’ān. In Classical
Arabic, Shahādah primarily means testimony and bearing witness; and Shahīd means the one who testifies
or the one who is the witness [to the truth of some affairs]. Both terms in Arabic have a connotation of
truthful testimony based on certitude. The secondary meanings of the terms Shahādah and Shahīd are
martyrdom and martyr. In modern times, the secondary meanings of these terms have obtained more
significance due to their usage in a number of political paradigms concerning the Muslim world. This is
similar to the term Jihād that primarily means exertion and secondarily fighting wars. As for why the term
Shahādah has been used in Islam to refer to martyrdom, there have been several explanations. Some have
argued that martyrs will “bear witness to the Divine Truth” –or Divine Mercy– on the Day of Judgement
[see Muḥammad ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-‘Arab]. Others have referred to the Qur’ānic verse that declares
martyrs to be alive, “finding their sustenance in the presence of their Lord” [3:169, Yūsuf ‘Alī’s
translation]. According to this verse, since martyrs are in fact alive, they are witness to all affairs and,
hence, their title is Shahīd. There have also been more esoteric explanations for the Ṣūfīs sometimes call
those who achieve the highest level of spiritual ascendance martyrs. This highest level refers to the
annihilation of the Ṣūfī’s ego in the Divine Presence and the unification of the former with the latter. Since
there is an element of self-sacrifice or annihilation of the self in the Divine Self, the Ṣūfī literature has used
the term Shahādah to describe this state of the soul. Employing this Ṣūfī theme, some have argued that
martyrs are called Shahīd in Islam for they bear witness to the highest and most sacred Truth in the world,
i.e. the Truth of Unity of all beings. As will be further discussed below, the Ṣūfī themes play an important
role in the Shī‘ī understandings of Shahādah and the spiritual state of Shahīds.
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The reader can find a useful summary of Shahādah in Shī‘ah political thought in Enayat, Hamid.
Modern Islamic Political Thought. pp. 181-94.
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See, for instance, 2:154; 3:157, 169-171, 195; 4:74; 9:111; 22:58; 47:4-6. Also note that various
Prophetic Ḥadīths reinforced the Muslim notion of martyrdom. See for instance ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-
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Qur’ān, therefore, deal with the notion of Shahādah and the “blissful status” of Shahīds in
the eyes of God. Even though this general veneration of Shahādah preexisted the
emergence of the Shī‘ah-Sunnī schism, the turn of events in the early history of Islam
gave birth to a fairly different doctrine of Shahādah in Shī‘ah Islam281 compared to the
dominant Sunnī Islam.

The incident in Karbalā, in particular, showed vividly the grave vulnerability of
the Shī‘ah community. It led to an acute sense among Shī‘ahs of being threatened by
fellow Muslims. At the same time, it was seen as evidence that the traditional etiquette of
respect and reverence for supposedly inviolable and sacred matters was falling apart in
the Muslim society. Even having blood relations to the Prophet and belonging to a family
of such high stature could not spare one’s life, Shī‘ahs deduced. In the honor-driven Arab
society of the time, the notion of one’s household being imprisoned and exiled was
appalling. The fact that such an affront had been committed to the wives and children of
Ḥusayn and his companions in Karbalā solidified the belief among early Shī‘ah Muslims
that they were on their own. In an overwhelmingly Sunnī society and at the dawn of the
Muslim empires of the Umayyad and the Abbasid282, Shī‘ah Muslims were but a weak
minority on the fringe. This observation begged for a constant consciousness of their
minority status and its implications. It also meant the necessity of elaborating theological
Anwār, Vol. 97, pp.1-16; al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, pp.
8-10; Muḥammad ibn Ismā‘īl al-Bukhārī, al-Ṣaḥīḥ, Vol. 3, pp. 199-235; and ‘Alā al-Dīn ‘Alī al-Hindī,
Kanz al-‘Ummāl fī Sunan al-Aqwāl wal-Af‘āl, Vol. 4, pp. 397-407.
281

See al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, p. 8; ‘Allāmih Majlisī,
Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 45, p. 118; ‘Alī ibn Abī-Ṭālib, Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 119; and Ibid. Letter 53.
282
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doctrines as well as survival strategies in order to weather the increasingly harsh
environment. It was in this context that Shahādah was re-visited by early Shī‘ah Muslims
as a paradigm to take refuge in.
In the face of the utter physical defeat of Ḥusayn in Karbalā and obliteration of
nearly all his close companions and the male members of his family, the doctrine of
Shahādah was to instill a sense of respect, honor, and even victory. Again, the notion of
“victorious martyrdom” had existed in Islam and had been elaborated upon in some
verses of the Qur’ān. The story of Ḥusayn, however, brought it to a whole different level.
The sufferings that Ḥusayn had to go through in the hands of fellow Muslims began to be
understood as the generic story of Shī‘ah Muslims.283 As a result, some scholars of Islam
have argued that in the story of Ḥusayn, Shī‘ah Muslims found a mythology for their
identity as well as the identity of their enemies.284 The fact that the Muslim society
silently watched the slaughter of the grandson of the Prophet and, by and large, did not
protest it proved to be a wake-up alert for the Shī‘ah community. The community had to
come in term with its precarious position. To provide itself with a psychological relief
from the burden of this overwhelming vulnerability, the early Shī‘ah community
developed an elaborate doctrine of sacred suffering and martyrdom. The thrust of this
doctrine was the “metaphysical security”285 of a community so utterly deprived of
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According to Hamid Enayat, “[t]he memory of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom serves as an everlasting exhortation
to the Shī‘īs of all times to brave their numerical inferiority in the face of firmly established majorities”
[Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thoughts. p. 20].
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Soroush, Abdolkarim, Lecture titled “‘Aqlānīyat wa Shahādat,” December 15, 2010, Rockville,
Maryland. Retrieved from www.drsoroush.com on February 29, 2012.
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Shī‘ah Muslims commonly refer to the month of Muḥarram, i.e. the month in which Ḥusayn was killed,
as the month of “victory of blood over the sword” to signify this puzzling notion of “metaphysical
security.” The notion emphasized the eventual and absolute, yet otherworldly, security of the Shī‘ah

105

physical security.
Along with this notion of “metaphysical security,” there emerged a mainstream
Shī‘ī belief that Ḥusayn was well aware of his fate when he embarked on the journey
towards Kūfah. He allegedly refused to escape from the battlefield when offered the
chance and famously declared hayhāt min al-dhillah, meaning “woe unto the
wretchedness.” The phrase has ever since become an element of the Shī‘ī discourses on
Shahādah, which belittled “wretched survival.” Such consciousness regarding the
honorable versus the wretched life had of course serious implications for a persecuted
minority community. In fact, had it not been accompanied with the more pragmatic
doctrine of Taqīyyah286, the doctrine of Shahādah could arguably have led to a much
more difficult historical trajectory for Shī‘ah Muslims.
At the same time, Shahādah provided the early Shī‘ah community with the muchneeded source of inspiration and with a sense of honor. The notion of “metaphysical
security” asserted Ḥusayn’s martyrdom to be for a supreme cause and not in vain, a
sacrifice that, according to Shī‘ah Muslims, brought him to ultimate security and serenity
in the Presence of God. It has been reported that, once encountered with the army of
Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah, Ḥusayn delivered a sermon. He put forward his grim assessment
of the state of the Muslim society in which “the worldly life has been transformed and
turned into a more depraved one. [People] have been turning their backs on righteousness
and they are doing so as a habit […]. Do not you see [O my foemen!] that the good has

community in the Divine “grand scheme” and despite the worldly insecurities and persecutions. For more
discussion, see Chapter V.
286

See the following Chapter.
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been forgotten and the evil is not been inhibited? [It is in such conditions that] a believer
would rather to meet God [through death]. And, indeed, I do not see this as death so much
as salvation, and I do not see living under injustice as anything but misery.”287 In another
famous passage attributed to Ḥusayn, he addresses the motivation behind his journey
towards Kūfah. He says “I have left [Medina] to straighten the affairs of my grandfather’s
[i.e. the Prophet’s] Ummah; I intend to enjoin the good and to prohibit the evil.”288 The
latter announcement includes a major claim and begs the question of which specific
“good” and which specific “evil” Ḥusayn was referring to.
To answer this question, one must note that prior to Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah’s claim
to caliphate, his father, Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān, had ruled the Muslim world for about
a decade. During this decade, Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān’s caliphate remained, for the
most part, unchallenged. Ḥusayn, similar to his elder brother, followed a more or less
“quietist” approach vis-à-vis Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān. It was only after Yazīd ibn
Mu‘āwīyah’s rise to power that Ḥusayn openly expressed his strongest protests against
the “state of affairs” in his “grandfather’s Ummah.” Ḥusayn goes as far to declare that “it
shall be the end of Islam if someone such as Yazīd [ibn Mu‘āwīyah] is to be in charge of
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Various Shī‘ah sources have reported longer or shorter versions of the sermon. See ‘Allāmih Majlisī,
Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 44, p. 192; Ibn Shu‘bah al-Ḥarrānī, Tuḥaf al-‘Uqūl, p. 245; and Sayyid ibn Ṭāwūs, alLuhūf fī Qatlā al-Ṭufūf, p. 48.

Note that in many Ḥadīths attributed to Ḥusayn, one can find a similar theme where he contrasts honorable
death in fighting injustice on the one hand and living miserably under injustice on the other. Ḥusayn
unequivocally praises the former course while loathing the latter. “Dying honored and free is better,” he
declares, “than living in humiliation” [‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 44, p. 192; and Shaykh
‘Abbās al-Qumī, Nafs al-Mahmūm, p. 562] and “death is desired compared to submission to abjection”
[Najm al-Dīn Ja‘far ibn Namā Ḥillī, Muthīr al-Aḥzān wa Munīr Subul al-Ashjān, p. 54; and Shaykh alQumī, Nafs al-Mahmūm, p. 562].
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See ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 44, p. 329.
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the Muslim Ummah.”289 The noticeable shift means that the “evil” Ḥusayn was trying to
remove from the society was more than political injustice or an “imperfect ruler,” for
Ḥusayn believed that Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān’s claim to the caliphate was as unjust as
that of Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah. Yet, he accepted the former’s rule as de facto; and he did
not consider it as an “irreversible development” in the Muslims’ affairs. The caliphate of
Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah appeared to be qualitatively different. If left unchallenged by
Muslims, Ḥusayn believed, Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah’s caliphate would lead to “the end of
Islam.”
The key to understanding Ḥusayn’s uncompromising opposition to Yazīd ibn
Mu‘āwīyah is the essentially Shī‘ī notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah. As will be further
discussed in Chapter V, the two notions constitute a particular Shī‘ī ontology –a specific
understanding of the “metaphysical structure” of the world. Wilāyah and Walāyah refer,
respectively, to the exoteric and esoteric aspects of a sacred hierarchy around which the
world is believed to have been organized. In Ḥusayn’s view, what happened with Yazīd
ibn Mu‘āwīyah’s laying claim on the caliphate was an unacceptable violation of such
sacred hierarchies. With his “non-Islamic” outward behaviors and his alleged denial of
the Divine Revelations to the Prophet, Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah epitomized, in Ḥusayn’s
eyes, a major deviation in Muslim affairs. In fact, he mentions a number of Yazīd ibn
Mu‘āwīyah’s “blatant” violations on the eve of his martyrdom. He describes Yazīd ibn
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See Sayyid ibn Ṭāwūs, al-Luhūf fī Qatlā al-Ṭufūf, p. 18. Note that in the peace treaty concluded between
Ḥasan and Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān, there was an item prohibiting Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān from
creating a hereditary caliphate [see Aḥmad ibn A‘tham al-Kūfī. Kitāb al-Futūḥ. Vol. 4. pp. 290-1; and also
Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī, Vol. 2, pp. 214-5]. To Ḥusayn, Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah’s claim to his
father’s caliphate was, inter alia, a violation of that treaty too. The inherited caliphate was, to Ḥusayn, a
clear indication of a return to pre-Islam patterns of tribal politics in the Arabian Peninsula [see Feirahi,
Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. pp. 201-4].
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Mu‘āwīyah as an “unjust ruler who has turned what is forbidden by God into something
allowed; who has broken the Covenant[290] of God; who is against the tradition of the
Prophet; [and] who rules over God’s devotees by injustice and arrogance.”291 By
“straightening the affairs of the Prophet’s Ummah,” therefore, Ḥusayn intended to reverse
such a deviation from Wilāyah and Walāyah.292 As such, the more exoteric issue of
political injustice seems to have been secondary in Ḥusayn’s dramatic and fatal protest
against Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah.
There is one other indication that short-term political objectives were not a
priority in shaping Ḥusayn’s decisions. In a number of occasions during his final journey
from Medina to Karbalā, it has been reported that Ḥusayn gave permission to and even
encouraged his companions to leave; and many of them did so. Had short-term
considerations been a factor, Ḥusayn arguably would have not allowed such a large
number of desertions. The last of these permissions for leaving came at the last night

290

For the notion of the “Original Covenant” in Islam, see the Qur’ān 7:172 [“When thy Lord drew forth
from the Children of Adam –from their loins– their descendants, and made them testify concerning
themselves, (saying:) “Am I not your Lord (who cherishes and sustains you)?” They said: “Yea! We do
testify.” (This) lest ye should say on the Day of Judgment: “Of this we were ignorant.””]; 36:60 [“Did I not
make a Covenant with you, o ye Children of Adam, that ye should not worship Satan?”]; and 33:72 [“We
did indeed offer the Trust to the Heavens and the Earth and the Mountains; but they refuse to undertake it,
being afraid thereof; but man undertook it; –he was indeed unjust and ignorant” [Yūsuf ‘Alī’s translation].
291

Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 4, p. 304.
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Ḥusayn’s assertion that he was the “bearer of Wilāyah and Walāyah” can be recognized in his answer to
Walīd ibn ‘Aqabah, then governor of Medina. After the death of Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān, Walīd ibn
‘Aqabah approached Ḥusayn to solicit his pledge of allegiance to Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah. Refusing Walīd ibn
‘Aqabah’s request, Ḥusayn says “we [i.e. the Shī‘ah Imāms] are the channels of the [Divine] Message; and
[we receive] constant visitations from the angles; and [we are] the conduits of the [Divine] Mercy; and with
us, God began and to us, He shall conclude… [This is why] a man such as I shall not pledge allegiance to a
man such as him [i.e. Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah]” [see ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥar al-Anwār, Vol. 44, p. 325; and
Aḥmad ibn A‘tham al-Kūfī, Kitāb al-Futūḥ, Vol. 5, p. 14].
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before the final day of ‘Āshūrā293. In that dramatic night when imminent death was
looming over Ḥusayn’s camp, he called his men to a meeting. After describing their
precarious situation and the prospect of their death, Ḥusayn says “I believe it will be
tomorrow when the enemy attacks us. Now, I shall permit you all to leave and I absolve
you from your [previous] oath of allegiance [to myself]. So benefit from the darkness of
night [to save your lives]! … For these people are only after me.”294 In this last-night
sermon, Ḥusayn also prayed for those who would desert him to be rewarded by God. As a
result, Shī‘ah Muslims have often viewed Ḥusayn’s martyrdom as the ultimate and
supreme act of individual sacrifice295 to protect Islam. The fact that the Imām of the
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‘Āshūrā in Arabic means the number ten or the tenth. The events of Karbalā occurred on the tenth day of
the month of Muḥarram in Muslim calendar. Shī‘ah Muslims commonly refer to the day of Ḥusayn’s
martyrdom as the day of ‘Āshūrā; and they generally believe that the Qur’ānic reference to the “ten nights”
refer to, inter alia, the first ten nights of Muḥarram 680 C.E., when Ḥusayn and his small group of
companions camped in Karbalā. The promise of heavens for the “peaceful” or “confident soul” at the end
of this Qur’ānic chapter has also been believed to be bestowed upon Ḥusayn [see the Qur’ān 89:2, 27-30
and Shaykh Makārim al-Shirāzī, Tafsīr Nimūnih, Vol. 26, pp. 440-3. Retrieved from www.andisheqom.com
on January 19, 2012].
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devotees from ignorance and confusion” [see ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥar al-Anwār, Vol. 98, p. 210; and
Muḥammad al-Riyshahrī, al-‘Aql wal-Jahl fīl-Kitāb wal-Sunnah, p. 163]. Also, in an alleged conversation
between Ḥusayn and his step-brother, Muḥammad ibn Ḥanafīyyah, one can find yet another sacrificial
imagery. When Muḥammad ibn Ḥanafīyyah tried in vain to dissuade Ḥusayn from embarking on his
dangerous journey towards Kūfah, Ḥusayn replied that God had wanted to “see him [i.e. Ḥusayn]
martyred” [see Sayyid ibn Ṭāwūs, al-Luhūf fī Qatlā al-Ṭufūf, pp. 39-40]. Although the actual occurrence of
this dramatic conversation has been questioned, the imagery has percolated to a great extent into Shī‘ī
narration of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom.
In addition, similar to the Christian convictions regarding Jesus’ Crucifixion, Shī‘ah Muslims believe that
commemoration of Ḥusayn and mourning for his martyrdom is one of the means towards salvation [see, for
instance, ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 44, p. 278; Ibid. Vol. 44, p. 289; al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il
al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 14, pp. 500-9; Shaykh ‘Abbās al-Qumī, Nafs al-Mahmūm, p.
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whole Shī‘ah community viewed the upcoming martyrdom as an individual religious
duty and not a collective responsibility of his people had serious strategic implications. It
strengthened those theological arguments that viewed the doctrine of Shahādah as an
ultimate and exceptional resource. The fact that the deserted companions296 had been
absolved from their allegiance to the Imām and had been prayed for by the Imām further
reinforced this notion. The understanding of Shahādah as an ultimate measure became an
important permissive cause for Shī‘ah theologians to develop the more pragmatic
doctrine of Taqīyyah.
In terms of shaping the strategic paradigm of Shī‘ah Islam, the individualistic and
non-pragmatic approach of Ḥusayn has had yet another implication. As will be discussed
in the following Chapter on Taqīyyah and prudence, on several occasions, the Shī‘ah
Imāms did appear to be little concerned with “pragmatism.” The result was the
emergence of a paradigm of “principled action” in Shī‘ah Islam along with that of
Taqīyyah. Principled action, one might say, is the Shī‘ī equivalent of Kant’s –
deontological– “categorical imperatives.”297 The notion emphasizes acting in accordance
to “principles” regardless of the worldly consequences. Two prime examples of adherents
to such an approach in the history of Shī‘ah Islam have been the first and the third Shī‘ah

27; and Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. pp. 181-3]. It is interesting to note, however,
that Shī‘ah Muslims –and the Shī‘ah Imāms– have traditionally compared the martyrdom of Ḥusayn with
that of John the Baptist [see ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 14, p. 168; Ibid. Vol. 14, p. 175; and
Shaykh al-Ḥuwayzī, Tafsīr Nūr al-Thaqalayn, Vol. 3, p. 324].
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It must be noted that those companions who abandoned Ḥusayn have been widely censured by Shī‘ah
Muslims throughout history. Yet, they have not been considered as non-Shī‘ah by the virtue of deserting
their Imām due to the explicit permission they had received.
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See Kant, Immanuel. (2011). Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A –German-English Edition.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Imāms, namely ‘Alī and Ḥusayn. While ‘Alī’s legacy of principled action in Shī‘ah Islam
will be discussed in the next Chapter, it is worth looking into this byproduct of Karbalā
here. Some of the –mostly earlier– Shī‘ah jurists have argued that Ḥusayn was not certain
about the outcome of his journey towards Kūfah. These jurists suggest that Ḥusayn left
Medina based on rational calculations and with the hope of establishing his political rule
against Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah in Kūfah. The turn of events, however, forced him to
choose between humiliation and death in Karbalā and he, being of such an “honorable
lineage,” chose the latter.298
Mainstream Shī‘ah Fuqahā, in contrast, have believed that Ḥusayn was well
aware of his destiny even prior to embarking on his journey towards Kūfah. Either
thorough prophecies or by accurate calculations of the political environment, Ḥusayn
knew that Kūfah would not support his political bid and that he would die. Yet, he did not
draw back. This, many Shī‘ah commentators have argued, was due to Ḥusayn’s
adherence

to

the

paradigm of

principled action and his low regard for

“consequentialism.”299 Some of the later Fuqahā, on the other hand, have tried to
combine the two interpretations. While acknowledging Ḥusayn’s knowledge of his
destiny, these jurists argue that the “Islamic principle” for which Ḥusayn left Medina was,
indeed, to establish an “Islamic state” in Kūfah. He knew that he would not succeed.
Nonetheless, he embarked, according to these jurists, on his journey towards martyrdom
to set a model for his Shī‘ah followers. Prominent among the Shī‘ah jurists who have
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See, for instance, Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thoughts pp. 190-4; and Ṣāliḥī Najafābādī,
Ni‘matullāh. (1970). Shahīd Jāwīd. Tehran: Unknown.
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developed this synthetic explanation –or re-elaboration– is Ayatollah Khomeini (d.
1989).300 Each of the above three explanations of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom have important
implications for Shī‘ī strategic cultures. The legitimacy of expediency and “pragmatism”
as well as the significance of establishing a –Shī‘ah– state in Shī‘ah Islam all pertain to
how Shī‘ah Muslims interpret Ḥusayn’s actions. In particular, the interpretation affects
the Shī‘ī criteria for engaging in war or opting for peace and for how much such
decisions rely on pragmatic or deontological considerations.

It must be re-emphasized that the veneration of Shahādah in Shī‘ah Islam and the
singular place given to the “Master of the Martyrs” also indicated the special character of
Ḥusayn’s actions. It is worth noting that out of the twelve Shī‘ah Imāms, who are all
considered “infallible” by Shī‘ah Muslims, it was only Ḥusayn who was killed on the
battlefield. By most measures, Ḥusayn’s tradition is an exception among the Shī‘ah
Imāms. The majority, if not all, of the Shī‘ah Imāms after Ḥusayn followed a cautious
and prudent course of actions. Strategically speaking, this also contributed to the
emergence of the notion that Shahādah is a measure to be employed in extraordinary
situations. Enayat argues that
“[w]ith the increasing tendency of the Shī‘īs to a passive form of
taqiyyah, and acquiescence in the established order, the concept of
the martyrdom of Ḥusayn as vicarious atonement prevailed over its
interpretation as a militant assertion of the Shī‘ī causes.
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See, for instance, Ayatollah Khomeini, Ṣaḥīfih Nūr, Vol. 17, pp. 52-61. Retrieved from www.tebyan.net
on January 23, 2012.
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Concomitantly,

weeping,

and

not

edification

or

political

indoctrination, came to be recognised as the sole aim of all
reminiscence of Ḥusayn.”301 (emphases in the text)
The spectacle of Karbalā proved to be a charismatic one for Shī‘ah Muslims. It
led to annual commemoration of the martyrdom of Ḥusayn in the Muslim month of
Muḥarram by Shī‘ah Muslims. The Muḥarram processions, which are not unlike
Christian commemoration of the passions of Christ on Good Friday, continue to be one of
the major Shī‘ah religious ceremonies.302 These annual ceremonies were sanctioned and
encouraged by the leaders of the early Shī‘ah community –and notably by the Shī‘ah
Imāms who succeeded Ḥusayn.303 The Shī‘ah Imāms also encouraged their followers to
use the opportunity of commemorating Ḥusayn’s martyrdom to revisit the central notions
of Wilāyah and Walāyah in Shī‘ah Islam.304 One can conceive of at least two strategic
implications of these commemorations. First, they functioned as an annual reminder of a
301

See Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. p. 183.
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Throughout centuries, the processions of Muḥarram have developed into an elaborate and complex ritual
with cultural, social, and indeed political implications. The processions often extend the first ten nights of
the month of Muḥarram culminating in the massive processions of 10th of Muḥarram –the day of ‘Āshūrā.
Most devout Shī‘ah Muslims, however, observe a general attitude of sorrow for the following forty days –
i.e. till the end of the Muslim month of Ṣafar. The processions have entered into the realm of public arts in
the form of a genre of dramatic representations called Ta‘zīyih. On 10th of Muḥarram, artists reproduce the
events of Karbalā and the martyrdom of Ḥusayn in Ta‘zīyih. See Malekpour, Jamshid. (2004). The Islamic
Drama. Portland: Frank Cass Publishers. Professor Richard Bulliet believes that the formal “ritual” of
commemorating the martyrdom of Ḥusayn was first developed during the reign of the Shī‘ah Būyid
dynasty in Persia in the tenth and eleventh centuries [R. Bulliet, personal communication, March 5, 2010].
See also Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. p. 181-2.
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See ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 98, pp. 1-106 for numerous reports regarding
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martyrdom.
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See Chapter V and ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 71, p. 354. In the Ḥadīth reported by
‘Allāmih Majlisī, the Shī‘ah Imām encourages his followers to meet each other frequently and to use every
gathering opportunity “to revive and strengthen the Imām’s Amr.” Here, Amr, which can loosely be
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turning point in the history of Shī‘ah Islam.305 It caused socialization and internalization
of a strategic attitude towards pain, loss, and suffering. Secondly, the processions
functioned as a hallmark ritual of Shī‘ah Muslims to distinguish them from the majority
Sunnī Muslims. As a collective effort towards an elaborate ceremony, it also strengthened
the community bonds much needed for a minority group to survive.
While informing the collective identity of Shī‘ah Muslims, the events of Karbalā
began to be theorized by prominent Shī‘ah jurists. The effort aimed at reconciling
Ḥusayn’s assertive and proactive actions on the one hand and other Shī‘ah Imāms’
political “quietism” on the other. As will be discussed in Chapter V, the notions of
Wilāyah and Walāyah were central in the accommodation of the two seemingly
contradictory approaches within a single theological framework. To the early Shī‘ah
jurists, however, a primary theological challenge was the tension between Ḥusayn’s
journey to Karbalā and the Qur’ānic prohibition against self-destruction expressed in the
verse 2:195. The verse categorically rejects committing suicide.306 As will be discussed in
the following Chapter, the universal prohibition of self-destruction in this verse has
served as one of the main theological justifications for the doctrine of Taqīyyah in Shī‘ah
Islam. One of the general deductions drawn from the verse has been, for instance, the
limits of a Muslim’s duty “to enjoin the good and to prohibit the evil.” Shī‘ah jurists often
argue that if such an enjoining or prohibiting may lead to one’s destruction, one must
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The martyrdom of Ḥusayn in Karbalā was a major turning point in Shī‘ah history and not, as some
scholars have claimed, the starting point of Shī‘ah Muslims as a community. As will be discussed in
Chapter V, the distinct foundation of Shī‘ah Islam compared to Sunnī Islam has been the notions of
Wilāyah and Walāyah going back to the time of the Prophet.
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avoid it. The fact that Ḥusayn had framed his journey towards Karbalā as an attempt to
“enjoin the good and prohibit the evil”307 along with the mainstream Shī‘ī belief that he
had known the result of this journey created a major theoretical dilemma for Shī‘ah
jurists.
The early generations of Shī‘ah jurists resolved the tension by explicitly or
implicitly suggesting that Ḥusayn was not certain about his coming death when he
embarked on the journey towards Kūfah. Some of these jurists have argued that, given his
high stature in the Muslim society, Ḥusayn felt he would not be harmed. Some prominent
Shī‘ah jurists such as Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 1044 C.E.), Shaykh alṬūsī, and Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī (d. 1153 C.E.) have suggested this line of argument.308
The belief in Ḥusayn’s incertitude about his fate was later on rejected by the mainstream
Shī‘ah jurists as well as the laity. During the early centuries of Shī‘ah Islam, the notion of
‘Iṣmah –or the “infallibility of the Imāms”– gradually became an established Shī‘ī
popular belief. Meanwhile, the notion was further elaborated by various Shī‘ah jurists and
theologians. The far-reaching implications of the belief in the infallibility of the Imāms
and the “Imām’s penetrating knowledge of the universe” contradicted309 the arguments
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See, for instance, Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Masā’il al-‘Akbarīyyah; al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, Tanzīh al-Anbīyā’;
Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Talkhīṣ al-Shāfī; and Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī, Majma‘ al-Bayān.
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It is not difficult to find similar cases in early Shī‘ah texts where the image and the status of the Shī‘ah
Imāms do not quite match the subsequent Shī‘ī belief in their infallibility and their extraordinary
knowledge. In fact, scholars such as Mohsen Kadivar have used some of these texts to argue that early
Shī‘ah Muslims viewed their Imāms as “extremely knowledgeable and pious, yet fallible men.” The reader
can find other examples of the discrepancy between the current mainstream Shī‘ī belief in the infallibility
of the Imāms on the one hand and the early depictions of them in Shī‘ah sources on the other in Modarresi
Tabatabaii, Hossein. Crisis and Consolidation in the Formative Period of Shi‘ite Islam.
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proposed by early jurists310 regarding Ḥusayn’s possible lack of certainty about his
imminent death in Karbalā when he left Medina.
Arguably aware of the growing tension between the above solution and the belief
in the infallibility of the Imāms, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī
proposed another possible explanation.311 They argued that, given the increasing political
pressure on Ḥusayn to announce an oath of allegiance to Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah, Ḥusayn
had really had no other choice. In other words, Ḥusayn was to choose between humility
of being forced to support Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah or an honorable death; and he chose the
latter course. The explanation is further supported by Ḥusayn’s various statements
comparing the two options. The above line of argument has received a more favorable
response by later Fuqahā. These Fuqahā often viewed Ḥusayn’s martyrdom as a
watershed in Islam that had been predicted even by the Prophet himself.312 The above
theological explanation was also important in shaping Shī‘ī strategic cultures; for it
projected Ḥusayn’s action –as a manifestation of Shahādah par excellence– to be a
proactive one. It was a conscious decision made in accordance to the “principles” at a
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It must be noted that the above argument is not the only explanation proposed by Shaykh al-Mufīd and
other early Shī‘ah jurists. There are other possible explanations offered by these jurists that are more
compatible with the belief in the infallibility of the Imāms.
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There are various secondary Shī‘ah sources that attribute a number of Ḥadīths to the Prophet and ‘Alī
containing prophecies regarding the fate of Ḥusayn and his martyrdom in Karbalā. These Ḥadīths often
highly praise Ḥusayn as a “chosen devotee” to God and depict his future journey towards his death as an
epic one [see, for instance, Shaykh al-Islām al-Juwiynī, Farā’id al-Simṭayn, Vol. 2; and al-Qundūzi alḤanafī, Yanābi‘ al-Mawaddah li-dhawī al-Qurbā]. Various Shī‘ah sources have also reported that, once
about to leave Medina, Ḥusayn wrote to his fellow clan members of Banī Hāshim to accompany him in his
journey towards Kūfah. According to these reports, in this letter, Ḥusayn predicted martyrdom for himself
and his companions and humiliation for those of Banī Hāshim who stayed behind [see Ibn Shahr Āshūb,
Manāqib Āl Abī Ṭālib, Vol. 3, p. 230; and Ḥasan ibn Sulaymān al-Ḥillī, Mukhtaṣar Baṣā’ir al-Darajāt, p. 6.
See also also ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 44, p. 310].
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time of severity and insecurity.
‘Allāmih Ḥillī, however, took the discussion to a new level.313 His argument
comes closer to Shī‘ī interpretation of Islam and the implications of the notions of
Wilāyah and Walāyah. ‘Allāmih Ḥillī argues that the decision for Hudnih, i.e. truce,
ceasefire or peace treaty, and Ḥarb, i.e. war, lies in the province of the Imām’s
authority.314 The authority comes from the Wilāyah of Imām or his exoteric status in the
sacred and “metaphysical hierarchy” of the world. An Imām possesses an “extraordinary
knowledge” of the “Reality” behind the various things and affairs. As such, he is wellpositioned, ‘Allāmih Ḥillī argued, to choose the appropriate course of action at a given
time and place. This is why Ḥusayn’s brother, Ḥasan, chose to conclude a peace treaty
with Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah’s father, while Ḥusayn refused to acquiesce to the rule of
Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah. Both actions are, according to ‘Allāmih Ḥillī, equally legitimate
and religiously warranted given the status of Ḥasan and Ḥusayn as the “bearers of the
Divine Wilāyah.” ‘Allāmih Ḥillī concludes that Ḥusayn could have chosen peace because
of his legal and religious authority.
There is an important implication of ‘Allāmih Ḥillī’s interpretation of Ḥusayn’s
decision to fight, even though it was elaborated upon by later Fuqahā. The Wilāyah of the
Imām means not only the legitimacy of his actions and decisions, but also the ultimate
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For ‘Allāmih Ḥillī’s extensive discussion of various legal aspects of Hudnih and Ḥarb, see ‘Allāmih
Ḥillī, Tadhkirah al-Fuqahā’, Vol. 9, pp. 5-390. Another prominent jurist, Shahīd al-Thānī, –i.e. the Second
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expediency embedded in such actions and decisions.315 Since the Imāms are, according to
Shī‘ī beliefs, an essential part of the Divine design for the humanity, their actions are in
line with the ultimate goal of creation. Such goal is inherently benevolent. This means
that Ḥusayn’s refusal to accommodate Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah’s rule and his death in
Karbalā was necessary in the grand scheme of events that were to follow, even though in
the short run the decision might have appeared to be futile.316
Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī317 made the next important contribution to the jurisprudential
study of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom in Karbalā. Murtaẓawī reviews the major points of
differentiation between ‘Allāmih Ḥillī and Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī regarding the issue of war
and peace.318 ‘Allāmih Ḥillī in Tadhkirah al-Fuqahā’ argues that in no condition
Mudāhinah, i.e. opting for truce or peace treaty, is religiously “obligatory,” or al-Wājib.
Such a course of action may be, nonetheless, legitimate if the expediency and concerns
for the Shī‘ah community’s survival demand it.319 The argument was in line with
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i.e. truce and peace treaties, in Shī‘ah juridical texts. The stark contrast between the peace treaty of “Imām
Ḥasan” and the martyrdom of “Imām Ḥusayn” has demanded quite a large number of theoretical efforts by
Shī‘ah theologians aimed at resolving the seeming tension. One outcome of these efforts has been further
theorization of the notion of prudence and its legitimacy based on Ḥasan’s peace treaty with Mu‘āwīyah ibn
Abī Sufyān. In the following Chapter on expediency, a brief analysis of this peace treaty in shaping Shī‘ī
strategic cultures is offered.
316

The notion that Ḥusayn’s martyrdom in Karbalā was meant to be an essential step in the progress of
Islam as the final message of God is seared into Shī‘ī collective imagination. There are many references to
this image of Karbalā as the “guarantor of Islam’s future.” Ayatollah Khomeini, for instance, declared that
“it has been Muḥarram and Ṣafar [i.e. the two months in Muslim calendar associated with the events of
Karbalā and the commemoration of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom by Shī‘ah Muslims] that have protected Islam”
[see Ayatollah Khomeini, Ṣaḥīfih Nūr, Vol. 15, p. 330. Retrieved from www.tebyan.net on January 23,
2012].
317

He is also known as Muḥaqqiq al-Thānī.

318

Murtaẓawī, S. Ḍ. ‘Āshūra dar Fiqh, pp. 51-7.

319

See ‘Allāmih Ḥillī, Tadhkirah al-Fuqahā’, Vol. 9, pp. 352-9 –see p. 358 in particular.

119

‘Allāmih Ḥillī’s other assertion that Ḥusayn’s decision to fight was a choice between two
religiously allowed courses of actions, i.e. war against injustice or an expedient peace.
In contrast, Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī argues that opting for truce may become
religiously obligatory for the Imām if the community’s survival is hinged upon it.320 As
Murtaẓawī notices, Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī specifically refers to the Qur’ānic command
against self-destruction.321 According to him, the absolute terms of this verse
circumscribe any seemingly universal command for war in Islam. Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī’s
argument also implies that the survival of Shī‘ah community at the time did not hinge
upon Ḥusayn’s refusal to militarily engage his enemies.
In Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī’s theological reading of the events of Karbalā, one may
find an example of what was to become the mainstream Shī‘ī understanding of those
events. He argues that Ḥusayn’s decision to fight could have been the result of a number
of considerations: that he did not trust Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah would at least in appearance
respect a treaty; that, as some historical sources have argued, there was no real offer of
truce and political “quietism” to begin with; that he believed the actual choice was
between a humiliating death and an honorable one; and that he saw in a humiliating truce
320
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321

See the verse 2:195 in the Qur’ān.

120

with Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah a major damage to the “foundations of Islam.” Therefore, in
contrast to ‘Allāmih Ḥillī, Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī did not see in the actions of Ḥusayn a
possible justification for the universal application of the doctrine of Shahādah. Instead,
the decision for war and almost certain martyrdom was shaped to a great extent by
exceptional historical, social, and psychological contexts of the time. This is further
supported by the fact that, as discussed before, Ḥusayn absolved his companions of their
oaths of allegiance and allowed them to leave.
The question of Hudnih, i.e. truce or peace treaty, versus Shahādah continued to
be a theological problem for many Shī‘ah theologians and jurists. The underlying
strategic question was, however, when and where Shī‘ah Muslims should emulate
Ḥusayn’s Shahādah and when and where they should follow Ḥasan’s peace treaty. It
seemed that the Qur’ān provided enough support for both sides of the argument.322
Therefore, Shī‘ah theologians had to tackle the question of war and peace with their
analytical and textual skills. For a minority community under constant threat of
extinction, the answer to this theological question would have had significant
implications. In his encyclopedia of the Shī‘ah jurisprudential traditions,323 Muḥammad
Ḥasan al-Najafī324 reviews various juridical opinions regarding Hudnih and tries to strike
a balance between appreciation of necessities and that of survival on the one hand and the
“idealist” doctrine of Shahādah on the other. Similar to Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī, al-Najafī
322

While the verse 2:195 was interpreted as a categorical prohibition against self-destruction, verse 2:244
appeared to be a universal invitation to “fight in the cause of God.”
323

Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ Sharāyi‘ al-Islām is a multi-volume collection of Shī‘ah juridical discourses
and the opinions of prominent Shī‘ah jurists of the past.

324

d. 1850 C.E.

121

views Ḥusayn’s martyrdom as an extreme and exceptional case.325 Ḥusayn’s actions, he
argues, should be understood in the light of the extraordinary circumstances as well as
Ḥusayn’s special status –even arguably among the Shī‘ah Imāms. As such, it does not
relieve Shī‘ah Muslims’ from their duty to be cautious and judicious in protecting
themselves, their religion and their community either through peace or war.326 The line of
argument has been the main reason why few Shī‘ah jurists have dealt with the events of
Karbalā as direct sources of religious reasoning, or Ijtihād. In other words, many Shī‘ah
jurists perceived Ḥusayn’s unique action –compared to those of other Shī‘ah Imāms– as a

tradition beyond the realm of Ijtihād. Instead, the story of Ḥusayn became the epic story
of Shī‘ah community and one of the pivotal foundations of their self-perception.
The above understanding of the doctrine of Shahādah as the last measure –and
reserved for extraordinary circumstances– has been a mainstream paradigm among
Shī‘ah jurists regarding the matter. The paradigm projected the story of Ḥusayn as the
metaphor of an “ideal life,” a life that could serve to inspire Shī‘ah Muslims but could not
be imitated by them.327 The most significant exception to this mainstream interpretation
belongs to Ayatollah Khomeini. While acknowledging the special status of Ḥusayn,
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See Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ Sharāyi‘al-Islām, Vol. 21, p. 3-50; and
Ibid., Vol. 21, p. 295.

326

See Ibid., Vol. 21, pp. 295-6; and Murtaẓawī, S. Ḍ. ‘Āshūra dar Fiqh. pp. 68-9.

327

This understanding of Ḥusayn’s “idealistic” martyrdom continues to exist to this day. As recent as 2011,
Grand Ayatollah Waḥīd al-Khurāsānī reiterated the tenets of this interpretation in his message for 2011
annual commemoration of the events of Karbalā. His articulation is particularly important for Waḥīd alKhurāsānī is arguably the most prominent “traditional” Marja‘ in Qum’s Shī‘ah seminary and is considered
by many to be the head –i.e. Za‘īm– of that seminary. His understanding of the “lessons of ‘Āshūrā”
follows the mainstream Shī‘ī approach and differs decidedly with that of Ayatollah Khomeini [see
www.vahid-khorasani.ir, Retrieved November 28, 2011].

122

Ayatollah Khomeini took issues with the notion that Ḥusayn’s action was beyond jurists’
reasoning. Similar to other reported traditions of the Prophet and the Shī‘ah Imāms,
Ayatollah Khomeini argued, Ḥusayn’s martyrdom and the events of Karbalā might be
used as a source for religious jurisdiction.328 He acknowledged that Ḥusayn’s
“extraordinary sacrifice” had been for the higher purpose of protecting the “core of
Islam.” Yet, he argued that a qualified Shī‘ah jurist might as well recognize a moment of
such vital threat to Islam.329 Upon such recognition, Ayatollah Khomeini believed, the
jurist could refer to Ḥusayn’s tradition and employ the doctrine of Shahādah. He then
offers a number of examples to show what he means by a vital threat to the core of Islam.
These include “a threat to the lives or dignity of a group of Muslims,” “a threat to destroy
the traditions of Islam,” “an attempt to remove a ‘validating proof’ [i.e. Ḥujjat] of Islam,”
and “an attempt to destroy the supreme signs and symbols of Islam [i.e. Sha‘ā’ir alIslām]”– such as the house of Ka‘bah in Mecca. Once such a threat is looming, a Shī‘ah
jurist could not side with “short-term expediency,” refer to political prudence, or resort to
the doctrine of Taqīyyah, Khomeini argued. Indeed, the reference to “the lives or dignity
of a group of Muslims” in his argument can be applied to the Shī‘ah Muslims as a whole
as well as smaller Shī‘ah minority communities. The argument brings the doctrine of
Shahādah to the fore of Shī’ī strategic culture according to Ayatollah Khomeini. On the
practical level, he employed this doctrine in formulating Iran’s war with Iraq in the
1980s. The “forgotten” doctrine of Shahādah was revived as the tradition of “Imām
328
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Ḥusayn” to protect Shī‘ah Iran. For this reason, Mesbahi argues that the doctrine of
Shahādah was the “backbone of Iran’s national security strategy during the war with
Iraq.”330 Yet, as Mesbahi notes, the “national security strategy” was not purely
nationalistic. The defensive war was not merely about protecting Iran as an independent
national unit against the invading Iraq. It was also about protecting Iran as the bastion of
Shī‘ah Islam.
This brings us to the more consequential item on the list of examples specified by
Ayatollah Khomeini. He refers to ‘validating proofs,’ i.e. Ḥujjat331, of Islam as something
to be carefully protected. Without these ‘validating proofs,’ people would get bewildered
about the religion and they might go astray, he maintained. One of the supreme examples
of these ‘validating proofs’ in Shī‘ah Islam is the sacred hierarchies of Wilāyah and
Walāyah. It was, as discussed above, in protest against the grave violation of Wilāyah by
Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah that Ḥusayn laid his life on the line. It was, Khomeini claimed, the
serious violation of the same sacred notion by the Shah that allowed Khomeini to employ
the doctrine of Shahādah in his struggle against the Pahlavī dynasty.332
Ayatollah Khomeini also brought the above argument to its logical extreme. He
asserted that Shī‘ah Muslims are obliged not only to protect Wilāyah once threatened,
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they must also strive to establish Wilāyah once it has been destroyed.333 He argued that
Ḥusayn’s journey towards Kūfah was a proactive act of “volunteerism” to establish an
“Islamic state” based on Ḥusayn’s Wilāyah. Ayatollah Khomeini rejected the
interpretations of Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī and Ṣāḥib al-Jawāhir334, who had suggested that once
in Karbalā, Ḥusayn had had no option but to fight. Instead, Khomeini saw the decision to
go to Kūfah as an essentially deliberate one despite Ḥusayn’s knowledge of its fate.
Ḥusayn’s Wilāyah demanded, in other words, a journey that would end in martyrdom.335

It is not surprising, therefore, that one of the outcomes of the Iranian Revolution has been
a political structure built upon Ayatollah Khomeini’s theory of Wilāyat Faqīh.336
The Mystical Dimension of Shahādah
Before visiting the implications of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom for Shī‘ī understanding of
Jihād, it is worth discussing the mystical theme of Shahādah in Shī‘ah Islam. Shī‘ah
Muslims trace this mystical theme to a Prophetic tradition.337 In addition, there exists the
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A brief discussion of the notion of Wilāyat Faqīh is offered in Chapter V. For more information, see
Ayatollah Khomeini’s Ḥukūmah al-Islāmīyyah. Mesbahi offers an insightful analysis of various
ramifications of Ayatollah Khomeini’s political theory for Iran’s modern politics. This includes arguably the
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In particular, Shī‘ah sources refer to a reported conversation between the Prophet and Ḥārithih ibn
Mālik, one of his disciples. When Ḥārithih ibn Mālik conveyed to the Prophet the “extraordinary spiritual
visions” he had received, he asked the Prophet to pray so that God “grants him martyrdom.” The Prophet
did so and shortly after, Ḥārithih ibn Mālik was killed in a small battle [see ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-
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Ṣūfī treatment of the notion of Shahādah. As discussed before, the word Shahādah
essentially means to testify and Shahīd is the one who testifies. In the Ṣūfī literature, it is
not unusual to find the term Shahīd in reference to those Ṣūfīs who have achieved the
highest level of mystical experience, namely the experience of unification with God.
Since such an experience involves, Ṣūfīs believed, the annihilation of one’s self in the
Divine Self, it implied a sort of demise or “martyrdom.” At the same time, according to
Ṣūfī doctrines, by sacrificing one’s self in the Divine Self, a Ṣūfī would testify the
ultimate Truth of Unity –and that there is no being other than the Being. For these
reasons, the word Shahīd, which implies both testimony to the Truth and martyrdom, has
been an apt term for the Ṣūfīs describing their ultimate religious experiences. Such
experiences were also tied to the notion of Walāyah, which is central in various Ṣūfī
traditions of Sunnī or Shī‘ah origins. A Ṣūfī Shahīd was also believed to be a “bearer of
the Divine Walāyah” for he or she had ascended through the esoteric and “metaphysical”
sacred hierarchy –a hierarchy that the term Walāyah signified.
In the context of Shī‘ah Islam, therefore, it is not surprising that the doctrine of
Shahādah had obtained a mystical undertone after the events of Karbalā. Not only
Ḥusayn literally sacrificed his self in the way of testifying the “ultimate Truth” of Islam,
but also he was the supreme “bearer of Walāyah” at the time according to Shī‘ahs.338 As

Anwār, Vol. 67, p. 174; and Abū Ja‘far Thiqat al-Islām Kuliynī, Uṣūl al-Kāfī, Vol. 2, p. 54]. According to
Shī‘ī interpretations of this report, Ḥārithih ibn Mālik’s mystical experience culminated in his desire to
thoroughly sacrifice himself through martyrdom. This notion of “mystical martyrdom” was further
elaborated by the Shī‘ah Imāms and some of the Shī‘ah theologians later on.
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In fact, one of the longest and most popular “mystical prayers” in Shī‘ah Islam, i.e. the prayer of
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such, Ḥusayn’s martyrdom was more than fulfilling a religious duty in the eyes of Shī‘ah
Muslims. It was also a gratifying mystical experience of unification with God –albeit
appearing physically painful.339 Similar to the epic Bhagavad-Gita in Hinduism, Ḥusayn’s
martyrdom in Karbalā turned the experience of battlefield in Shī‘ah Islam into an
extremely elaborate mystical experience of the highest order. The mystical flavour of
Karbalā, of course, does not mean that “mysticism” has become a driving force in Shī‘ī
strategic cultures.
The involvement of the hierarchies of Wilāyah and Walāyah in the Shī‘ī doctrine
of Shahādah has had yet another strategic implication. The “blissful state of martyrdom”
cannot be achieved unless permission is granted by an appropriate religious authority, i.e.
an authority that bears a certain level of Wilāyah and in some cases Walāyah. This is why
the overwhelming majority of Shī‘ah jurists have argued that “offensive wars” are
forbidden unless with the direct permission of an “infallible” Shī‘ah Imām.340 A Shī‘ah
killed in an “offensive battle” without such permission will not be considered a martyr
according to this ruling. In addition, many Shī‘ah jurists hold that a “defensive war” is
were killed in circumstances other than war. Yet their deaths are often understood as their final act of
testimony to the Divine Truth and as the “ultimate mystical experience” of Shahādah. This connection is
further solidified by a Ḥadīth attributed to the sixth Shī‘ah Imām, Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad, in which he says
that “[t]here is [and will be] no one among us [i.e. the Shī‘ah Imāms] not killed as a martyr” [see ‘Allāmih
Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 27, p. 209].
To further emphasize the “mysticism” of Shahādah, both ‘Alī and Ḥasan –i.e. the first and the second
Shī‘ah Imāms– have argued that a “true Shī‘ah” is eventually a martyr regardless of how he or she dies for
he or she will “achieve the Sacred Knowledge of the Divine Truth” upon death [see Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd,
Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāghah, Vol. 13, p, 111; and Shaykh Hādī al-Najafī, Mūsū‘ah Aḥādīth Ahl al-Bayt, Vol. 8,
p. 357].
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legitimate only when a qualified jurist sanctions it.341 It is only with such a sanction that
those killed in a “defensive war” are considered martyrs. In both juridical arguments
above, the Shī‘ah jurists have relied on the notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah. The extreme
nature of “offensive wars” demands the supreme religious authority of the “infallible”
Imāms who, according to Shī‘ī beliefs, possess both Wilāyah and Walāyah.342 “Defensive
wars,” although less controversial, still require a partial level of Wilāyah, or exoteric
religious authority, that a qualified Shī‘ah jurist possesses.

Shī‘ah Understanding of Jihād
Besides their effects on shaping the Shī‘ī doctrine of Shahādah, the events in
Karbalā had another important consequence. They left an enduring mark on Shī‘ī
understanding of Jihād. In recent decades and especially following the collapse of the
Soviet Union, much has been written about the notion of Jihād in Islam. Yet, the essential
difference between the Shī‘ī and the Sunnī interpretations of this notion has often been
overlooked. The Arabic word Jihād means, inter alia, exertion. Similar to the phrase
Shahādah, Jihād has been used in Muslim religious discourses in various ways. Many of
the scholars of Islam have already pointed to the incorrect translation of Jihād as “Holy
War.”343 In traditional Muslim literature the primary meaning of the term Jihād is exertion
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implying struggle with the ego. As such, sacrificing one’s comfort and life on the
battlefield for a religious cause may be considered as one of the manifestations of
Jihād.344 Accordingly, Muslim “just wars,” or “religiously sanctioned” wars, are
considered an example of Jihād by the virtue of being an extension of believers’
continuous fight against their egos. While acknowledging this broader context of the term
Jihād, this section focuses on the perception of external Jihād, or physical wars, by Shī‘ah
Muslims; for the purpose of this section is to better understand the narrative of “just war”
in Shī‘ī strategic cultures as well as their “metaphysical dimensions.”345
In Sunnī Islam, there seems to be more continuity in the general perception of
“just wars” from the time of the Prophet to the present time. Throughout his career as a
statesman, the Prophet engaged in a number of battles346 with disbelievers, or “infidels.”
Press. pp. 68-70; Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. (Fall 1982). The Spiritual Significance of jihãd. Parabola, 7(4),
14-19; and Shah-Kazemi, Reza. (Summer 2009). Recollecting the Spirit of Jihad. Sophia Perennis, 1(3),
23-51].
344

The often quoted reference in this regard is a Ḥadīth by the Prophet in which he refers to the external
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The logic behind these battles, it is often argued, was to spread Islam or to secure the
interests and the survival of the emerging and vulnerable Muslim community.347 On the
whole, one essential feature of these wars was that they were fought between believers
and “infidels.” This continued to be the essential feature of Muslim wars during the time
of the first three of the “Rightly Guided Caliphs.”348 More or less similar

conceptualization of “just wars” against “infidels” survived during the Umayyad, the
Abbasid and the Ottoman empires.349
Given the above historical context, the first Muslim civil wars that occurred
during the caliphate of ‘Alī350 did appear to be great anomalies. As a result, the Sunnī
sources have often described the period of these civil wars as the time of Fitnah, which
implies great confusion and perilous disorder. The notion that two Muslim parties had
engaged in war with each other created quite a number of theological dilemmas. It was
not clear, according to Sunnī point of view, whether such wars were religiously
legitimate. Since these civil wars did not lend themselves to the tradition of the Prophet,
347
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it was also not clear whether they could be considered as Jihād. The theological
predicament becomes yet more disturbing when one considers the parties involved in
these battles. In the Battle of Jamal, ‘Alī and some prominent disciples of the Prophet
fought against ‘Āyishah bint Abī Bakr,351 the beloved wife of the Prophet, and two other
prominent disciples352 of his. Similarly, in the Battle of Ṣiffīn some disciples of the
Prophet fought against each other.353 In the Battle of Nahrawān, ‘Alī fought against
Khawārij, an outwardly pious group of Muslims.354 Many Sunnī jurists, therefore,
refrained from definite judgments regarding these wars. They often lean towards ‘Alī’s
position for he was, after all, one of the “Rightly Guided Caliphs.” Yet, they usually
hesitated to go beyond admonishing the opposing parties in these battles for breaking the
“sacred unity” of the Ummah.355 Since there was no “disbeliever” side in these battles,
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These two prominent disciples were Zubayr ibn ‘Awwām (d. 656 C.E.) and Ṭalḥah ibn ‘Ubaydullāh (d.
656 C.E.). It must be mentioned that as the war was to break out, Zubayr ibn ‘Awwām left the battlefield
following a reported conversation with his former companion ‘Alī. For more discussion, see the following
Chapter.
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many Sunnī jurists avoided calling them Jihād, and those killed in these wars martyrs.356
The theological dilemmas regarding these battles had first emerged, in fact, during
the military preparations for them. Both ‘Alī and his opponents had difficulties
convincing some of their followers why they should fight with their “Muslim brothers.”
‘Alī often resorted to his political legitimacy and his “Wilāyah” in his exhortation of his
doubtful followers. Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān, on the other hand, employed his
powerful propaganda machine to cast doubt on ‘Alī’s adherence to Islam. In fact, he
succeeded in convincing many people in his stronghold, al-Shām, to believe that ‘Alī was
no longer a “true Muslim.” Khawārij also claimed similar charges of Irtidād, or leaving
the religion, against ‘Alī. Both Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān’s and Khawārij’s solutions

show the difficulty of justifying wars between two groups of Muslims according to Sunnī
Islam.
To Shī‘ah Muslims, the situation appeared much more clear. Not only was ‘Alī
the first Shī‘ah Imām and, according to Shī‘ah beliefs, the most prominent disciple of the
Prophet, but also he was the “bearer of the sacred Wilāyah and Walāyah.” Any war
against such a man was by definition illegitimate regardless of who had fought it. As a
result, Shī‘ah Muslims had no theological hesitation in believing that the battles of ‘Alī
were true Jihāds. They also praised and venerated those companions of ‘Alī killed in the
battlefields as martyrs. The above perspective divorced the Shī‘ī understanding of Jihād
from the mainstream Sunnī perception. For a war to be called Jihād, it was no longer
356

‘Alī’s wars during his caliphate and their implications for Shī‘ī strategic cultures, especially in terms of
the Shī‘ī doctrine of Taqīyyah and political prudence, will be discussed in some more detail in the
following Chapter under the subtitle “Principled Action and Expediency: The Legacy of ‘Alī.”
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necessary for one side to consist of “infidels.” Two groups of Muslims can indeed engage
in Jihād, according to Shī‘ah history, and only one side may end up in martyrdom.357 In
such cases, one group is believed to be the followers of “the Truth,” while the other side
is believed to be either hypocrite or ignorant. Not surprisingly, the criteria for adherence
to “the Truth” in the Shī‘ī interpretation have been developed around the notions of
Wilāyah and Walāyah. In the resulting discourse of Jihād in Shī‘ah Islam, the notion of
“just war” was tied to the supreme principle of Divine Justice –instead of nominal
adherence to Islam. Justice, as will be discussed in Chapter V, is at the core of the sacred
hierarchies of Wilāyah and Walāyah in Shī‘ah Islam.358 According to Shī‘ī discourses,
any war waged by Muslims in the cause of justice may be deemed a Jihād in the true
sense of the term regardless of the religious status of the opposing side.359
The shift in the paradigm of Jihād in Shī‘ah Islam was, in fact, a manifestation of
a central theological feature of Shī‘ah Islam, namely the doctrinal version of the Divine
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Note that in Sunnī Islam, the notion of war between two groups of Muslims was developed later on.
Articulating from a majority position, however, Sunnī jurisdiction discusses the notion of Ahl al-Baghy, i.e.
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According to mainstream Sunnī jurisdiction, it is the duty of Muslims to fight against Ahl al-Baghy;
although the war with them is usually called Qitāl, i.e. war, and not Jihād. Note the contrast between
minority Shī‘ahs’ point of emphasis on “justice” –and hence the legitimacy of rising against an “unjust
rule”– on the one hand and the majority Sunnīs’ point of emphasis on legitimate rulers and the prohibition
of challenging such a rule on the other. See, for instance, Imām al-Shāfi‘ī, Kitāb al-Umm, Vol. 4, pp. 170251 –see pp. 226-238 in particular.
358

One of the important contributions to Shī‘ah Studies in general and the study of justice and spirituality
in Shī‘ah Islam in particular is Lakhani, M. Ali. (2006). The Sacred Foundations of Justice in Islam: The
Teachings of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib. Bloomington: World Wisdom. Reza Shah-Kazemi’s essay on “A Sacred
Conception of Justice: Imam ‘Ali’s Letter to Malik al-Ashtar” (Ibid. pp. 61-108) is of particular relevance.
359

Shī‘ī discourses sometimes refer to one of the verses of the Qur’ān regarding Jihād, i.e. verse 2:193, in
this matter. The verse does not mention “infidels” as the targets of Jihād. Instead, it describes them as alẒālimīn, i.e. those who commit injustice. The verse is particularly significant for it has been referred to by
the prominent Sunnī jurist, Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi‘ī, to justify “offensive Jihād against infidels.” See
below.
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Justice. Similar to Sunnī Mu‘tazilīs360, Shī‘ah theologians emphasized the absolute
justness of God. They viewed the principle of justice as the fundamental moral principle
from which other moral virtues were derived. The reverence for the principle of justice in
Shī‘ah theology was accompanied by an acute sensitivity to social justice among the
Shī‘ah community.361 Shī‘ī scholars developed a keen theoretical bent towards reflecting
upon justice and injustice. They further established the theological and political emphasis
on justice by quoting a Ḥadīth by the Prophet according to which “a state may survive
with infidelity, but [it] would not survive with injustice.”362 Meanwhile, the scrupulous
character of ‘Alī and his rule as the caliph consolidated the central place of justice in
Shī‘ah theological edifice. Venerated as the “Imām of Justice,” or Imām al-‘Adl, ‘Alī has

360

Mu‘tazilīs were an early group of Muslim theologians who believed in, inter alia, the power of
reasoning in interpreting the Qur’ān. They also preached “moral essentialism.” The Mu‘tazilī School was
the dominant school of theology in the Sunnī world until about the tenth century when the rivaling Ash‘arī
School marginalized them. The Ash‘arī School advocated a closer adherence to the literal meaning of the
sacred Text, believed in a more limited role for human reasoning faculty and understood moral rules within
–and dependent upon– the teachings of religion [see Frank, Richard M. (2006). Early Islamic Theology:
The Mu‘tazilites and al-Ash‘ari. Texts and Studies on the Development of History of Kalām. Aldershot:
Ashgate Publications; and Martin, R. C., Woodward, M. R., & Atmaja, D. S. (1997). Defenders of Reason
in Islam: Mu‘tazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol. Oxford: Oneworld Publications. Part I
provides some useful historical information about Classical Mu‘tazilī. See also Abū al-Fatḥ Shahristānī, alMilal wal-Niḥal, Vol. 1, pp. 43-84].
361

The Qur’ān and the tradition of the Prophet offered the theological platform for this peculiar attention to
the notion of social justice. This, of course, does not mean that the questions of social and Divine Justice
did not appear in Sunnī theology. These questions, however, obtained a prominent role within Shī‘ī Kalām,
or theology. For an extensive discussion, see Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā, (2009). ‘Adl Ilāhī. Tehran: Ṣadrā
Publications.
362

“Al-mulk yabqā ma‘a al-kufr, wa lā yabqā ma‘a al-ẓulm” is the famous Ḥadīth reported in both Shī‘ī and
Sunnī sources. See, for instance, Shaykh al-Mufīd, Kitāb al-Amāli, p. 310. Given the strong emphasis on
justice, those Shī‘ī jurists who supported the political legitimacy of the rulers did so by arguing that these
rulers were “just rulers.” In comparison, some of the Sunnī jurists have argued –in a rather Hobbesian way–
that the foundation of political legitimacy is in the provision of security and order by state. For an extensive
discussion of political legitimacy in Islām, see Feirahi, Davoud. (2009). Qudrat, Dānish wa Mashrū‘īyat
dar Islām. Tehran: Nashr Niy. Note that the issues of Kufr, i.e. disbelief, and Ẓulm, i.e. injustice or tyranny,
relates to the notions Ḥaqq Allāh, or “duties towards God,” and Ḥaqq al-Nās, or “duties towards fellow
human beings,” in Shī‘ah theology and Shī‘ah jurisprudence. See Kadivar, Mohesn. (2008). Ḥaqq al-Nās:
Islām wa Ḥuqūq Bashar. Tehran: Kawīr Publications.
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become the icon of justice in Shī‘ī discourses.363 His actions have often been considered
by Shī‘ah Muslims as examples of just deeds, and his wars, of course, as examples of just
wars.
The final turn in the Shī‘ī formulation of Jihād took place in Karbalā. The Shī‘ī
narration of the events emphasizes the “utter injustice” that was inflicted upon the
“House of the Prophet.” The battle was interpreted, inter alia, as one between the Truth,
which is associated with Justice in the Qur‘an364, and falsehood. It was a legitimate Jihād
against persecution and injustices. The event, therefore, sealed the essential character of
Jihād in Shī‘ah Islam. The Battle of Karbalā in Shī‘ī strategic cultures, it must be noted,
is considered Jihād par excellence. As such, it weakened the association of Jihād in its
Shī‘ī formulation with the “spread of Islam.”365 The above approach to Jihād was
cogently summarized in one of the well-known Shī‘ī traditions. According to this
tradition, the Prophet has said that “[t]he most commendable of all Jihāds is [preaching]
the word of justice at the presence of an unjust ruler.”366 In parallel to this turn of
emphasis to justice, Shī‘ah eschatology emerged around the same notion. The coming of
Muḥammad al-Mahdī, the Shī‘ah twelfth Imām, is believed to usher in an era of justice in
the world. The prophesied battles of Muḥammad al-Mahdī have been projected to be
363

See Lakhani, M. Ali. The Sacred Foundations of Justice in Islam.

364

See the verses 6:115, 16:76, and 31:13 in the Qur’ān.

365

It is not, therefore, unexpected that Shī‘ah rulers have easily invoked the metaphor of Ḥusayn’s
martyrdom in their wars with neighboring Muslim countries. In pre-modern era, Shāh Ismā‘īl (d. 1524
C.E.) of the Safavid dynasty employed the imagery of Karbalā during the Battle of Chāldurān (1514 C.E.)
against the Ottoman Empire. In modern times, Ayatollah Khomeini used this imagery during the Iran-Iraq
War (1980-8). In neither case, the Shī‘ah leaders faced major difficulties in calling their wars with fellow
Muslims Jihād.
366

See Muḥammad al-Riyshahrī, Mīzān al-Ḥikmah, Vol. 3, pp. 1943-4, Ḥadīth No. 2690; and also
Ayatollah Muntaẓirī, Dīrāsāt fī Wilāyah al-Faqīh wal-Fiqh al-Dawlah al-Islāmīyyah, Vol. 2, p. 245.
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about the “spread of justice.”367
The triangle of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom, Jihād, and justice offered a unique paradigm
for the Shī‘ah community. In fact, one of the frequently quoted phrases in Shī‘ī popular
culture declares that “every day is ‘Āshūrā, every land is Karbalā.”368 An underlying
assumption of this popular phrase was the atemporal and aspatial nature of what
happened in Karbalā. Ḥusayn’s “fight against injustice”369 was venerated as a sacred ideal
and a supreme example of man’s inherent desire for justice. As discussed before, the
veneration of Ḥusayn has not been generally translated into the notion that Shī‘ah
Muslims should follow the example of their martyred Imām. Yet, combined with Shī‘ah
eschatology, the events of Karbalā led to the emergence of a Shī‘ī “philosophy of history”
built around the notion of justice and its eventual triumph. As Shī‘ah Muslims rose to
power in the Safavid Persia and the minority became the majority, the flavor of this
metaphor gradually changed. While the pre-Safavid emphasis was on Ḥusayn’s
victimization, the new discourses became more assertive culminating in modern

367

A brief discussion of Shī‘ah eschatology in relation to Shī‘ī strategic cultures will follow at the end of
Chapter V.
368

“Kullu yawmin ‘Āshūrā, kullu arḍin Karbalā.” As mentioned before, however, Shī‘ah Muslims
generally did not interpret this phrase as a prescription to rebel against unjust rulers whenever the
opportunity presented itself. The mainstream approach has been more cautious and sensitive to practical
concerns. Even the Shī‘ah Imāms who followed Ḥusayn generally refrained from radical political actions.
The above phrase, therefore, was often treated as a description of an enduring social reality, namely that of
widespread injustice committed against the minority Shī‘ah community. Several Shī‘ī traditions reinforced
the exceptionality of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom in the battlefield. In addressing a fervent group of Muslims who
were pressing him to declare Jihād, ‘Alī says “be patient […] and do not move your swords following your
ego […] for one amongst you who dies in the bed having obtained the true knowledge of God, of his
Prophet, and of Ahl al-Bayt, has passed away as a martyr” [see ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Nahj al-Balāghah,
Sermon 190].
369

A common epithet of Ḥusayn among Shī‘ah Muslims is al-Maẓlūm, which means the “victim of
injustice.” For an interesting discussion of this word and its connotations, see Enayat, Hamid. Modern
Islamic Political Thought. p. 183.
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“revisionist” narrations. In these modern narrations, Ḥusayn emerged as one who had
fought for justice and later on, during the Islamic Revolution of 1979, for freedom.370 As
a result, the story of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom has turned into a powerful mixture of myth and
epic in Shī‘ah collective consciousness.
While Shī‘ī discourses of Jihād with their emphasis on justice are markedly
different from Sunnī understandings, there are more similarities between Shī‘ah and
Sunnī in terms of the legal aspects of Jihād. In fact, in several areas of jurisdiction, Shī‘ah
jurists seem to have generally followed their Sunnī counterparts in their legal rulings. In
terms of Shī‘ī fatwās related to Jihād, this situation has caused some inconsequential
rulings. Most of the Sunnī rulings on Jihād concern wars between Muslims on the one

370

‘Alī Sharī‘tī (d. 1975), a gifted preacher, was particularly influential in formulating Ḥusayn’s martyrdom
in more “activist” and “volunteerist” terms prior to the Revolution. In fact, Sharī‘tī may be considered as a
prime example of a group of Muslim “activists” without any formal and traditional education in Shī‘ah
Islam who, through self-education, began to re-interpret Shī‘ah theology and Shī‘ah history. Sharī‘tī
believed that Ḥusayn’s decision to go to Kūfah was a conscious decision rooted in a deep sense of social
responsibility [see Sharī‘tī, ‘Alī. (2011). Ḥusayn Wārith Ādam. Tehran: Qalam]. His formulation of
Shahādah was also imbued with mystical notion of Divine unification through the act of martyrdom, for
which Ḥusayn was the “supreme role model.” Sharī‘tī argued that Ḥusayn’s martyrdom was not about
winning a battle. Instead, Ḥusayn succeeded by “sending a message through his martyrdom” to the next
generations [Ibid.]. He also emphasized the role of Ḥusayn’s surviving sister, Zaynab bint ‘Alī, in
“propagating the message of Karbalā.” In addition, Sharī‘tī dismissed the traditional Shī‘ī understanding of
Taqīyyah as strategies of expediency. He reinterpreted Taqīyyah as either “Taqīyyah Waḥdat,” i.e. Taqīyyah
aimed at strengthening unity among Muslims, or “Taqīyyah Mubārizih,” i.e. tactics of concealment for
those who struggle against injustice. He claimed that Taqīyyah Mubārizih is not about protection of
individual believers, but about protection of the Shī‘ī “belief system” itself [see Sharī‘tī, ‘Alī. (2011).
Tashayyu‘ ‘Alawī, Tashayyu‘ Ṣafawī. Tehran: Sipīdih Bāwarān]. As such, Sharī‘tī saw Taqīyyah as a
practical tactic for “activists” in their “never-ending struggle against unjust rulers.” To Sharī‘tī, history of
mankind was the continuation of the archetypical rivalry between Abel and Cain, or the forces of good and
evil. The evil was also associated with socioeconomic injustice, discriminations, and property ownership in
Sharī‘tī’s discourse [see Sharī‘tī, ‘Alī. (2008). Islām Shināsī. Tehran: Ilhām]. It was within such a blackand-white philosophy of history that Sharī‘tī re-conceptualized quite a number of Shī‘ī notions such as
Shahādah and Taqīyyah. These reinterpretations often diverged from the traditional Shī‘ī theological
discourses, especially on Taqīyyah [see the following Chapter]. Nevertheless, his formulations of Shahādah
and Taqīyyah became influential during the Revolution and even informed the discourses of some of the
Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā on the subjects. For more discussion of this “revisionist” understanding of martyrdom see
Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. pp. 190-4. Enayat argues that in this modern discourse,
martyrdom was transformed from a “passive and harmless” doctrine to a “rhetorical instrument of political
mobilisation” [Ibid. p. 184].
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hand and non-Muslims on the other. The rulings are not unexpected as the majority of the
military encounters of Sunnī Muslims were against non-believers along the expanding
borders of the Muslim world. For the most part of Shī‘ah history, such encounters were
irrelevant to the Shī‘ah community; for they were a small minority group living among
Sunnī Muslims and they rarely shared a border with non-Muslims. The Battle of Karbalā,
in which a small fringe group of Muslims were surrounded by a large Muslim army, is a
reminder of this fact. Yet, Shī‘ah jurists followed the lead of their Sunnī colleagues in
writing extensively about “Jihād with infidels.”371 Such encounters with “infidels” did
occur for Shī‘ah Muslims. But they were far fewer and occurred much later.372 Not
surprisingly, in these wars with the “infidels,” the general Muslim discourse of Jihād
proved to be a powerful mobilizing force.373
As suggested before, however, there is a distinct element in Shī‘ī jurisdiction of
Jihād compared to the Sunnī discourses. For a war to be considered Jihād, there should be
371

One of the clear examples of this rather Sunnī articulation can be find in the writings of Muḥammad
Ḥasan al-Najafī (Ṣāḥib al-Jawāhir), the prominent Shī‘ah jurist of the nineteenth century. Arguably
neglecting the tradition of the Shī‘ah Imāms –‘Alī and Ḥusayn– and their “Jihāds” against “unjust”
Muslims, he argues that Jihād signifies war against disbelievers with the purpose of spreading Islam [see
Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ Sharāyi‘al-Islām, Vol. 21, p. 3].
372

The most notable of these wars were a series of wars between the Shī‘ah Persia under the Qājār dynasty
and Orthodox Christian Russian Empire. The first Russo-Persian Wars happened between 1804 and 1813
C.E. and ended with Persia’s defeat and the humiliating Gulistān Peace Treaty of 1813 C.E. The Second
Russo-Persian Wars took place between 1826 and 1828 C.E. resulting, again, in Persia’s defeat and yet
more humiliating Turkmanchāy Peace Treaty of 1828 C.E. In addition to the Russo-Persian wars, the other
significant case of encounter between Shī‘ah Muslims and non-Muslims took place in Iraq in 1920. The
Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā of Najaf and Karbalā including Ayatollah Muḥammad Taqī Shīrāzī (d. 1920) and Shaykh alSharī‘ah Fatḥallāh Iṣfahānī (d. 1920) declared Jihād against the occupying British forces. The fatwās led to
a “Shī‘ah revolt” against the British that was soon crushed [see Chapter 4 in Dawisha, Adeed. (2009). Iraq:
A Political History from Independence to Occupation. Princeton: Princeton University Press].
373

Prominent Shī‘ah jurists of the time including Shaykh Ja‘far Kāshif al-Ghiṭā’ and Mullā Aḥmad Narāqī
(d. 1829 C.E.) issued fatwās and declared the coming wars with Russian Empire as –defensive– Jihād. In
fact, it was due to the insistence and religious exhortation of some of these prominent Shī‘ah jurists that
Fatḥ ‘Alī Shāh of the Qājār dynasty reluctantly agreed to engage in the second round of wars with the
Russian Empire in 1826 C.E.
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a “bearer of Wilāyah” present. Faghfoory discusses the various rulings of Shī‘ah jurists
when it comes to Jihād.374 According to him, the majority of Shī‘ah jurists believe that
“offensive Jihād” is only possible when the Prophet or an “infallible” Shī‘ah Imām is
present.375 As for the “defensive Jihād,” nearly all Shī‘ah jurists allow it with the
permission of a qualified jurist. In other words, a qualified Shī‘ah jurist may call a
defensive war Jihād by issuing a fatwā. Secular authorities including the kings could not
declare their wars as Jihād. Faghfoory also claims that those Shī‘ah jurists who have
condoned “offensive Jihād”376 were under the influence of their Sunnī counterparts and
particularly the writings of Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi‘ī377. Imām al-Shāfi‘ī’s influence
374

See Faghfoory, Mohammad H. Ethic of War and Peace in Shi‘ite Islam.

375

Faghfoory quotes Murtaḍā Muṭahharī (d. 1979), one of the prominent and influential Shī‘ah scholars of
the past century, who categorically rejects “offensive wars” as “evil and illegitimate” [see Ibid. and
Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā, (1998). Jihād. Tehran: Ṣadrā Publications. p. 43]. Muṭahharī also rejects the notion of
“spreading Islam through Jihād” as self-contradictory. According to his perspective, there is no such a
thing as “offensive Jihād” for Jihād is by definition legitimate while “offensive wars” cannot be so.
376

These include Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, ‘Allāmih Ḥillī, Shahīd al-Thānī, Ṣāḥib al-Jawāhir, and Sayyid al-Khū’ī
(d. 1992) [see for instance Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, al-Tibyān fī Tafsīr al-Qur‘ān, Vol. 5, p. 202-3; Amīn al-Islām
Ṭabarsī, Majma‘al-Bayān, Vol. 5, pp. 39-40; and Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ
Sharāyi‘al-Islām, Vol. 21, p. 4]. It must be mentioned, however, that Ṣāḥib al-Jawāhir’s position regarding
“offensive Jihād” has not been clearly stated. It seems that he accepts the possibility of challenging the
Shī‘ī consensus –i.e. the consensus about the impermissibility of “offensive Jihād” in the absence of the
Imām. He does not, however, further elaborate on this matter. It must be also noted that, despite his above
position, ‘Allāmih Ḥillī is considered as one of the Shī‘ah jurists who believe in centrality of peace and
exceptionality of war [see Faghfoory, Mohammad H. Ethic of War and Peace in Shi‘ite Islam].
Sunnī jurists who have argued for the possibility of “offensive Jihād” often refer to a controversial Ḥadīth
attributed to the Prophet. As Faghfoory points out, Shī‘ah jurists have questioned the authenticity of this
Ḥadīth by doubting the trustworthiness of its chain of transmitters. Instead, the above Shī‘ah jurists use one
Ḥadīth by Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad, the sixth Shī‘ah Imām, to establish their argument regarding “offensive
Jihād” [see Ibid.; and al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah. Vol. 15, pp. 3456].
377

Known as Imām al-Shāfi‘ī (d. 820 C.E.), Muḥammad ibn Idrīs is one of the most prominent Sunnī
jurists and the founder of the Shāfi‘ī School of jurisprudence, one of the four mainstream Sunnī legal
Schools. The other three Schools of Fiqh in Sunnī Islam are the Ḥanafī, the Mālikī and the Ḥanbalī
Schools.
Ni‘matullāh Ṣāliḥī Najafābādī, a prominent Shī‘ah scholar and theologian, argues in his Jihād dar Islām, or
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is particularly evident, Faghfoory argues, when it comes to Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s position on
Jihād.378 It has been argued that Imām al-Shāfi‘ī’s consequential stance regarding
“offensive Jihād” was rooted in the sociopolitical context of his time and the need of the
powerful Abbasid empire to religiously justify its rapid territorial expansion.379 In this era
of Muslim conquests, few Sunnī jurists questioned the legitimacy of such territorial
expansions. Those Prophetic traditions380 that might have restricted or slowed down these

“Jihād in Islam,” that most of the Sunnī and Shī‘ah jurists who have accepted the possibility of “offensive
Jihād” have been under the influence of Imām al-Shāfi‘ī and his rather extreme interpretation of the verse
2:193 of the Qur’ān in his famous book [see Kitāb al-Umm, Vol. 6, p. 38]. Although several Mālikī and
Ḥanbalī jurists have accepted Imām al-Shāfi‘ī’s stance regarding Jihād, his interpretation has not remained
unchallenged. Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, the prominent Sunnī commentator on the Qur’ān, is among those who
have rejected Imām al-Shāfi‘ī’s interpretation of the verse 2:193 [see Faghfoory, Mohammad H. Ethic of
War and Peace in Shi‘ite Islam; and Ṣāliḥī Najafābādī, Ni‘matullāh. (2008). Jihād dar Islām. Tehran: Nashr
Niy].
378

See Faghfoory, Mohammad H. Ethic of War and Peace in Shi‘ite Islam; and Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, al-Nihāyah
fī Mujarrad al-Fiqh wal-Fatwā, pp. 289-93. As noted by Faghfoory, several other early jurists of Ḥillī
origin followed Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s position on “offensive Jihād.” These include Aḥmad ibn Idrīs Ḥillī (d.
1202 C.E.) [see in particular his al-Sarā’ir al-Ḥāwī li-Taḥrīr al-Fatāwī, Vol. 2, pp. 3-19] and ‘Allāmih
Ḥillī.
379

See Faghfoory, Mohammad H. Ethic of War and Peace in Shi‘ite Islam; and Ni‘matullāh Ṣāliḥī
Najafābādī, Jihād dar Islām.

380

Generally speaking, Muslim jus in bello and jus ad bellum contain some of the generic ethics-of-war
items such as protection of civilians and the environment as well as the laws of proportionality. There are
several obligations in regards to declaration of war, sending warnings, and giving ultimatums [see
Faghfoory, Mohammad H. Ethic of War and Peace in Shi‘ite Islam; and Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Najafī,
Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ Sharāyi‘al-Islām, Vol. 21, pp. 51-4]. There are certain prohibitions against
cutting trees, destroying farms and villages, killing animals, polluting rivers, cursing the enemy, catapulting
fireballs, and flooding the enemy as well as strong prohibitions against poisoning enemy’s drinking waters
[see ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 32, p. 399; Ibid. Vol. 19, p. 179; al-Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām fī
Sharḥ Sharāyi‘al-Islām, Vol. 21, pp. 66-8; Abū al-Majd al-Ḥalabī, Ishārat al-Sabaq, pp. 142-3; ‘Allāmih
Ḥillī, Tadhkirah al-Fuqahā’, Vol. 1, p. 413 (Maktabah al-Murtaḍawīyyah’s edition); and Quṭb al-Dīn alBiyhaqī, Iṣbāḥ al-Shī‘ah bi Miṣbāḥ al-Sharī‘ah, pp. 187-9]. Insulting the enemy’s dead and mutilation are
forbidden [see Abū Ṣalāḥ al-Ḥalabī, al-Kāfī fīl-Fiqh, pp. 255-7; and al-Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ
Sharāyi‘al-Islām, Vol. 21, pp. 77-8]. Fighting is prohibited in sacred places such as the vicinity of Ka‘bah
as well as during four sacred months of Muslim calendar [see al-Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ
Sharāyi‘al-Islām, Vol. 21, pp. 32-4]. Killing of women, children, the elderly, the disabled, and the blind are
generally prohibited [see al-Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ Sharāyi‘al-Islām, Vol. 21, p. 68; and Ibid.
pp. Vol. 21, 73-7]. There are also some strong prohibitions against killing scholars, monks, and residents of
monasteries and nunneries [see Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 2, pp. 131-385;
‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 21, p. 60; al-Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ Sharāyi‘al-Islām,
Vol. 21, p. 76; and ‘Allāmih Ḥillī, Tadhkirah al-Fuqahā’, Vol. 1, p. 412 (Maktabah al-Murtaḍawīyyah’s

140

expansions were also overlooked.
Unlike Imām al-Shāfi‘ī, however, the Shī‘ah Imāms who lived during the
Umayyad and Abbasid expansions did not accept the legitimacy of their rule, let alone
sanctioning their wars as Jihād. Therefore, even the Shī‘ah jurists who have condoned the
possibility of “offensive Jihād” accept the Shī‘ah consensus. According to this juridical
consensus, for an “offensive Jihād” to be legitimate, the permission of an “infallible
Imām” is necessary.381 In Shī‘ah history, however, there exists a precedent that renders
“offensive Jihād” relatively problematic. According to Shī‘ī historiographies, ‘Alī did not
allow his army to initiate war.382 It might be due to such precedents that scholars such as
Murtaḍā Muṭahharī have identified Jihād with “defensive wars.”383
Finally, it is worth visiting the often-mentioned division between Dār al-Ḥarb, i.e.
the Abode of War, and Dār al-Islām, i.e. the Abode of Islam, when it comes to studying

edition)] although the legal details on all the above items vary from one jurist to another.
381

See Muḥaqqiq Ḥillī, Sharāyi‘ al-Islām fī Masā’il al-Ḥalāl wal-Ḥarām, Vol. 1, p. 232; Ibn Idrīs Ḥillī, alSarā’ir al-Ḥāwī li Taḥrīr al-Fatāwī, Vol. 2, p. 25; and Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām fī
Sharḥ Sharāyi‘al-Islām, Vol. 21, pp. 11-14. The only exception to this juridical consensus is a number of
contemporary Shī‘ah jurists. They have argued that not only “offensive Jihād” is possible, but also it could
be undertaken by the permission of a qualified jurist. The most significant Shī‘ah jurist who has taken this
position is Ayatollah Sayyid Abū al-Qāsim al-Khū’ī [see al-Mīrzā Jawād al-Tabrīzī, Ṣirāṭ al-Nijāt fī
Ajwibah al-Istiftā’āt, Vol. 3, p. 359]. Ayatollah Khomeini’s position on this issue seems less clear. In his
earlier works such as Taḥrīr al-Wasīlah, he argues that “offensive Jihād” lies within the religious authority
of the “infallible Imāms”; and his emphasis is clearly on defense and resistance. Towards the end of his life
and in his position as the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic in Iran, however, Ayatollah Khomeini
seemed to have adopted a position that viewed the authority of a qualified jurist identical to that of the
“infallible Imāms” [see Ayatollah Khomeini, Ṣaḥīfih Nūr, Vol. 20, p. 451-2. Retrieved from
www.tebyan.net on January 23, 2012].
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See, for instance, Naṣr ibn Muzāḥim al-Minqarī, Waqa‘ah Ṣiffīn, p. 153; and ‘Alī ibn Abī-Ṭālib, Nahj alBalāghah, Letter 14 according to which ‘Alī explicitly forbids initiation of war.
383

See Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā. Jihād. p. 39. In his argument, Muṭahharī specifically refers to the verses 22:3940 of the Qur’ān. In addition to Muṭahharī, Faghfoory refers to Ayatollah Ṣāliḥī Najafābādī as well as
Ayatollah Muḥaqqiq Dāmād as prominent Shī‘ah jurists who categorically reject “offensive Jihād” [see
Faghfoory, Mohammad H. Ethic of War and Peace in Shi‘ite Islam].
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Jihād in Islam. The two terms appeared in Sunnī legal discourses due to the expansion of
–Sunnī– Islam during the Umayyad and Abbasid empires. Some of the Shī‘ah jurists then
followed their Sunnī predecessors in employing these and several similar terms. Yet, the
reduction of the complex legal system of Sunnī Muslims –in regards to non-Muslims– to
Dār al-Ḥarb and Dār al-Islām seems unwarranted. In fact, depending on the political
conditions of the time, Sunnī jurists devised a spectrum of concepts such as Dār alHudnih, i.e. the Abode of Truce, Dār al-Ṣulḥ, i.e. the Abode of Peace, Dār al-Amn, i.e.
the Abode of Safety, and Dār al-Da‘wah, i.e. the Abode of Invitation or Calling.384 For
each of these “Abodes,” they developed various rulings that differed from one jurist to
another. The diverse legal rulings highlight the complexities inherent in Sunnī and Shī‘ah
legal systems when it comes to the issues such as war, peace, Jihād as well as the
treatments of different groups of non-Muslims during and after wars.385
384

Ibid.
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Before concluding this Chapter, it is worth briefly reviewing the issue of suicide and surprise attacks.
Suicide attacks, properly speaking, are a modern phenomenon. These attacks are technically possible only
because of the modern advancements in explosive technologies. In the pre-modern world, there existed the
notion of surprise attacks with the attacker risking certain death in the course of the assault. Yet, the
attacker would not kill himself. For this rather evident technical reason, there is nothing in Shī‘ī theological
sources that directly engages the issue of suicide attacks and its permissibility. There is, as discussed
before, the categorical rejection of committing suicide in the Qur’ān [2:195]. There is also the verse 5:32,
which declares murdering another human being unjustly is as if “one kills the whole of humanity.” Those
modern jurists who are against committing suicide attacks generally base their arguments upon these two
verses. They also refer to a variety of traditions attributed to the Prophet and the Shī‘ah Imāms against
“surprise attacks.” The frequently quoted of these traditions is a Ḥadīth by Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad, the sixth
Shī‘ah Imām, who reports that the Prophet never conducted “surprise night assaults” against his enemies
[see Abū Ja‘far Thiqat al-Islām Kuliynī, Uṣūl al-Kāfī, Vol. 5, pp. 27-8; Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, al-Nihāyah fī
Mujarrad al-Fiqh wal-Fatwā, p. 298; and ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 19, p. 167]. In another
report attributed to Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad, it is claimed that “Islam rejects Fitk” [see ‘Allāmih Majlisī,
Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 47, p. 137; Shaykh Hādī al-Najafī, Mūsū‘ah Aḥādīth Ahl al-Bayt, Vol. 2, p. 47; and
Ibid. Vol. 8, p. 280]. In classical Arabic, Fitk means killing someone off-guard or attacking someone by
surprise [see Muḥammad ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-‘Arab]. There is also a general prohibition against “surprise
attacks” attributed to the Prophet himself [see Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ
Sharāyi‘al-Islām, Vol. 21, p. 82]. Finally, there is the tradition of ‘Alī in the Battles of Jamal, Ṣiffīn, and
Nahrawān who rejected surprise night attacks against the enemy [see Naṣr ibn Muzāḥim al-Minqarī,
Waqa‘ah Ṣiffīn, pp. 193-225].
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CHAPTER IV
TAQĪYYAH: STRATEGIES OF EXPEDIENCY
Introduction
The violent events in Karbalā bolstered the place of Shahādah and the metaphor
of an “ideal death” in Shī‘ah theology. Yet, the implications of the killing of the Prophet’s
grandson proved to be more complicated. As discussed before, the majority of Shī‘ah
jurists began to view Ḥusayn’s final decisions and his martyrdom as exceptional;386 and
so did the majority of the Shī‘ah community. The fact that Ḥusayn’s dramatic fate was
not paralleled with that of any other Shī‘ah Imām further established the notion that
Karbalā was an extraordinary page in Shī‘ah history. Ḥusayn’s martyrdom, in other
words, was believed to be the result of “the gravest of conditions.” At the same time, the
naked vulnerability of the Shī‘ah community, so radically illustrated in Karbalā, called
for urgent measures in order to guarantee the survival of the community. The Shī‘ah
Imāms and, later on, the Shī‘ah jurists understood the implications of Karbalā well. They
tried, therefore, to strike a balance between the rather “idealistic” messages of the story of
Ḥusayn on the one hand and the growing, pragmatic, concerns on the other. Following
Based on the above traditions, some Shī‘ah jurists have rejected suicide attacks, for they both entail the
forbidden act of committing suicide; and there is an element of surprise embedded within them. Arguably
the most prominent Shī‘ah jurist in our time who has ruled against the practice and, in a number of
interviews, has called it an “act of terrorism” is Ayatollah Yūsuf Ṣāni‘ī [retrieved from www.saanei.org on
February 29, 2012]. It must be also noted that traditional Shī‘ah jurists have generally tended to be
conservative in their social rulings. The roots of this conservativeness have been both theological and
institutional. In terms of the issue of Qatl, or killing, some of these jurists have been extra cautious.
Muḥaqqiq al-Ardabīlī (d. 1585 C.E.), for instance, calls Qatl “a grave affair” that demands “the greatest
caution” [see al-Sayyid al-Khānsārī, Jāmi‘ al-Madārik, Vol. 7, p. 35]. According to Mohsen Kadivar, AbulFaḍl Bahā’ al-Dīn Iṣfahānī, also known as Fāḍil Hindī (d. 1725 C.E.), goes as far to argue that legitimate
killing is only possible with the permission of the “infallible Imām” [see Kadivar, Mohesn. Ḥaqq al-Nās:
Islām wa Ḥuqūq Bashar. p. 181; and Fāḍil Hindī, Kashf al-Lithām ‘an Qawā‘id al-Aḥkām].
386

As discussed in the preceding Chapter, a number of modern Shī‘ah jurists and scholars have disputed
this mainstream interpretation, with Ayatollah Khomeini being the most influential among them.
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the examples of the Shī‘ah Imāms who succeeded Ḥusayn, the early Shī‘ah theologians
managed to elaborate a complex juridical edifice. Their legal construct was an effort to
accommodate both their ideals and the severity of the reality. A delicate and at times
brittle combination of “principled action” and “pragmatism” was the result. The
combination of these two dynamics was intended to provide Shī‘ah Muslims with an
aspiring drive to achieve “spiritual ideals” and, at the same time, to socialize them to
heed constraints and limitations. It imparted, furthermore, a sense of “religious” respect
for the protection of the Shī‘ah community as well as that of individual Shī‘ah Muslims.
It must be reminded that this combination was due to the strategic assessment of the early
Shī‘ah community’s situation by the Shī‘ah Imāms –especially the fourth, the fifth, and
the sixth Imāms. The result was the sometimes misunderstood Shī‘ī doctrine of
Taqīyyah387.
Before examining this doctrine, it must be noted that neither Shahādah nor
Taqīyyah are central theological notions in Shī‘ah Islam.388 Nevertheless, they appear to
be the most important strategic notions in Shī‘ah theology. Therefore, they have been
particularly consequential in shaping Shī‘ī strategic cultures. As will be discussed in the
following Chapter however, both the doctrine of Shahādah and that of Taqīyyah rest upon
a

central

Shī‘ī

theological

notion,

i.e.

Wilāyah

and

Walāyah

387

The Arabic word Taqīyyah comes from the Arabic root w-q-y (i.e. )یوق. According to Wehr’s ArabicEnglish Dictionary, w-q-y means, inter alia, “to guard”; “to preserve”; “to shield”; “to be wary”; “to be on
one’s guard”; and “to fear.” The term Taqīyyah does not appear in the Qur’ān. However, one of the key
Qur’ānic terms, “Taqwā,” comes from the same root. Taqwā means piety, virtue, and righteousness and its
observance is among the major callings that the Qur’ān makes to its readers [see, for instance, 2:197; 5:2;
7:26; 20:132; 22:37; 48:26; 58:9 and 49:13 –or the “verse of diversity”– in the Qur’ān].
388

Some of the central theological notions in Shī‘ah Islam are the doctrine of Divine Unity, the principle of
Prophethood, the principle of Afterlife and the Day of Judgement, the principle of Divine Justice, and the
ontology of Wilāyah and Walāyah.
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Unlike Shahādah, the doctrine of Taqīyyah has not been extensively elaborated
upon in Shī‘ah Islam. Neither has it been visibly manifested in a particular episode in
Shī‘ah history as did Shahādah in Karbalā. Nevertheless, Taqīyyah has imbued Shī‘ī
strategic cultures with a keen sense of prudence and expediency. It is not, therefore,
surprising that among numerous minority groups that emerged throughout the Muslim
world, Shī‘ah Muslims have proved to be among the most viable and self-sufficient ones.
The Foundations of Shī‘ī Doctrine of Taqīyyah and Its Implications
In his Modern Islamic Political Thought, Hamid Enayat has written a few pages
on the notion of Taqīyyah. His approach is within the theoretical framework of political
thought studies. However, given the importance and relevance of Enayat’s analysis, it is
worth beginning with a rather long quotation from his work. After reviewing the
etymology of the word Taqīyyah, and its Arabic root, Enayat writes
“[t]here is thus nothing in the term [i.e. Taqīyyah] itself to justify its
standard translation in English either as dissimulation or (expedient)
concealment, although both acts may be necessary to guard oneself
from physical or mental harm on account of holding a particular
belief opposed to that held by the majority. The Shī‘ī case for the
necessity of Taqiyyah is based on a commonsense ‘counsel of
caution’ on the part of a persecuted minority. Since for the greater
part of their history the Shī‘īs have been a minority amidst the global
Islamic community and have lived mostly under regimes hostile to
their creed, the only wise course for them to follow has been to avoid
exposing themselves to the risk of extinction resulting from an open
and defiant propagation of their beliefs, although they have not
shunned their mission, whenever the opportunity has presented itself,
to give a jolt to the Muslim conscience by revolting against impious
rulers. This precautionary attitude has not been confined to the Shī‘īs
alone in Islamic history […]. But the practice has come to be almost
exclusively associated with Shī‘īsm, partly because of the enduring
status of the Shī‘īs in history as a minority, or ‘unorthodox’ group,
and partly because their opponents have found in it valuable
ammunition for their propaganda.”
(emphasis in the text)
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Enayat notes the strategic thinking that underlies the doctrine of Taqīyyah as well as the
element of “common sense” embedded within it. The causal link between the minority
status of Shī‘ah Muslims and the emergence of this doctrine seems evident.389 Yet, Shī‘ah
jurists proactively strived to establish the religious foundation of Taqīyyah. The practice,
these jurists maintained, had Qur’ānic roots. Several verses in the Qur’ān imply the
permissibility of expediency and, more explicitly, that of prudent concealment. The most
important among these is the verse 16:106. According to this verse, “[w]hoso disbelieves
in God, after he has believed –excepting him who has been compelled, and his heart is
still at rest in his belief– but whosoever’s breast is expanded in unbelief, upon them shall
rest anger from God, and there awaits them a mighty chastisement.”390 The sixth Shī‘ah
Imām, Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad, is also reported to have related the famous verse 2:195 to
the doctrine of Taqīyyah. As discussed before, this is the verse that rejects selfdestruction. Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad has been reported commenting upon the verse by
arguing that it refers to the practice of Taqīyyah.391

389

It must be mentioned that the notion of Taqīyyah also exists in Sunnī Islam –albeit with a different
flavor; for, as Hamid Enayat reminds, there is a “commonsense” element in this notion that renders it
unavoidable in any comprehensive system of life [see Ibid.].
390

This is Arberry’s translation. It has been reported that the verse was revealed during the early years of
Islam and that it addresses ‘Ammār ibn Yāsir, who was one of the earliest disciples of the Prophet. Under
tortures at the hand of Meccan idol-worshipers, ‘Ammār ibn Yāsir had rejected Islam by tongue while still
a believer in heart. The verse is understood as God’s absolving ‘Ammār ibn Yāsir of guilt in doing so.
Various Shī‘ī and Sunnī commentaries on the Qur’ān have reported this historical context for the verse.
See, for instance, Shaykh Makārim Shirāzī, Tafsīr Nimūnih; Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī, Majma‘ al-Bayān; and
‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Abī Bakr al-Suyūṭī, al-Durr al-Manthūr fīl-Tafsīr bil-Ma’thūr. In several traditions
reported from the Shī‘ah Imāms, the practice of Taqīyyah is justified by reference to this particular verse.
See, for instance, al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, pp. 479-80.
391

See Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 467.
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In addition to the Qur’ānic verses392, several traditions, or Ḥadīths, attributed to
the Shī‘ah Imāms further solidified the permissibility of cautionary acts of Taqīyyah. The
overwhelming majority of these Ḥadīths comes from the sixth Shī‘ah Imām. The large
number of Ḥadīths by Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad is in part a result of the fact that he was
exceptionally active in teaching his Shī‘ah followers. In fact, the number of the Ḥadīths
attributed to Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad is more than that of any other Shī‘ah Imām. Yet, it is
also reasonable to believe that the building social pressure had had something to do with
the unusually large number of “Taqīyyah Ḥadīths” by him. During Ja‘far ibn
Muḥammad’s imamate, high expectations emerged among the Shī‘ah community about
the necessity of political engagement by their Imām.393 As a result, Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad
seems to have had to justify his aloof approach in politics; and he did so through a
number of teachings on Taqīyyah. Later on, these teachings constituted the “Ḥadīth
Foundation,” or Dalā’il al-Rawā’ī, of the doctrine of Taqīyyah.
In several Ḥadīths, Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad is reported to have commented upon the
Qur’ānic verses 28:54 and 41:34 in which “good deeds” and “evil deeds” are compared.
In his comments, he teaches his followers that “Taqīyyah is [what is referred in these
verses as] the good deed while divulging [the secrets of the community] is an act of
evil.”394 He then argues that the “best defense” for Shī‘ah Muslims is to practice

392

Other Qur’ānic verses that refer to the permissibility of expediency in general and that of Taqīyyah in
particular are 3:28 and 40:28. Note that these Qur’ānic references have generally sparked a similar response
among both Shī‘ah and Sunnī commentators. The practical relevance of expediency and caution to Shī‘ah
Muslims, however, created more incentive for Shī‘ah jurists to elaborate upon the doctrine, its implications,
as well as its limitations.

393

For a more detailed discussion of the political context of Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad’s imamate, see below.

394

See Sayyid Ḥasan al-Bujnūrdī, al-Qawā‘id al-Fiqhīyah, Vol. 5, p. 77; Abū Ja‘far Thiqat al-Islām
Kuliynī, Uṣūl al-Kāfī, Vol. 2, pp. 217-8; and al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-

147

Taqīyyah so that “the one whom between you and him is enmity [would turn around] as
though he has been a devoted friend.”395 In another commentary upon the Qur’ānic
verses 18:94 and 18:95, Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad likens the practice of Taqīyyah to erecting
a “strong barrier” between one and one’s enemies.396 In several other traditions, he
declares Taqīyyah to be the “protective screen,” or Junnah, the “shield,” or Turs, and the
“sanctuary,” or Ḥirz, for “the believers.”397 He emphasizes that the practice of Taqīyyah is
the tradition of his fathers, i.e. the previous Shī‘ah Imāms, and that of the prophets.398 In
parallel to these traditions, a number of Ḥadīths encouraged Shī‘ah Muslims to be
vigilantly discreet and to practice Kitmān, which implies secrecy, restraint, and

Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, pp. 459-61. Several other Ḥadīths include the Shī‘ah Imāms’ commentaries on verses
such as 2:83; 3:200; 41:34; 41:35; 49:13; and 103:3; in which Taqīyyah is related to various acts including
“speaking leniently to [non-Shī‘ah] others,” practicing “endurance,” “winning over one’s enemies,”
practicing “patience,” observing “piety and righteousness,” and “doing the righteous deeds” all in a spirit of
expediency and caution [see Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 463; Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 466; Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 473; and ‘Allāmih
Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 72, p. 401].
395

See al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, p. 461. The latter part
of the above Ḥadīth contains a direct quotation from the verse 41:34 of the Qur’ān [consulted with Yūsuf
‘Alī’s translation].
396

Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 467. Note that the socio-historical context of these teachings by Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad
was the rising tendency within the Shī‘ah community to become politically more assertive. Such course of
actions would have entailed certain unrestrained public acts against which Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad adamantly
argued. See Sayyid Ḥasan al-Bujnūrdī, al-Qawā‘id al-Fiqhīyah, Vol. 5, p. 77.
397

See al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, pp. 460-61. Arguably,
the most explicit affirmation of Taqīyyah appears in a short Ḥadīth attributed –with slight differences– to
various Shī‘ah Imāms including Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad. The Ḥadīth declares that lā dīna li man lā taqīyyata
lahū, which means “one who does not observe Taqīyyah has no religion” [see Ibid. Vol. 11, pp- 465-6; and
Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 468].
398

See Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 460; Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 463; Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 464; and also ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār alAnwār, Vol. 75, p. 347. It is worth noting that, despite the explicit defense of Taqīyyah in these Ḥadīths,
there is no Shī‘ī tradition from the Imāms clearly and comprehensively defining what constitutes Taqīyyah.
This might be an indication that, at the time, the Shī‘ah community had a relatively clear, intuitive,
understanding of what the notion of Taqīyyah implied. The Imāms, therefore, did not feel obliged to
expound upon the definition of the notion; and they did not go beyond relating Taqīyyah to commonsense
prudence, dissimulation, and discretion.
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discretion.399 In one Ḥadīth, the sixth Imām elaborates on the practice of Kitmān by
encouraging the Shī‘ah community to be “subtle” in their social interactions and to
observe extreme care in following –and fulfilling– the Imām’s wishes.400 These Ḥadīths
unequivocally repudiated the act of Idhā‘ah, or divulging the secrets [of the
community].401 The body of traditions, therefore, related the doctrine of Taqīyyah with
the notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah, which constituted some of the central “Sacred
Secrets” of the Shī‘ah community.402 In a Ḥadīth attributed to the eighth Shī‘ah Imām, the
“secret” that must be protected against Idhā‘ah is stated to be Wilāyah –which had been
transferred from God to the Prophet and from him to the Shī‘ah Imāms.403
One can infer from the above Shī‘ī traditions that, from the beginning, the
doctrine of Taqīyyah has had an esoteric aspect as well. The esoteric dimension went
399

See, for instance, Abū Ja‘far Thiqat al-Islām Kuliynī, Uṣūl al-Kāfī, Vol. 2, pp. 221-5.

400

See Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 223. The Imām uses the derivatives of the Arabic word Luṭf, which means subtlety
and delicacy, in reference to the practice of Kitmān. In another Ḥadīth, he relates the practice of Taqīyyah
to that of Kaẓm al-Ghayẓ, i.e. containing one’s indignation, in front of one’s enemy [see al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī,
Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 12, pp. 179-80].
401

See, for instance, Ibid. Vol. 11, pp. 492-6. In the same body of Ḥadīths, the Shī‘ah Imāms also warn their
followers against divulging the Imāms’ Amr. Here, Amr, which can loosely be translated into “affairs,”
might also refer to the extensive yet underground Shī‘ah network that had emerged around the offices of the
Imāms.
402

During the imamate of the last eight Imāms, it seems that the protection of the Shī‘ah “secrets,” or alAsrār, had become a major issue in the community. Ja‘afar ibn Muḥammad, for instance, declares that
protection of the Imām’s Sirr, or secret, is the “Jihād of Shī‘ah Muslims,” and that divulging such a Sirr is
nothing short of “intentionally killing” the Imām [see Ibid. Vol. 11, pp. 494-5].
The relation between Taqīyyah and Jihād is further elaborated upon in another Ḥadīth by the sixth Imām. In
this Ḥadīth, Ja‘afar ibn Muḥammad says that the Jihād of Shī‘ah Muslims against “God’s enemies” is with
“sword” under the auspices of a just ruler and with “Taqīyyah” under the reign of an unjust one [See Ibid.
Vol. 11, p. 464].
403

For this Ḥadīth, see Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 492. The sixth Shī‘ah Imām also confirms that “bearing,” i.e.
Iḥtimāl, of the “heavy doctrine” of Wilāyah and Walāyah entails not only accepting its truth, but also
protecting it from disclosure to any “unsuited audience” [see Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 484; and Abū Ja‘far Thiqat alIslām Kuliynī, Uṣūl al-Kāfī, Vol. 2, pp. 222-3].
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beyond the exoteric implications of the doctrine for the survival of the Shī‘ah community.
“Esotericism” of Taqīyyah may be approached in two different ways. First is related to
the “esoteric teachings” of the Shī‘ah Imāms and what such teachings entailed. Hamid
Enayat elaborates upon this aspect elegantly. He writes
“[t]here is another argument in defence of taqiyyah which is mysticphilosophical, and is predicated on the esoteric character of Shī‘īs
[…]. If the raison d’être and the essential function of the Imāms
should be sought in their status as the repository of the truth of the
religion, or the ‘sacred trust’[404] placed exclusively at their disposal,
then their knowledge of that truth cannot be communicable through
propagation (idhā‘ah), otherwise […] the knowledge itself will be in
danger of being misrepresented and vulgarised.”405 (emphases in the
text)

According to Enayat, the concern for the protection of the Bāṭinī, or inward, teachings of
the Imāms was one of the reasons that led the Shī‘ah community to be cautious and to
practice Taqīyyah. Accompanying this outlook was the belief that Shī‘ah Muslims would
always be a minority in the Muslim world; for the “heavy burden of the Sacred Truth”406
would render it “unbearable” for the majority of mankind. The emergence of this belief
was due to the esoteric nature of parts of the teachings of the Shī‘ah Imāms. These
teachings, early Shī‘ah Muslims believed, were not meant to be disseminated to the larger
404

This “sacred trust” refers, inter alia, to the notion of “Divine Trust” as articulated in the Qur’ān, 7:172.
See the preceding Chapter for some more discussion.
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Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. p. 176.

406

The notion of the “heavy burden of the Truth” is elaborated upon in some of the Ḥadīths attributed to the
first Shī‘ah Imām, ‘Alī. See, for instance ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Nahj al-Balāghah, Letter 53; and Ibid. Ḥikmah
376. To further establish their assertion that there exists a correlation between Shī‘ahs’ minority status and
the truth of their beliefs, Shī‘ah authors have referred to several verses of the Qur’ān including 2:249; 4:66;
6:119; 7:17; 8:34; 11:40; 12:106; 23:70; and 34:13. Needless to say, these Qur’anic references provided
early Shī‘ah communities with the much-needed theological and spiritual comfort in coming in terms with
their inferior social status.
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public. As a result, during the life of the eight Shī‘ah Imāms who succeeded Ḥusayn, a
far-reaching, yet secret, network of Shī‘ah Muslims emerged. The network effectively
connected Shī‘ah Muslims throughout the large and expanding Muslim territory to their
Imāms in Medina, Baghdad, Khurāsān, or Sāmarrā. The teachings and instructions of the
Imāms were disseminated through this network while it also made extensive financial
transactions among Shī‘ah Muslims possible.407
There is, however, another esoteric dimension of Taqīyyah that Enayat does not
address in his book. This relates to the self-perception of the Shī‘ah community as the
“bearers and protectors” of Wilāyah and Walāyah, which they viewed as the core
teachings of Islam. Belief in such a unique position demanded Shī‘ah Muslims to
consider their very existence as a sacred object. Shī‘ah self-perception also meant that
their collective survival was of utmost –spiritual– importance for it was necessary for the
protection of the “Divine Secrets.” The doctrine of Taqīyyah, therefore, was not merely to
protect secret teachings. It also meant to protect a “chosen community.”408 Several
Ḥadīths reinforced this communal aspect of Taqīyyah. These Ḥadīths often ties the
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For more information on this extensive Shī‘ī network, its sophisticated division of labors, and its many
layers –such as Nuqabā, Nuẓarā, Du‘āt, and Du‘āt al-Du‘āt– see Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat
dar Islām. pp. 241-3. Tha‘ālibī argues that the clan of Banī ‘Abbās successfully used parts of this extensive
Shī‘ī network in their struggle against the Umayyad dynasty, which eventually led to the establishment of
the Abbasid dynasty in 750 C.E. [see below for more discussion and also Tha‘ālibī, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz. (1995).
Suqūṭ al-Dawlah al-Umawīyah wa Qīyām al-Dawlah al-‘Abbāsīyah. Beirut: Dār al-Maghrib al-Islāmī].
408

The notion of Shī‘ah community as a “chosen community” has one of its roots in Shī‘ah Ḥadīths. In one
reported tradition, the sixth Shī‘ah Imām instructs one of his disciples, Ibn Abī Ya‘fūr, to protect his beliefs
by practicing Taqīyyah. In justifying his instruction, the Imām argues that “you [i.e. the Shī‘ahs] among the
people are like honeybees among the birds. Had the birds known what [precious secrets] honeybees carry
within, they would have destroyed the bees altogether and at once” [see Muḥammad al-Riyshahrī, Mīzān
al-Ḥikmah, Vol. 4, p. 3652, Ḥadīth no. 4178]. See the following Chapter for more discussion.
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necessity of Taqīyyah with the “rights of the Shī‘ah community.”409 The fifth Imām, for
instance, relates the practice of Taqīyyah to the protection of the Shī‘ah “brethren.”410
Some of the most legally binding descriptions of Taqīyyah may be found in this body of
Shī‘ī traditions. In these Ḥadīths, Shī‘ah Muslims are encouraged to “know what
Taqīyyah entails” in any given circumstances.411 The under-defining character of these
Ḥadīths is yet another indication of the fluidity of the doctrine of Taqīyyah and its
circumstantial and contingent nature.
The above Qur’ānic and Ḥadīth foundations are the reason behind many
prominent Shī‘ah jurists’ unequivocal emphasis on the necessity of Taqīyyah. The
writings of these jurists on the subject show the existence of a general consensus about
the meaning of the term Taqīyyah. In Shī‘ī legal texts, Taqīyyah often refers to acts of
prudence and discretion in dealing with one’s potential enemy in order to protect one’s
life and/or belongings or to protect one’s community. Furthermore, the “enemy” is often
understood as someone with a different religious belief system. In dealing with such an
enemy, Taqīyyah is a legal permission to practice expediency including, but not limited
to, concealing one’s true beliefs.412

409

In a Ḥadīth by the fourth Imām, for instance, “abolishing Taqīyyah” is mentioned along with “violating
the rights of the brethren” as “unforgivable sins” in the eyes of God [see al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il alShī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, p. 474].
410

For this and quite a number of other similar Ḥadīths, see Ibid. Vol. 11, pp. 472-5.

411

See, for instance, the Ḥadīth by the tenth Imām in Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 475.

412

As mentioned before, the notion of Taqīyyah –especially for the purpose of protecting one’s life against
non-Muslims– exists in both Shī‘ī and Sunnī legal discourses. See, for instance, Shaykh al-Mufīd, Taṣḥīḥ
al-I‘tiqādāt al-Imāmīyah; Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī, Majma‘al-Bayān; Shaykh al-Anṣārī, Kitāb al-Makāsib;
Sayyid Ḥasan al-Bujnūrdī, al-Qawā‘id al-Fiqhīyah; Maḥmūd al-Ālūsī, Rūḥ al-Ma‘ānī fi Tafsīr al-Qur’ān
al-‘Aẓīm wal-Sab‘ al-Mathānī; Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, Tafsīr al-Minār; Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, Tafsīr alKabīr; Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Aẓīm; and Abū al-Qāsim Zamakhsharī, al-Kashshāf ‘an Ḥaqā’iq al-

152

One of the earliest Shī‘ah theologians, Muḥammad ibn Bābawayh al-Qumī,413
equates the religious necessity of observing Taqīyyah with that of Muslim daily
prayers.414 In fact, he goes even further to argue that “Taqīyyah is religiously obligatory
and its abolishment is not allowed until the appearance of the Imām al-Qā’im[415 at the
end of the time].”416 Later Shī‘ah theologians and jurists continued to write about the
necessity of practicing Taqīyyah –especially for those living under unjust rulers– in order
to protect one’s survival as well as that of the community. Mūḥammad ibn Makkī417,
Shaykh al-Mufīd418, Shaykh al-Ṭūsī419, Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī420; Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī421,
Tanzīl wa ‘Uyūn al-Aqāwīl fi Wujūh al-Ta’wīl. It seems that the Sunnī legal discourse often considers
Taqīyyah as a “permissible,” or Mubāḥ, act in “extreme conditions” while Shī‘ī discourse differentiates
among “obligatory,” “permissible,” and “forbidden” cases of Taqīyyah. See below for further discussion.
413

He is also known as Shaykh al-Ṣadūq (d. 991 C.E.).

414

See Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, al-I‘tiqādāt fī Dīn al-Imāmīyah. p. 107.

415

Al-Qā’im is one of the epithets for the twelfth Shī‘ah Imām, Muḥammad al-Mahdī, who is believed to
be hidden and is believed to reappear at the end of the time. See the following Chapter for some more
discussion of Shī‘ah eschatology.
416

See Ibid. p. 108. This argument is based on a Ḥadīth reported from the eighth Shī‘ah Imām in which
Taqīyyah is declared obligatory till the return of the “hidden Imām,” i.e. the end of the time. In the same
Ḥadīth, the Imām declares that “whoever abolishes the practice of Taqīyyah prior to that time [i.e. the
coming back of the “hidden Imām”] is not of us” [see al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl alMasā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, p. 466]. According to ‘Allāmih Majlisī, in another Ḥadīth, Ja‘far ibn
Muḥammad states that as the time of the return of the “hidden Imām” approaches, the practice of Taqīyyah
becomes more prevalent –or necessary [see ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 72, p. 434; and also in
al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, p. 462].
417

d. 1384 C.E. He is also known as Shahīd al-Awwal, or the First Martyr. See Shahīd al-Awwal, alQawā’id wal-Fawā’id fīl-Fiqh wal-Uṣūl wal-‘Arabīyah, Vol. 2, p. 155. Shahīd al-Awwal relates Taqīyyah
to the practice of Mujāmilah, which means amiability and agreeableness. As will be discussed, Taqīyyah
has also been associated with Mudārāt, which implies amicable coexistence [see Enayat, Hamid. Modern
Islamic Political Thought. p. 177; and ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 72, p. 401]. The Mudārātī
Taqīyyah is sometimes called Taḥbībī, which implies “displaying affection.”
418

See Shaykh al-Mufīd, Taṣḥīḥ al-I‘tiqādāt al-Imāmīyah, p. 137. Shaykh al-Mufīd notices that the Shī‘ah
Imāms ordered some of their followers to practice Taqīyyah while asked others to reveal their beliefs in
order to invite people “to the Truth.” In the latter case, however, there was no fear of being harmed due to
abandoning Taqīyyah. Based on this observation, Shaykh al-Mufīd concludes that practicing Taqīyyah is
sometimes obligatory while in other situations it might not be allowed [see Ibid.].
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and Shaykh al-Anṣārī422, among others, have written about the legal aspects of the
doctrine of Taqīyyah, its conditions, and its limits.423 Jurists such as Shaykh al-Ṭūsī and
Aḥmad ibn Idrīs Ḥillī424, in particular, categorically reject Taqīyyah when the issue of
Dimā’, or spilling of blood, might be an outcome. This legal qualification on the practice
of Taqīyyah is based on a Ḥadīth reported from the fifth Shī‘ah Imām. According to the
Ḥadīth, “Taqīyyah has been allowed for the purpose of protecting bloods [from being
spilled]; once [the practice of Taqīyyah] leads to the [spilling of] blood, Taqīyyah no
419

See Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, al-Tibyān fī Tafsīr al-Qur‘ān, Vol. 2, p. 435. Shaykh al-Ṭūsī reports a tradition from
the Prophet regarding Taqīyyah, which Sunnī jurists, according to him, have “misinterpreted.” Sunnī jurists
have understood this particular tradition as an indication that Taqīyyah is allowed; yet revealing one’s true
belief even when one might die for doing so is preferable. Shaykh al-Ṭūsī then rejects this interpretation
and asserts that observing Taqīyyah in such conditions is “obligatory,” or al-Wājib.
420

See Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī, Majma‘al-Bayān, Vol. 2, p. 272. This is Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī’s
commentary on the verse 40:28 of the Qur’ān that, as mentioned before, is one of the three Qur’ānic verses
used to justify Taqīyyah.
421

See Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī, Rasā’il al-Karakī, Vol. 2, pp. 49-54. Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī argues that
justification of Taqīyyah comes from not only the consensus of Shī‘ah jurists but also “the deeds and the
sayings” of the Shī‘ah Imāms [see Ibid. p. 51]. For more discussion of the “deeds” of the Shī‘ah Imāms
regarding Taqīyyah, see below.
422

See Shaykh al-Anṣārī, al-Taqīyyah. This short treatise belongs to a genre of writings by various Shī‘ah
scholars including, for instance, Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī on the notion of Taqīyyah. These short treatise were in
part an effort to respond to some of the accusations raised against Shī‘ah Muslims for their practice of
Taqīyyah. The opponents of Taqīyyah maintained that by observing Taqīyyah, Shī‘ah Muslims were in fact
being hypocrite. In his essentially Realist argument, Shaykh al-Anṣārī tries to sketch the legal boundaries of
Taqīyyah and the type of “dire conditions,” or Aḥwāl al-Iḍṭirār, that would render practicing Taqīyyah
permissible, preferable, or even obligatory. He also reviews the conditions in which practicing Taqīyyah is
not preferable, such as pretending to be a disbeliever, as well as conditions in which practicing Taqīyyah is
forbidden, such as drinking alcoholic beverages or an act of Taqīyyah that could lead to the death of
another Muslim [see Ibid. pp. 39-40 and Ibid. p. 57]. Shaykh al-Anṣārī clearly expands the notion of
Taqīyyah from its usual connotation to its essence of observing prudence [see Ibid. pp. 53-5]. See below for
further discussion of the broader implications of the doctrine of Taqīyyah and its consequences for Shī‘ī
strategic cultures.
423

Another useful juridical discussion of Taqīyyah can be found in the work of one of the prominent Shī‘ah
jurists of the past century, Sayyid al-Bujnūrdī (d. 1975). See Sayyid Ḥasan al-Bujnūrdī, al-Qawā‘id alFiqhīyah, Vol. 5, pp. 47-81.
424

See Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. p. 179; Shaykh al-Anṣārī, al-Taqīyyah, p. 57;
and also Aḥmad ibn Idrīs al-Ḥillī, al-Sarā’ir al-Ḥāwī li Taḥrīr al-Fatāwī, Vol. 2, p. 26.
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longer applies.”425 In another Ḥadīth by the sixth Imām, Taqīyyah is said to be
impermissible if it leads to “the corruption of the religion.”426 Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī, on
the other hand, reports a tradition from the first Shī‘ah Imām, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, in which
Taqīyyah is related to Wilāyah and Walāyah. In this Ḥadīth, protection of one’s self is
legally permitted as long as one continues to be a Mawāl, or a follower of the [Imām’s]
Walāyah, in one’s heart.427 As Enayat writes, however, a common theme in nearly all of
these legal writings is that Taqīyyah is “an exceptional dispensation granted only in cases
of emergency and compulsion (iḍṭirār).”428 At the same time, the legal discussion of the
subject has created a small yet complicated body of juridical arguments with various
categorizations of obligatory429, preferable430, permissible431, non-preferable432, and
425

See al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, p. 483.

426

See Shaykh al-Anṣārī, Kitāb al-Ṭahārah, Vol. 2, p. 400; and Abū al-Qāsim al-Khū’ī, Kitāb al-Ṭahārah,
Vol. 4, pp. 253-68.

427

See Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī, Kitāb al-Iḥtijāj, Vol. 1, pp. 354-5; and al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī
Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, pp. 478-9.

428

Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. p. 177 (emphasis in the text). The notion of Dār alTaqīyyah, or the Abode of Taqīyyah, has been used in Shī‘ah Ḥadīths in reference to this situation of Iḍṭirār,
which leads to the obligation to observe Taqīyyah [see al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl alMasā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, p. 466]. See also Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 468, Ḥadīths no. 1 and 2; as well as Ibid.
Vol. 11, p. 469, Ḥadīth no. 8. According to Shī‘ah Fiqh, Taqīyyah is not allowed in the absence of Iḍṭirār
[see Shaykh al-Anṣārī, al-Taqīyyah]. As for the notion of Dār al-Taqīyyah itself, some Shī‘ī sources go as
far to label the age of Occultation of the twelfth Imām as an example of Dār al-Taqīyyah. One of the Ḥadīth
foundations of this argument is a discourse attributed to the eighth Shī‘ah Imām in which he qualifies the
permissibility of Jihād with “infidels” in the absence of the “just Imām.” Such an absence is then identified
as a characteristic of Dār al-Taqīyyah [see Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ
Sharāyi‘al-Islām, Vol. 21, pp. 12-3].
429

As mentioned before, a key condition for the obligation of Taqīyyah is Iḍṭirār.

430

For instance, when the practice of Taqīyyah might lead to winning over one’s enemies or helps
strengthening the unity among Shī‘ah and Sunnī Muslims. See below.

431

For instance, when avoiding Taqīyyah might lead to one’s “martyrdom” without endangering others in
the community [see al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, pp. 4767]. In such cases, both practicing and abandoning Taqīyyah may be legally permitted.
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forbidden433 acts of Taqīyyah.434 Enayat writes
“[f]our categories are particularly mentioned: (1) the enforced
(ikrāhiyyah), (2) precautionary or apprehensive (khawfiyyah), (3)
arcane (kitmāniyyah), and (4) symbiotic (mudārātī). The enforced
taqiyyah consists of acting in accordance with the instructions of an
oppressor, and under necessity, in order to save one’s life. […] The
precautionary or apprehensive taqiyyah consists of the performance
of acts and rituals according to the fatwās (authoritative opinions) of
the Sunnī religious leaders, and in Sunnī countries. […] The arcane
taqiyyah is to conceal one’s faith or ideology […] to carry out
clandestine activity for furthering religious goals. […] Finally, the
symbiotic type is simply a code of coexistence with the Sunnī
majority, and of participation in their social and ritual congregations
for maintaining Islamic unity.”435 (emphases in the text)
Despite these legal categorizations and differentiations of various types of
Taqīyyah, the essential undertone of the doctrine of Taqīyyah has been one of prudence
and expediency. Taqīyyah socialized Shī‘ah Muslims to be sensitive to practical concerns
and to appreciate what one may call “realism.”436 As a result, the early Shī‘ah community

432

For instance, when the stakes are not high –e.g. protection of small properties [see Ibid. Vol. 11, pp. 4512], or when an act of Taqīyyah involves “pretending to reject the Shī‘ah Imāms” [see Shahīd al-Awwal, alQawā’id wal-Fawā’id fīl-Fiqh wal-Uṣūl wal-‘Arabīyah, Vol. 2, p. 158].
433

For instance, when there is no Iḍṭirār, or when Taqīyyah leads to violation of “another person’s rights,”
or when it might cause “spilling of bloods,” or when it may lead to religious “innovation” –i.e. Bid‘ah [see
al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, p. 510]. According to the
mainstream Shī‘ī beliefs, Taqīyyah was forbidden to Ḥusayn in Karbalā for the caliphate of Yazīd ibn
Mu‘āwīyah was a blatant “corruption of the religion.” For more discussion of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom in
Karbalā and the alternative Shī‘ī argument, which believes that Ḥusayn could have practiced Taqīyyah, see
the preceding Chapter.
434

For a classical example of the legal discussion of these five categories of Taqīyyah, see Shahīd alAwwal, al-Qawā’id wal-Fawā’id fīl-Fiqh wal-Uṣūl wal-‘Arabīyah, Vol. 2.

435

See Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. pp. 177-8. For more on these four categories of
Taqīyyah, see al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11.

436

For an insightful discussion of the forces of “idealism” and “realism” in Shī‘ah political thought, see
Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. pp. 26-8.
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internalized a sense of religious duty attached to efforts aimed at protecting the
community, be it concealing their religious adherence or practicing Sunnī rituals.437 The
implications of the doctrine, however, were far-reaching. In fact, the practice of Taqīyyah
made it possible for the aforementioned extensive and underground Shī‘ī network to
emerge. The creation of the network was a notable achievement especially when one
considers the devastating blow the Shī‘ah community had received in Karbalā. That
Taqīyyah went beyond simply concealing Shī‘ī belief and that it implied strategies of
expediency and prudence could be seen in the lives of the Shī‘ah Imāms. In fact, the
foundation of the doctrine of Taqīyyah may be found more easily in the actions of these
Imāms, rather than their words.
The earliest precedence for the doctrine of Taqīyyah is recognizable in the life of
the Shī‘ah patriarch, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib. Following the death of the Prophet in 632 C.E.,
‘Alī was marginalized by the powerful sectors within the tribe of Quraysh.438 For the next
twenty five years, he reluctantly acquiesced to the caliphate of Abū Bakr, ‘Umar ibn alKhaṭṭāb, and ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān. During this long period, ‘Alī’s relationship with the
sitting caliphs was a sophisticated one. On the one hand, ‘Alī was adamant about his right
to succeed the Prophet.439 On the other hand, however, he offered these caliphs his
437

Using an analogy, the sixth Shī‘ah Imām instructs his followers to internalize Taqīyyah so that it
becomes their “overgarment and undergarment” at once. In other words, the Imām seems to demand
expediency to become the second nature of the Shī‘ah community [see al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah
fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, p. 466].
438

See Madelung, Wilferd. The Succession to Muhammad. Quraysh was the tribe of the Prophet, and that of
the first four caliphs. For a discussion of the political context of the selection of the first caliph, Abū Bakr,
and especially of the tribal politics involved in the process, see Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat
dar Islām. pp. 158-9.
439

For his explicit statement regarding the issue of caliphate, see ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Nahj al-Balāghah,
Sermon 3 –also known as the “Sermon of Shiqshiqīyyah.”
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assistance and his advice from time to time.440 ‘Alī justified this complex relationship by
expressing his concerns for the future of Islam and what harm his protest against the
caliphs might do to the Muslim community.441 Nevertheless, the “twenty-five year
silence” served as a “tradition foundation,” or Sunnah, behind the doctrine of Taqīyyah in
Shī‘ah Islam. Even though ‘Ali’s accommodation of the three caliphs was associated to
the issue of “future of Islam” instead of the concern for his own survival, it was
understood as an example of observing Taqīyyah by the Shī‘ah patriarch, hence
establishing the broader implications of Taqīyyah.
In regards to the doctrine of Taqīyyah, however, it must be noted that ‘Alī’s
contribution has been more restrictive than permissive. As will be discussed in the
following section442, ‘Alī’s political legacy is often associated with his uncompromising
adherence to his principles during his caliphate. Even during the twenty-five years of
“political silence” prior to his caliphate, ‘Alī refrained from engagement in the tribal
balance-of-power politics, further –politically– marginalizing himself.443 The resulting
paradigm of “principled action” in Shī‘ah Islam later on qualified the doctrine of
Taqīyyah in noticeable ways.
The doctrine of Taqīyyah found its next reinforcements in the lives of the second
and the third Imāms, namely Ḥasan and Ḥusayn. Ḥasan’s peace treaty with Mu‘āwīyah
440

For the examples of the helps the three first caliphs received from ‘Alī see Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Irshād,
Vol. 1, pp. 201-212; and also Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 3; Ibn al-Athīr, alKāmil fīl-Tārīkh, Vol. 3; and Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī, Vol. 2.
441

See, for instance, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Nahj al-Balāghah, Letter 62.

442

See the section titled “Principled Action and Expediency: The Legacy of ‘Alī” below.

443

See Madelung, Wilferd. The Succession to Muhammad.
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ibn Abī Sufyān signed in 661 C.E.444 has become one of the most debated aspects of
Shī‘ah history among Shī‘ah commentators. His concession of the caliphate to the
archenemy of his father has called for complex intellectual and theological arguments by
the Shī‘ahs to defend the actions of their Imām. The main thrust of these arguments,
however, has been the pragmatic concerns of Ḥasan regarding the prospect of a war with
the organized army of Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān.445 As a result, the peace treaty is
sometimes associated with the practice of Taqīyyah.446 Ḥasan’s brother, Ḥusayn, also
continued the same expedient approach upon becoming the third Shī‘ah Imām in 670
C.E. Even though Ḥusayn is generally associated with the more assertive doctrine of
Shahādah and the events of Karbalā, he did observe Taqīyyah as long as Mu‘āwīyah ibn
Abī Sufyān was alive.447 This constituted ten years of Ḥusayn’s imamate from 670 C.E.
to 680 C.E. It was only in the months that followed the death of Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī
Sufyān when Ḥusayn refused to observe Taqīyyah. The result, as discussed in the
preceding Chapter, was his death in the same year in Karbalā.

444

See Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 4, pp. 126-9; and Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fīlTārīkh, Vol. 3, pp. 404-7.

445

See Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, ‘Ilal al-Sharāyi‘, Vol. 1, pp. 210-9; ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 44,
pp.1-33; and Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī, Kitāb al-Iḥtijāj, Vol. 2, pp. 8-12.
446

Ayatollah Kāẓim Sharī‘atmadārī (d. 1986), for instance, favored cautious “quietism” during and after the
Islamic Revolution in Iran by referring to “Imām Ḥasan’s tradition” and to the Shī‘ī principle of Taqīyyah
[M. Mesbahi, Interview, February 27, 2012]. Ayatollah Sharī‘atmadārī’s argument was in line with Ḥasan’s
own justification of the peace treaty with Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān. In a conversation with some of his
followers who protested against the peace treaty, Ḥasan argues that the treaty was necessary so that “you
and I may survive among them [i.e. the enemies]” [see Muḥammad al-Riyshahrī, Mīzān al-Ḥikmah, Vol. 2,
p. 1620].
447

See, for instance, Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 4, p. 126; Amīn al-Islām
Ṭabarsī, Kitāb al-Iḥtijāj, Vol. 2, pp. 20-1; and Abū Muḥammad ibn Qatibah al-Daynūrī, al-Imāmah walSīyāsah, Vol. 1, p. 201.
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It was, however, after the horrifying events of Karbalā that Taqīyyah became the
essential modus vivendi of the Shī‘ah community and that of the Shī‘ah Imāms. The
Imāms who succeeded Ḥusayn –with arguably the exception of Mūsā ibn Ja‘far, the
seventh Imām– are believed to have chosen the “politics of Taqīyyah.”448 The fact that
these Imāms observed Taqīyyah, however, does not mean that they concealed their Shī‘ī
beliefs; for these were prominent figures known to be the heads of the Shī‘ah community.
Instead, their observance of Taqīyyah meant a particularly prudent approach in politics.
The fourth Shī‘ah Imām, ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn449, was one of the few male companions of
Ḥusayn who survived the Battle of Karbalā. Yet, he never sought to avenge his father’s
death by the Umayyad. Other branches of Banī Hāshim450 did rebel against the Umayyad
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Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. p. 252.
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658 – 712 C.E. He is also known by his epithets al-Sajjād and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn.
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Along with Banī Umayyah, i.e. Sons of Umayyah, Banī Hāshim, i.e. Sons of Hāshim, was one of the
main clans of Quraysh, the tribe of the Prophet. Prior to Islam, Banī Umayyah was the most powerful clan
of Quraysh. When Muḥammad, who belonged to Banī Hāshim, revealed his prophetic mission, the fiercest
opposition came from Banī Umayyah. With the success of the Prophet in establishing his authority,
therefore, Banī Umayyah was temporary marginalized. This relative marginalization continued during the
reign of Abū Bakr, who was from Banī Tamīm clan of Quraysh, and ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, who was from
Banī ‘Adī clan of that tribe. With the rise of ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān, who was from Banī Umayyah, to the
caliphate in 644 C.E., Banī Umayyah began to resume their position of power. Their return was so
successful that by the time ‘Alī, who was from Banī Hāshim, became the caliph in 656 C.E., it was already
impossible to reverse Banī Umayyah’s hold on power. ‘Alī’s archenemy, Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān was in
fact the head of Banī Umayyah at the time and the rise of the Umayyad dynasty had already been in the
making. After ‘Alī, Banī Hāshim was divided into several sub-clans. The most important among these were
the ‘Alawīs, i.e. Sons of ‘Alī, and Banī ‘Abbās, i.e. Sons of ‘Abbās, the Prophet’s uncle. The Shī‘ah Imāms
all belong to the ‘Alawī sub-clan of Banī Hāshim. Banī ‘Abbās were either identified themselves as Shī‘ah
or were sympathetic to the Shī‘ī cause. This is probably why they were a part of the underground Shī‘ī
network that emerged after Karbalā. It was partly due to employing this network that Banī ‘Abbās managed
to advance their fight against the Umayyad dynasty. Later on, however, Banī ‘Abbās and the ‘Alawīs parted
ways. This divergence culminated in 750 C.E. when the former group rose to power by establishing the
Abbasid caliphate –under the banner of returning the caliphate to the “family of the Prophet.” The Abbasid
caliphs persecuted the ‘Alawīs and their Imāms as potential challengers to their claim of political
legitimacy [see Ibid. pp. 241-51; and Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī, Vol. 2]. The fear of the
‘Alawīs also caused the Abbasid dynasty to adopt Sunnī jurisdiction and Sunnī theology as the legal and
religious foundations of the state. Due to this choice, Feirahi argues that after the establishment of the
Abbasid caliphate, the term Shī‘ah began to be used exclusively in reference to the ‘Alawīs, and no longer
included Banī ‘Abbās [see Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. p. 265; and Ibid. p. 182.
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to revenge the martyrdom of Ḥusayn. In fact, one of the most important Shī‘ī uprisings
against the Umayyad dynasty took place during ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn’s imamate. The leader of
the rebellion was Mukhtār al-Thaqafī451 whose avowed mission was to avenge Ḥusayn.
Yet, he did not claim this revenge on behalf of ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn. Instead, he fought under
the banner of Muḥammad ibn Ḥanafīyyah (d. 700/701 C.E.), who was Ḥusayn’s stepbrother. Many Shī‘ahs joined Mukhtār al-Thaqafī in this uprising that seriously
challenged the hold of Banī Umayyah to power. Yet ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn refrained from
public engagement in the affair and, according to the Shī‘ī sources, referred the matter to
his uncle, Muḥammad ibn Ḥanafīyyah.452 Meanwhile, according to the mainstream
Shī‘ah historiography, ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn initiated a quiet “educational movement” aimed at

Also, Ibid. p. 160-1 offers a useful discussion of the rising political tensions between Banī Hāshim and
Banī Umayyah following the death of the Prophet]. For a classical account of the tensions between Banī
Hāshim and Banī Umayyah, see Taqī al-Dīn Abī Muḥammad al-Maqrīzī, al-Nizā‘ wal-Takhāṣum fīmā bayn
Banī Umayyah wa Banī Hāshim.
451

Mukhtār al-Thaqafī’s rebellion was eventually crushed by the forces of Umayyad caliph and he was
killed in 687 C.E. See Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 4, pp. 513-76; and Ibn alAthīr, al-Kāmil fīl-Tārīkh, Vol. 4, pp. 211-77.
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According to Shī‘ah sources, ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn did give his implicit consent to Mukhtār al-Thaqafī’s
uprising and Mukhtār al-Thaqafī also respected ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn’s high stature among the Shī‘ah
community [see ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 45, p. 339; Ibid. Vol. 45, p. 351; and, particularly
for ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn’s implicit support, see Ibid. Vol. 45, p. 365. See also Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh
Ya‘qūbī, Vol. 2]. Despite this mutually respectful relationship, however, there seems to be a general
consensus among the historians that Mukhtār al-Thaqafī considered –or at least represented– Muḥammad
ibn Ḥanafīyyah as the head of the community and maybe even as the “Shī‘ah Imām.” Prominent
contemporary historian, Sayyid Ja‘far Shahīdī, for instance, believes that ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn did not respond
to Mukhtār al-Thaqafī’s initial invitation sent to him; and after the uprising, he only partially approved of
Mukhtār al-Thaqafī’s acts of revenge [see Shahīdī, Sayyid Ja‘far. (1995). Zindigānī ‘Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn.
Tehran: Daftar Nashr Farhang Islāmī. p. 92; and also Abū al-Ḥasan Mas‘ūdī, Murawwij al-Dhahab wa
Ma‘ādin al-Jawhar, Vol. 2]. As a result, later Shī‘ah Imāms, while often speaking highly of Mukhtār alThaqafī, refrained from fully sanctioning his actions [see, for instance, ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār,
Vol. 45, pp. 343-5].
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spreading Shī‘ī teachings.453 In particular, he laid the foundation for the rise of Shī‘ī Fiqh,
or jurisprudence, during the imamate of the next two Shī‘ah Imāms.454
The fifth and the sixth Shī‘ah Imāms, Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī and Ja‘far ibn
Muḥammad, followed the same “politics of Taqīyyah.” They permitted a selected number
of their followers to serve in various governmental positions without revealing their Shī‘ī
beliefs.455 These elite “secret Shī‘ahs” proved to be helpful in protecting the Shī‘ah
community because of their high positions within the bureaucracy of the caliphate. The
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One the important yet understudied Shī‘ī classical texts is Ṣaḥīfah al-Sajjādīyah, a book of prayers
taught by ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn. Along with the Qur’ān and Nahj al-Balāghah by ‘Alī, Ṣaḥīfah al-Sajjādīyah is
among the central texts in Shī‘ah Islam. Sometimes dubbed as the “Sister of the Qur’ān,” Ṣaḥīfah alSajjādīyah is more than a book of prayers however; for it lays the general ground of the Shī‘ī worldview
through these prayers. The fifty four prayers of the mainstream version of the book cover a long list of
subjects including questions of theology, divinity, prophethood, fate, and Providence; existential issues such
as pain, suffering, death, sickness, health, desires, sorrow, fear, repentance, supplication, contentment,
gratefulness, and humility; social issues such as parents, progeny, friends, neighbours, as well as discretion,
poverty, and benevolence; rituals of Islam such as the “prayer of the night,” pilgrimage, and fasting; the
central Shī‘ī issues of justice and injustice; and finally a major discourse on ethics and high morals. As the
diverse subjects of these prayers indicate, Ṣaḥīfah al-Sajjādīyah functioned as a set of reflections for the
Shī‘ah community following the disaster of Karbalā. This is why many Shī‘ah authors have argued that it
was ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn who laid the foundations of what was to become the elaborate legal and theological
edifice of Shī‘ah Islam. Needless to say, he succeeded in spreading his teachings by resorting to an
extremely prudent approach in politics justified by the flexible doctrine of Taqīyyah.
454

‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn’s complex “politics of Taqīyyah” can also be recognized in the anti-Umayyad rebellion
of the people of Medina. The revolt, also known as Qīyām al-Ḥurrah, took place about a year after the
events of Karbalā and ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn, who was a prominent figure in the city, did not support it. When the
rebels took the control of the city in their hand, the family of Marwān ibn Ḥakam sought the protection of
‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn, which they were granted. Protection of Marwān ibn Ḥakam’s family is significant for he
was an archenemy of the ‘Alawīs and, later on, he went on to become the fourth Umayyad caliph. The
revolt was eventually crushed by the army of Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah and he ordered that prominent figures
of Medina to be publicly humiliated. The only exception was ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn who was treated with respect
after the fall of the city. The Shī‘ah sources argue that it was the Taqīyyah of the Imām during the revolt
that spared him the public humiliation [see Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 4, pp.
370-380; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah wal-Nihāyah, Vol. 6, pp. 261-3; Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī.
Vol. 2, p. 250; and Shahīdī, Sayyid Ja‘far. Zindigānī ‘Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn]. The other aspect of ‘Alī ibn
Ḥusayn’s “politics of Taqīyyah” may be found in his adamant opposition to Shī‘ahs’ interactions with those
associated with the Umayyad court. In a famous letter ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn strongly censures his former
student, Muḥammad ibn Muslim al-Zuhrī, for “cozying up to the unjust [Umayyad] rulers” and
“accompanying the betrayers” [see Ibn Shu‘bah al-Ḥarrānī, Tuḥaf al-‘Uqūl, p. 274-7].
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For an example of such permissions, see al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il alSharī‘ah, Vol. 11, p. 460.
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“educational” consequences of the two Imāms’ Taqīyyah, however, were more significant
than implantation of their agents in positions of high power. By observing Taqīyyah, they
managed to solidify the basic tenets of the Shī‘ī School of jurisprudence during an
extremely turbulent period of Muslim history. These two Imāms spent the majority of
their lives quietly teaching large crowds of devoted followers. According to Shī‘ī reports,
these teachings covered a wide spectrum of subjects in theology, exegesis of the Qur’ān,
logic, ethics, and jurisprudence. Both Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī456 and Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad
based their “system of education” in the city of Medina, a city that, while religiously and
symbolically significant to Muslims, had become marginalized by the rise of such
powerful centers of politics as Baghdad and Damascus. The retreat to Medina gave them
a leeway to expand their circle of students.457 As the Ummayad dynasty was falling to its
knees due to the internal conflicts as well as the forceful opposition of Banī ‘Abbās, the
Shī‘ah Imāms made sure to steer clear of politics. In Shī‘ah historiography, the “quietist”
attitude of Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī and Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad is often viewed as arguably
the most significant examples of practicing Taqīyyah. At the same time, the approach
proved successful as, by the time of Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad’s death in 765 C.E., Shī‘ah
456

Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī was particularly influential in establishing the Shī‘ī methodology of critical
reasoning in jurisprudence. The method was then employed in practicing Ijtihād, i.e. the “process of
arriving at judgements on points of religious law using reason and the [science] of principles of
jurisprudence” [see Subḥānī, Ja‘far. Doctrines of Shi‘i Islam., p. 182]. In regard to his epithet, al-Bāqir, and
its relation to his method of critical reasoning, see Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī. Vol. 2; and
Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, ‘Ilal al-Sharāyi‘, Vol. 1, p. 233.
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Even in their teachings, Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī and Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad observed a form of Taqīyyah
that is sometimes called Taqiīyyah fil-Ḥukm, i.e. “Taqīyyah in Opinion.” This Taqīyyah refers to
concealing one’s jurisprudential opinion in order to protect oneself. Both Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī and Ja‘far
ibn Muḥammad attracted large number of students among whom existed many non-Shī‘ahs. The occasional
discrepancies in the jurisprudential opinions of these Imāms are often related to their “Taqīyyah in
Opinion” in responding to different audiences. See in particular Ṣafarī, Ni‘matullāh. (2003). Naqsh
Taqīyyah dar Istinbāṭ. Qum: Būstān Kitāb Qum.
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Islam had already obtained an elaborate and comprehensive theological and juridical
paradigm.458
The broad implications of the doctrine of Taqīyyah go beyond the common
understanding of “expedient concealment.” That becomes more evident when one
considers the political context of Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad’s life. In 740 C.E., an important
Shī‘ī uprising broke out under the leadership of Zayd ibn ‘Alī, son of the fourth Shī‘ah
Imām, ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn. The revolt was against the crumbling Umayyad dynasty in order
to reclaim the ‘Alawī’s right to the caliphate.459 Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad, however, did not
join the revolt. While most of the Shī‘ah community followed Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad’s
“quietism,” some joined Zayd ibn ‘Alī’s movement and even considered him instead of
Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad to be the Shī‘ah Imām. Eventually, the revolt was suppressed by
the Umayyad forces and Zayd ibn ‘Alī was killed in the same year. Yet, the disagreement
between the two sides of the Shī‘ah community survived. The majority followed what
was to become the Twelver Shī‘ah Islam while the minority Zaydīyyah branched out.
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As mentioned before, most of the Shī‘ah Ḥadīths are reported from the sixth Shī‘ah Imām, Ja‘far ibn
Muḥammad. In fact, given the central role played by Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad in the development of the Shī‘ī
School of jurisprudence, this School is often called the “Ja‘farī School of Fiqh” [see, for instance, Shaykh
al-Mufīd, al-Irshād, Vol. 2, pp. 179-214 for a mainstream Shī‘ī account of Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad’s status in
Shī‘ah jurisprudence]. It must be added that both Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī and Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad are
among the respected religious and scholarly authorities in Sunnī Islam as well.
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See Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 5, pp. 481-506; and Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fīlTārīkh, Vol. 5, pp. 242-7.
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On the theological level, the alleged disagreement460 between Zayd ibn ‘Alī and
Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad was the result of their different understandings of the doctrine of
Shahādah and that of Taqīyyah. Zayd ibn ‘Alī understood his grandfather’s martyrdom in
Karbalā as setting a universal example to be –literally– followed. He saw the doctrine of
Shahādah as a universal creed –a creed that only under extremely rare circumstances
might give way to the doctrine of Taqīyyah.461 As a result, Zayd ibn ‘Alī and his
followers believed that whenever the opportunity to rise against “injustice” presented
itself, it would be obligatory to engage in Jihād.462 Because of this interpretation, Zaydī
Shī‘ahs believed that the Imām must have two characteristics. First, he must be a “pious
and knowledgeable” descendant of the Prophet through his daughter Fāṭimah bint
Muḥammad. Second, he must rise against injustice by resorting to Jihād, i.e. Qiyām bil460

Similar to the case of Mukhtār al-Thaqafī, the fact that the Shī‘ah Imām did not publicly approve of
Zayd ibn ‘Alī’s revolt did not prevent Shī‘ah theologians to generally revere Zayd ibn ‘Alī as a pious and
knowledgeable member of Banī Hāshim. According to the mainstream reports, Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad paid
deference to his uncle Zayd ibn ‘Alī, and so did the following Shī‘ah Imāms [see, for instance, Muḥammad
‘Alī al-Ardabīlī, Jāmi‘ al-Ruwāt, Vol. 1, p. 343; Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Irshād, Vol. 2, pp. 172-3; and also
Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, ‘Uyūn Akhbār al-Ridhā, Vol. 2]. Some of the Shī‘ah theologians, such as Shahīd alAwwal, have even argued that Zayd ibn ‘Alī had had the implicit permission of the Imām in his revolt [see
Shahīd al-Awwal, al-Qawā’id wal-Fawā’id fīl-Fiqh wal-Uṣūl wal-‘Arabīyah, Vol. 2, p. 207]. Note that in
contemporary –“revisionist”– Shī‘ah historiography, one may find an attempt in softening the difference
between Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad’s approach and that of Zayd ibn ‘Alī. This “revisionist” historiography
bourgeoned in particular after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The “revolutionary Shī‘ah intelligentsia” that
emerged during the Revolution found it necessary to project the life of the Shī‘ah Imāms as unequivocally
pro-revolution –and thus sanctioning every revolutionary move. The task proved to be a difficult one given
the extensive tradition of political “quietism” and the practice of Taqīyyah by the Shī‘ah Imāms.
Nonetheless, an example of this “revisionist” historiography in regards to Zayd ibn ‘Alī’s movement can be
found in Razawi Ardekani, Abufazel. (1996). Shakhsīyat wa Qīyām Zayd ibn ‘Alī. Tehran: Daftar Tablīghāt
Islāmī.
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In fact, some have argued that Taqīyyah is forbidden in Zaydī Shī‘ah Islam [see Mullā Ṣāliḥ
Māzandarānī, Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Kāfī, Vol. 9, pp. 118-136]. Later on, some branches of Zaydīyyah, such as
Hādawīyyah, accommodated versions of Taqīyyah in part to explain Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī’s peace treaty with
Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān; for similar to Twelver Shī‘ahs, Zaydī Shī‘ahs consider Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī as one of
their Imāms.
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For a discussion of Shī‘ī understanding of Jihād and its relation to the principle of Justice in Shī‘ah
Islam, see the preceding Chapter.

165

Sayf, whenever it is possible.463 In contrast, Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad viewed the events of
Karbalā as an extraordinary episode. He did not believe that Ḥusayn’s martyrdom must
be universally followed by Shī‘ah Muslims. Instead, he maintained that it was Ḥusayn’s
“protest against injustice” that was to be followed by Shī‘ah Muslims –via various
measures including the practice of Taqīyyah. Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad also had a broader
understanding of the doctrine of Taqīyyah that entailed more caution compared to the
assertive approach of Zayd ibn ‘Alī. The notion of the universality of the doctrine of
Shahādah, which is sometimes inaccurately associated with Twelver Shī‘ah Islam, is
therefore a Zaydī Shī‘ah doctrine. Following this Zaydī doctrine, quite a number of
“Zaydī Imāms” continued Zayd ibn ‘Alī’s Jihād against the Umayyad and the Abbasid
caliphs after his death.464
The split between Twelver Shī‘ahs and Zaydī Shī‘ahs was an example of a
recurring pattern in the early history of Shī‘ah Islam. After the death of Ḥusayn in
Karbalā, the sub-clan of the ‘Alawīs of Banī Hāshim divided into three branches. These
included the Ḥasanīs, i.e. the descendants of Ḥasan, the Ḥusaynīs, i.e. the descendants of
Ḥusayn, and the Kaysānīyyah, i.e. the descendants of Muḥammad ibn Ḥanafīyyah.465 All
the Twelver Shī‘ah Imāms who succeeded Ḥusayn came from the Ḥusaynī branch of the
‘Alawīs. Yet, none of them resorted to Jihād in revenge of their ancestor’s martyrdom or
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See Shaykh al-Mufīd, Awā’il al-Maqālāt fīl-Madhāhib wal-Mukhtārāt, p. 39; Shaykh al-Mufīd, alMuqni‘ah, p. 655; Ḥasan ibn Mūsā Nawbakhtī and Sa‘d ibn ‘Abdullāh al-Qummi, Firaq al-Shī‘ah, pp. 314; and Abū al-Ḥasan Mas‘ūdī, Murawwij al-Dhahab wa Ma‘ādin al-Jawhar.
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See Aḥmad ibn A‘tham al-Kūfī, Kitāb al-Futūḥ, Vol. 8; Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh alṬabarī, Vol. 5, 6 & 7; and Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fīl-Tārīkh, Vol. 5 & 6.
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to claim their right to the caliphate. Instead, other prominent figures from all the three
branches466 of the ‘Alawīs revolted against the Umayyad and the Abbasid from time to
time. The reaction of the Shī‘ah Imāms to most if not all of these recurring rebellions
were neither open approval nor public condemnation, but almost everything in between.
It ranged from silent consent to quiet dismissal and to implicit rejection.467 These
sophisticated and calculated reactions were nothing short of the manifestations of their
“politics of Taqīyyah.”468 In an unusually direct explanation of his policy of nonengagement, Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad argued that the uprising of other factions among Banī
Hāshim had provided the Shī‘ah community with the much-needed breathing space; for it
had kept anti-Shī‘ah forces occupied.469
The imamate of Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad also witnessed a significant transition from
the Umayyad dynasty to the Abbasid dynasty in 750 C.E. As mentioned before, Banī
‘Abbās, who constituted the main oppositional thrust against the Umayyad dynasty,
466

For instance, Mukhtār al-Thaqafī from the Kaysānīyyah branch, Zayd ibn ‘Alī from the Ḥusaynī branch,
and ‘Abdullāh ibn Ḥasan, also known as Nafs al-Zakīyyah (d. 762 C.E.), from the Ḥasanī branch rebelled
against the sitting caliphs. None of them received the public sanction of their contemporary Shī‘ah Imāms,
further emphasizing the distinct political approach of these Imāms. In the case of ‘Abdullāh ibn Ḥasan,
Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad was more firm in his dismissal of the rebellion, even though he still expressed his
disagreement in a rather lenient way [see Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Irshād, Vol. 2, pp. 190-3]. Modarresi
Tabatabaii refers to Kuliynī’s Uṣūl al-Kāfī as well as other sources and reports that the followers of
‘Abdullāh ibn Ḥasan harassed Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad after the latter’s refusal to join them [see Modarresi
Tabatabaii, Hossein. (2007). Maktab dar Farāyand Takāmul: Naẓarī bar Taṭawwur Mabānī Fikrī Tashayyu‘
dar Sih Qarn Nukhustīn. Trans. Hashem Izadpanah. Tehran: Intishārāt Kawīr. p. 112].
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In some of the more significant cases of these Shī‘ah-sympathetic uprisings, the later Shī‘ah Imām
highly praised the efforts. In the case of Zayd ibn ‘Alī, for instance, his “martyrdom” was recognized by the
Imāms who came after his death even though his contemporary Imām had not joined his campaign [see, for
instance, ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 45, pp. 186-209]. This pattern of recognition after the
event was arguably another example of practicing Taqīyyah for it increased the survivability of the Shī‘ah
community.

468
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See Muḥammad al-Riyshahrī, Mīzān al-Ḥikmah, Vol. 1, p. 182, Ḥadīth no. 238; and al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī,
Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, p. 39, Ḥadīth no. 12.
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employed the clandestine Shī‘ī network in their campaign. Moreover, their key strategy
was to question the political legitimacy of the Umayyad dynasty and to call for the return
of the caliphate to its legitimate bearers, namely “the family of the Prophet.” The fact that
Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad was a direct descendant of the Prophet rendered him an obvious
candidate to whom Banī ‘Abbās was referring. Yet, there seems to be a consensus among
the Shī‘ah historians that Banī ‘Abbās did not have the intention of offering the caliphate
to the ‘Alawīs once they succeeded. At any rate, Banī ‘Abbās seemed to have managed to
conceal their intentions of marginalizing the ‘Alawīs throughout their campaign in order
to exploit the popularity of Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad among the Shī‘ahs.470 The strategy
created high expectations among the Shī‘ah community regarding the political future of
their Imām. In fact, upon the imminent success of Banī ‘Abbās movement, some
marginalized elements within that movement approached Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad with an
invitation to become the new caliph.471 He refused the invitation possibly due to his
awareness of the firm intention of Banī ‘Abbās to establish an ‘Abbāsī rather than an
‘Alawī caliphate.472 Meanwhile, Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad’s refusal to engage in politics
when the environment appeared to be so favorable confused the Shī‘ah community.
Modarresi Tabatabaii believes that the Imām’s “political silence,” which was in fact the
continuation of his father’s and his grandfather’s policy, was added to a series of
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“disappointments” in the community.473 Despite their popularity and high stature among
Banī Hāshim and even among the larger Muslim society, Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī and Ja‘far
ibn Muḥammad had refused to engage in politics.474 Their decision led to a painful
process of socialization of the notion of Taqīyyah among the Shī‘ah Muslims. The
experience further distanced the Shī‘ah community from the Zaydīs. The less political
and more esoteric image of the Imāms was also solidified in this period.475 This “spiritual
image” of the Imāms had now had a solid theological foundation in the teachings of the
fourth, the fifth, and the sixth Shī‘ah Imāms.
The seventh Shī‘ah Imām, Mūsā ibn Ja‘far, was politically more active compared
to his father and his grandfather. Yet, according to Shī‘ah historiography, he was still an
observer of the “politics of Taqīyyah.” Despite his more vocal opposition to the Abbasid
caliphate, for instance, he did not resort to violent measures. Instead, he successfully
created an organized Shī‘ī network by appointing representatives and deputies throughout
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the Muslim world.476 The network facilitated an increasing number of financial, legal,
and educational interactions between the community and the Imām as well as within the
community itself. The transactions that went through this network were under the radar of
the Abbasid caliphate; and they posed a direct challenge to the authority of the caliph. As
a result, the powerful Abbasid caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd477 eventually imprisoned Mūsā ibn
Ja‘far; and after a number of years in prison, Mūsā ibn Ja‘far was reportedly killed by
poison in 799 C.E.478
The next, somewhat controversial, application of the doctrine of Taqīyyah
happened during the imamate of the eighth Imām, ‘Alī ibn Mūsā479. Unlike the Umayyad
system, which was essentially the reproduction of pre-Islam inter- and intra-tribal
politics, the Abbasid political system was quite sophisticated. Ruling over a large multiethnic territory, the Abbasid had to balance different factions of the society over which
they ruled. They soon adopted the complex bureaucracy of the earlier Persian Empires
and hired a number of influential Persian viziers. To establish their political legitimacy,
they also developed systematic relations with the prominent Sunnī ‘Ulamā of the time.480
In this sophisticated political structure, the relationship between the Abbasid court and
the ‘Alawīs was even more complicated. The two had begun as implicit allies in their
opposition to the Umayyad dynasty and had grown into enemies after the establishment
476

See Ibid. pp. 40-1.

477

d. 809 C.E.

478

See Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Irshād, Vol. 2, pp. 237-243.

479

765 – 817 C.E. He is also known by his epithet al-Riḍā.

480

See Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. pp. 259-69.

170

of the Abbasid dynasty, for the Abbasid saw the ‘Alawīs as competitors with a more
plausible claim to the caliphate. As mentioned before, this enmity had already been
crystallized in the fate of the seventh Shī‘ah Imām. Moving among their Arab, Persian,
and Turkic bases, however, the Abbasid caliphs had to constantly revise the list of their
enemies and their allies. The situation created a dynamic Abbassid-Shī‘ah relationship.
Traditionally, the Shī‘ah Imāms had had a large number of followers in today’s Iraq
region. Gradually, however, they were obtaining a solid base among the Persians as well.
This was in part due to the fact that the Persians had grown disillusioned with the
Abbasid’s initial campaign to reverse the Umayyad’s “anti-Persian policies.” The rising
opposition between the ‘Alawīs (or Shī‘ahs) and the Abbasid, therefore, had led to proShī‘ah leanings among the Persians. To appease the growing number of ‘Alawī
sympathizers in Persia, the Abbasid caliphs felt the necessity of employing radically
different strategies vis-à-vis the Shī‘ah Imāms. As a result, while caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd
had ordered the execution of Mūsā ibn Ja‘far in prison, his son481 designated Mūsā ibn
Ja‘far’s son as his successor.482
The Shī‘ah historiography views ‘Alī ibn Mūsā’s response to the caliph’s
appointment as nothing short of practicing Taqīyyah. Prior to his appointment, ‘Alī ibn
Mūsā had been strictly following the usual “politics of Taqīyyah” for about fifteen years.
During this period, he had engaged mainly in administering the affairs of the Shī‘ah
community through the large network of his delegates and devotees. He had also
481

This is Ma’mūn al-‘Abbāsī (d. 833 C.E.).

482

According to Modarresi Tabatabaii, “many historians have speculated that the action of [the caliph]
Ma’mūn [al-‘Abbāsī in appointing ‘Alī ibn Mūsā as his successor] was to contain the rising [Shī‘ī] fervor”
[Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab dar Farāyand Takāmul. p. 42].

171

exploited the breathing space caused by the death of Hārūn al-Rashīd and by the brutal
rivalry between Hārūn al-Rashīd’s two sons, Amīn al-‘Abbāsi483 and Ma’mūn al-‘Abbāsi,
over the caliphate.484 Once Ma’mūn al-‘Abbāsi consolidated his hold on power as the
caliph, he made the Persian city of Marw in the eastern province of Khurāsān his interim
capital city. The choice of Marw was already an indication of Ma’mūn al-‘Abbāsī’s rising
worries about the seething ‘Alawī enclaves throughout Persia. In an attempt to contain
the ‘Alawīs, Ma’mūn al-‘Abbāsī invited ‘Alī ibn Mūsā from Medina to Marw485 and
designated him as the next caliph. According to the Shī‘ah historiography, ‘Alī ibn Mūsā
was forced to accept the position, making him an unwilling figurehead.486
Before accepting Ma’mūn al-‘Abbāsī’s offer, however, ‘Alī ibn Mūsā stipulated
several conditions. These conditions manifest the prevailing attitude of Taqīyyah that had
been taking roots in the political philosophy of the Shī‘ah Imāms after Ḥusayn.
483
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According to Shī‘ah sources, ‘Alī ibn Mūsā’s conditions included “not to be asked to
interfere in the appointments of government’s officials; not to be asked to interfere in
government’s procedures and protocols; not to be asked to serve as a judge; and not to be
asked to engage in the politics of the Abbasid caliphate.”487 For someone who had been
designated as the next caliph, these conditions appear to be counterintuitive. Yet, they
suggest that ‘Alī ibn Mūsā was not optimistic about the prospect of his political career
within the Abbasid court. By these conditions, therefore, he tried to steer clear of the
affair of that court. In the next few years prior to his death488, ‘Alī ibn Mūsā’s chief
activity was to attend scholarly forums sponsored by Ma’mūn al-‘Abbāsī. In these
forums, which has become one of the hallmarks of Ma’mūn al-‘Abbāsī’s caliphate489,
‘Alī ibn Mūsā and his Muslim and non-Muslim interlocutors discussed various
theological and ethical issues.
The next three Shī‘ah Imāms, i.e. Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī490, Alī ibn Muḥammad491,
and Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī492, continued the “politics of Taqīyyah.” They avoided political
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engagements and quietly expanded the Shī‘ī network of representatives and deputies
initially organized by Mūsā ibn Ja‘far. They also reduced their engagement with the
Shī‘ah community by further delegating partial authorities to their deputies.493 The
disengagement was, in part, due to the rising pressure lifted against the Imāms by the
Abbasid caliphs. The result was socialization of the Shī‘ah community to be able to
survive in the absence of the Imām. To achieve such an objective, the doctrine of
Taqīyyah was of increasing importance. It taught Shī‘ah Muslims to be self-sufficient and
to be extra cautious in dealing with their enemies. It also encouraged them to be prudent
when relying on their allies.
Historically, the lives of the Shī‘ah Imāms –with few, yet significant, exceptions–
have been shaped by the practice of Taqīyyah. The different sociopolitical contexts in
which these Imāms practiced Taqīyyah provided the Shī‘ah community with a rich set of
precedence. Taqīyyah provided the Shī‘ah community with a strategic “system of formal
and informal rules.”494 The system guaranteed the survival of the Shī‘ah community in
the turbulent decades that followed the death of the eleventh Shī‘ah Imām in 874 C.E.
During this period, the absence of the Shī‘ah Imām and the doctrine of the “hidden
Imām”495 created quite a confusion within the community. Towards the end of the ninth
century C.E., according to Modarresi Tabatabaii, many Shī‘ah Muslims had already
493
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grown doubtful of their Shī‘ī beliefs and some had already left Shī‘ah Islam for other
Muslim denominations.496 One of the dynamics that seems to have protected the
community from extinction was the theoretical and practical contributions of the Shī‘ah
theologians and jurists in the decades that followed the death of the eleventh Imām. Their
efforts were two-fold. On the purely theoretical level, the jurists and theologians
elaborated upon various Shī‘ī doctrines in theology (including the notions of Wilāyah and
Walāyah) and in jurisprudence.497 On the practical level, however, these emerging
religious leaders of the Twelver Shī‘ah community continued the practice of Taqīyyah.
They observed expediency and caution498 not only in dealing with the Sunnī –Abbasid–
caliphate, but also in responding to the rise of other branches of Shī‘ah Islam499 to power.
The habit of political prudence eventually helped the Twelver Shī‘ahs to survive the
“great bewilderment” and to begin to grow in number once again during the tenth century
C.E.
Given the flexibility of the doctrine of Taqīyyah, it is difficult to overlook the
powerful forces that this doctrine could release. As Enayat argues, Taqīyyah and its
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underlying expediency can be used and have been used as a pretext to violate other Shī‘ī
principles.500 To address this challenge, Shī‘ah jurists have tried to clarify the legal
boundaries of Taqīyyah, its conditions, and its limits some of which have been discussed
above. Arguably the most important counterforce to Taqīyyah, however, emerged in the
Shī‘ah historiography of the life of the first Imām, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib. In the following
section, a brief review of this historiography and the resulting paradigm of “principled
action” will be discussed.

Principled Action and Expediency: The Legacy of ‘Alī
After the Prophet, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib is the most important religious figure in
Shī‘ah Islam. It may be argued, in fact, that Shī‘ah Islam is based on ‘Alī’s understanding
of the teachings of the Prophet. It is not surprising, therefore, that ‘Alī’s life and the
traditions attributed to him play a central role in shaping Shī‘ī strategic cultures.501 The
legitimizing influence of his “twenty-five year silence” on the doctrine of Taqīyyah has
already been discussed above. In this section, another political legacy of ‘Alī will be
reviewed –a legacy that is arguably the most important political tradition associated with
him in Shī‘ah Islam.
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The mainstream understanding of the Shī‘ah-Sunnī split underlines the political
dispute over the succession of the Prophet. In the “Orientalist” account of the “roots of
Shī‘ah Islam,” consequential theological differences between the two versions of the
religion are often put aside. Yet, it seems that ‘Alī’s political career either as a “silent
protestor” or, later on, as a caliph had its roots in his more esoteric understanding of
Islam. It is not surprising, therefore, that ‘Alī’s political approach had an immediate
impact on Shī’ah political philosophies.
During the rule of the first three caliphs,502 ‘Alī did not endorse their legitimacy
as the successor of the Prophet.503 As discussed before, however, he refused to openly
challenge the first three caliphs; and on certain occasions he provided them with his
consultations. According to Shī‘ah historiography, ‘Alī’s “silent protest” and reluctant
accommodation during this period was an act of “sacrificing” his own political right for
the sake of the long-term interests of the Muslim community. In other words, by
abstaining from a “devastating revolt” against these caliphs, ‘Alī practiced political
expediency for the “greater cause” of the survival of Islam.
In contrast, during his rather short tenure as the fourth caliph504, ‘Alī appeared as
what can be called a full-fledged “principlist,” or someone who acts in accordance to his
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principles regardless of the political consequences. Both Sunnī and Shī‘ah sources report
his peculiar and uncompromising approach in politics. As the caliph, ‘Alī consciously
refused to put politics above his “principles.” For his disregard for political expediency,
‘Alī has been both admired and criticized. He has been admired, mostly by Shī‘ah
writers, as a “true” companion of the Prophet who remained faithful to the teachings of
the Prophet. After all, according to Shī‘ah theology, ‘Alī was the bearer of the “sacred
and supreme Knowledge,” or Wilāyah and Walāyah, after the Prophet. As the head of the
Muslim community, therefore, ‘Alī could have not compromised his “sacred principles.”
According to the Shī‘ī perspective, it was precisely his tradition of “principled action”505
that differentiated ‘Alī’s “legitimate” caliphate from that of the first three caliphs.
Several episodes in ‘Alī’s political career, in particular, manifests his
uncompromising adherence to the paradigm of “principled action.” One early indication
of his political philosophy may be found in his behavior as a member of the Council,
known as the Shawrā, responsible for selecting the third caliph. This electoral Council
was created after the assassination of ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, the second caliph, and
according to his instructions.506 Appointed by ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, ‘Alī and five other
senior members of the Muslim community507 were to select the next caliph. The
deliberations of the Council resulted in a final choice between ‘Alī or ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān
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to be the successor of ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb. According to the Shī‘ah historiography, the
Council asked ‘Alī and ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān whether they would follow “the Book of
God, the tradition of the Prophet, and the examples of the two previous caliphs.”508
‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān gave an unqualified affirmative response; and ‘Alī confirmed that he
would follow the Qur’ān and the tradition of the Prophet, or Sunnah, while remaining
quiet about his loyalty to “the examples of the two previous caliphs.”509 The Council,
then, selected ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān as the caliph. ‘Alī’s refusal to practice Taqīyyah in
responding to the Council even though the stakes were noticeably high was later on
interpreted by Shī‘ah commentators as an example of “principled action.”
When elected the caliph, ‘Alī appeared even more stringent in his adherence to his
principles. One may even argue that this uncompromising approach in politics eventually
caused ‘Alī to lose his control over a large part of the Muslim world. During his reign as
the fourth caliph, ‘Alī had three major military engagements one of which caused an
irrecoverable split in the Muslim world and paved the way for the rise of the Umayyad
dynasty. ‘Alī’s first major war, the Battle of Jamal, was with a well-known group of
people associated directly to the Prophet. These included ‘Āyishah bint Abī Bakr, one of
the wives of the Prophet, and Zubayr ibn ‘Awwām and Ṭalḥah ibn ‘Ubaydullāh, two of
the esteemed companions of the Prophet. While Zubayr ibn ‘Awwām and Ṭalḥah ibn
‘Ubaydullāh were among the first who pledged their allegiances to ‘Alī as the caliph510,
they gradually grew discontented with him. According to the Shī‘ah historiography, the
508
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breaking point was reached when ‘Alī refused to accommodate their political wishes and,
in particular, to appoint them as his governors.511 ‘Alī’s treatment of his fellow disciples,
Zubayr ibn ‘Awwām and Ṭalḥah ibn ‘Ubaydullāh, has often been understood as another
example of “principled action.” By declining the requests of the influential companions
of the Prophet, ‘Alī alienated them and activated several destructive dynamics against his
rule.512 The Battle of Jamal was the first major war between two prominent groups of
Muslims.513 As discussed in the preceding Chapter, this Muslim “civil war” proved to
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of ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān [see Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 3, pp. 399-425; Ibn alAthīr, al-Kāmil fīl-Tārīkh, Vol. 3, p. 286; Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī. Vol. 2, pp. 174-6; Abū
Muḥammad ibn Qatibah al-Daynūrī, al-Imāmah wal-Sīyāsah, Vol. 1, pp. 56-63; Aḥmad ibn A‘tham al-Kūfī,
Kitāb al-Futūḥ, Vol. 2, p. 393; Ibid. Vol. 2, p. 417; and Ibid. Vol. 2, p. 421. See also ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Nahj
al-Balāghah, Sermon 22; Ibid. Sermon 137; and Ibid. Sermon 174 in which ‘Alī complains that “those
responsible for ‘Uthmān [ibn ‘Affān]’s death have disguised themselves as the champions of his revenge”].
Historically, no one was tried for the murder of ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān, either under ‘Alī’s reign or that of
Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān.
In regards to Zubayr ibn ‘Awwām’s and Ṭalḥah ibn ‘Ubaydullāh’s political aspirations and specifically their
demands to be appointed as the governors of Kūfah and Baṣrah, see ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Nahj al-Balāghah,
Sermon 148; Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 3, p. 459; Abū Muḥammad ibn Qatibah
al-Daynūrī, al-Imāmah wal-Sīyāsah, Vol. 1, p. 70; and Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar
Islām. p. 194.
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It is reasonable to believe that had ‘Alī acquiesced to political ambitions of Zubayr ibn ‘Awwām and
Ṭalḥah ibn ‘Ubaydullāh, he could have prevented the Battle of Jamal and the great confusion it caused
within the Muslim society. It was arguably the aftershocks of the Battle of Jamal that deprived ‘Alī of a
decisive victory in the Battle of Ṣiffīn. This, in turn, led to the split of Khawārij from ‘Alī’s army, the
consequent Battle of Nahrawān, and eventually the assassination of ‘Alī by a member of Khawārij.
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For the early historical accounts of the Battle of Jamal, see Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh alṬabarī, Vol. 3, pp. 465-545; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fīl-Tārīkh, Vol. 3, pp. 205-59; and Aḥmad ibn Abī
Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī. Vol. 2, pp. 181-3.
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have had lasting legacies –one of which was the consequential Battle of Ṣeffīn between
the army of ‘Alī and that of Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān.
The Battle of Ṣiffīn was the culmination of a series of tensions between ‘Alī, the
caliph, and Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān, then governor of al-Shām. Appointed by caliph
‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, in 640 C.E., Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān had managed to establish
and consolidate his rule over that strategic territory prior to ‘Alī’s caliphate. Using his
political shrewdness over a long tenure of governorship, Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān had
cultivated the loyalty of powerful figures in al-Shām.514 In one of his first edicts as the
fourth caliph, ‘Alī removed Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān from the position of
governorship.515 Not surprisingly, Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān defied and questioned the
legitimacy of ‘Alī’s caliphate by accusing him of “sheltering the murderers of ‘Uthmān
ibn ‘Affān.” Eventually, the two sides came to a military conflict in the region of Ṣiffīn
that ended in an inconclusive arbitration. The war resulted in bifurcation of the Muslim
world and severely weakened ‘Alī’s hold on power. It also gave birth to a group of bitter
“extremists,” Khawārij516, who broke away in 657 C.E. Khawārij protested ‘Alī’s
handling of the Battle of Ṣiffīn and eventually assassinated him in 661 C.E. 517
‘Alī’s uncompromising treatment of Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān and his refusal to
renew his tenure as the governor were understood by Shī‘ah Muslims as manifestations
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For a concise yet helpful account of this period see Armstrong, Karen. (2002). Islam: A Short History.
New York: Random House.
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See Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fīl-Tārīkh, Vol. 3, p. 201.
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See Chapter II.
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For the early historical accounts of the Battle of Ṣiffīn and its consequences, see Muḥammad ibn Jarīr alṬabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 3, pp. 562-71; Ibid. Vol. 4, pp. 2-52; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fīl-Tārīkh, Vol. 3,
pp. 276-315; and Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī. Vol. 2, pp. 187-90.
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of his paradigm of “principled action.” Once again, had ‘Alī extended Mu‘āwīyah ibn
Abī Sufyān’s governorship, he could have arguably spared his caliphate from the second
devastating Muslim “civil war.”518 Yet, he unequivocally expressed his opposition to
Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān as a “matter of principles”519 and justified his disregard for
political expediency, or “shrewdness,” i.e. Dahā’. In a sermon, ‘Alī asserts that
“by God, Mu‘āwīyah [ibn Abī Sufyān] is not shrewder than I am; but [his
shrewdness is because] he perpetrates acts of deception and evil. Had it
not been for my despising of deceit and guile, I would have been the
shrewdest of all people. But, in fact, every act of deceit is an act of great
evil; and, as such, an affront to God. And it is [destined] for every
deceitful man to carry a banner [of shame] to be recognized in the Day of
Judgment.
By God, his [i.e. Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān’s] wicked ploys will not
cause me to become forgetful [of my obligations towards God by
committing the same evil]; and [even though this will cause me hardships]
I will not be overwhelmed by the difficulties.”520
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According to Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Mughayrah ibn Shu‘bah, who was one of the companions
of the Prophet, tried in vain to dissuade ‘Alī from removing Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān at that time. He
argued that by immediately replacing powerful figures such as Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān, ‘Alī would
endanger the future of his caliphate. He even urged ‘Alī to keep “all governors” of ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān in
their position until ‘Alī would consolidate his hold on power and would ensure the loyalty of his army.
After such a transition period, Mughayrah ibn Shu‘bah says to ‘Alī, “you may replace them or leave them
to govern” [see Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 3, p. 459; and also Feirahi, Davoud.
Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. p. 194].
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For ‘Alī’s position on Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān’s governorship and some of his letters to Mu‘āwīyah
ibn Abī Sufyān, see ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Nahj al-Balāghah, Letters 6, 7, 9, 10, 17, 28, 30, 32, 37, 48, 49, 55,
64, 65, 73, and 75. See also Abū Muḥammad ibn Qatibah al-Daynūrī, al-Imāmah wal-Sīyāsah, Vol. 1.
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Throughout Shī‘ah history, ‘Alī’s paradigm of “principled action” has become the
hallmark of his political philosophy. In particular, his legacy of “principled action” has
served as paradigm against unrestricted use of expediency in Shī‘ī strategic cultures. The
fact that the patriarch of Shī‘ah Islam refused to be politically expedient to the extent that
it cost him his caliphate and indeed his life has been a source of aspiration throughout
Shī‘ah history and especially for those Shī‘ahs who have not been comfortable with the
implications of the doctrine of Taqīyyah.521
To better understand the significance of the paradigm of “principled action” in
Shī‘ah Islam, it is worth briefly reviewing its powerful comeback after the Islamic
Revolution of 1979 in Iran. As Mesbahi argues, the newly established state in Iran had to
struggle with a wide range of theoretical and practical challenges.522 Mesbahi claims that
the new Shī‘ah state dealt with these challenges by employing the paradigm of political
expediency which, as discussed above, is at the heart of the doctrine of Taqīyyah. It was
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One of the important articulations of ‘Alī’s paradigm of “principled action” may be found in ‘Alī ibn
Abī Ṭālib, Nahj al-Balāghah, Letters 53. This is a letter written by ‘Alī to his appointed governor of Egypt,
Mālik al-Ashtar al-Nakha‘ī. Along with the so-called “Medina Constitution,” ‘Alī’s letter is among the
important ancient documents in Shī‘ah political philosophy. In the letter, ‘Alī expounds upon what
constitutes “good governance” in his opinion. It is a coherent and forceful argument that stands in a stark
contrast with –at least any generous– practice of political expediency. Interestingly, however, ‘Alī
formulates his paradigm of “principled action” as a kind of “ultimate consequentialism.” He does so by
adding the metaphysical dimension into the chain of causes and effects. In any case, even though after the
Prophet, ‘Alī is the most celebrated figure among Shī‘ah religious and political establishment, this letter
appears to have been of limited influence. See Homayounvash, M., & Mirtaheri, S. A. (Forthcoming 2012).
Honoring Contracts as a Foundation of Peace: A Shī‘ah Articulation. Journal of Religion, Conflict and
Peace. See also Reza Shah-Kazemi’s essay on “A Sacred Conception of Justice: Imam ‘Ali’s Letter to
Malik al-Ashtar” in Lakhani, M. Ali. The Sacred Foundations of Justice in Islam. pp. 61-108. For the text
of the “Medina Constitution” see Ibn Hishām, Sīrah al-Nabawīyyah, Vol. 2, pp. 348-51.
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Analyzing the challenge posed by the institution of modern nation-state –in the Muslim world in general
and in the Shī‘ah world in particular– goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. This challenge, however,
may affect the eventual manifestations of various Shī‘ī strategic cultures in different ways [M. Mesbahi,
Lectures, Fall 2007, and M. Mesbahi, Interviews, Fall 2011].
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in response to the extensive use of political expediency by the state that the paradigm of
“principled action” made its forceful return in the political career of Ayatollah Muntaẓirī.
A senior student and close companion of Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah
Muntaẓirī was a highly venerated figure among the revolutionaries in 1979. He was
generally respected by other usually more junior leaders of the Revolution, many of
whom were Ayatollah Muntaẓirī’s former students. Given his status, in the early 1980s,
Ayatollah Muntaẓirī was appointed as the future successor of Ayatollah Khomeini by the
Iranian “Assembly of Experts.”523 Moreover, as a Shī‘ah jurist universally admired for
his extent of knowledge and his jurisprudential skills, Ayatollah Muntaẓirī wrote arguably
the most powerful Shī‘ah treatise in support of Wilāyat Faqīh.524
Despite his high stature within the political establishment and among Shī‘ah
jurists, Ayatollah Muntaẓirī publicly voiced his criticism of what he perceived as “too
generous” employment of political expediency at the costs of Shī‘ī “principles.” He
refused to condone certain actions by the government especially in regards to the
treatment of political prisoners; and he did so based on religious arguments. In fact,
similar to ‘Alī, he refused to allow raison d’état to play any significant role in his political
523

In Iran’s complicated bureaucratic system, the “Assembly of Experts” is the elected body of high-rank
‘Ulamā responsible, according to the Constitution, for supervising and electing the leader in the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
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Wilāyat Faqīh is the foundational theory behind the Iranian state that emerged after the Revolution. The
term has often been translated as “Guardianship or Supervision of Jurist.” For some more discussion of the
theory of Wilāyat Faqīh and the relevant notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah in Shī‘ah Islam, see the following
Chapter.
Ayatollah Muntaẓirī’s multi-volume book on Wilāyat Faqīh, Dīrāsāt fī Wilāyah al-Faqīh, is in Arabic. The
book is written in the same legalistic tradition of classical Shī‘ī treatise using jurisprudential methodology
and the Science of Principles –i.e. ‘Ilm al-‘Uṣūl– to religiously justify the “truth of the theory of Wilāyat
Faqīh.” Ayatollah Muntaẓirī’s formulation of the theory, however, shows a consequential difference with
that of Ayatollah Khomeini. The former articulation is dryly legalistic while the latter’s approach to Wilāyat
Faqīh is unreservedly esoteric.
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judgments. As a result, the tension between him and the office of Ayatollah Khomeini
gradually rose. Eventually, this tension culminated in Ayatollah Muntaẓirī’s removal from
his position just month before Ayatollah Khomeini’s death. Ayatollah Muntaẓirī’s
students and followers usually interpret the episode as the testimony to Ayatollah
Muntaẓirī’s adherence to the paradigm of “principled action,” for according to them,
Ayatollah Muntaẓirī who was aware of the deteriorating health of Ayatollah Khomeini,
refused to remain silent for a few months and walked away from the most powerful seat
in the country without hesitation.525
Following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Muntaẓirī continued his
uncompromising political approach and showed little concern for immediate
consequences. He challenged the newly elected leader, Khamenei, in a similar fashion
and by resorting to essentially Shī‘ī arguments. He repeatedly advocated a return to what
he believed to be the religious principles of Shī‘ah Islam. Prime among such principles,
Ayatollah Muntaẓirī believed, was the notion that political and social injustice should be
protested at any cost. Because of his open and direct criticism of the leader of the country,
he was eventually put under house arrest, which lasted for several years. When he died in
2010, Ayatollah Muntaẓirī had already become the modern icon of the Shī‘ī paradigm of
“principled action” in Iran.526
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In response to Ayatollah Muntaẓirī’s criticism, the Iranian state resorted to the notion of expediency. As
Mesbahi notes, this was to establish, arguably for the first time in Shī‘ah history, a full-fledged religious
articulation of raison d’état. The state dismissed Ayatollah Muntaẓirī’s criticism as “naïve arguments” that
do not take into account the complex realities of politics [M. Mesbahi, Interviews, Fall 2011 & Spring
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Shaykh.”
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The significance of Ayatollah Muntaẓirī’s “school of thought” in political philosophy and especially in
relation to the doctrine of Taqīyyah became clear to me through my personal communications with
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CHAPTER V
WILĀYAH AND WALĀYAH: A SHĪ‘AH ONTOLOGY
Understanding Wilāyah and Walāyah
The reader may have noticed throughout the preceding Chapters that the notions
of Wilāyah and Walāyah527 lie at the heart of Shī‘ah theology. It is, in fact, one of the
central claims of my dissertation that unless taking these two notions into account, one
cannot fully explain the differences between Shī‘ah Islam and Sunnī Islam. In terms of
Shī‘ī strategic cultures, Wilāyah and Walāyah are the theological concepts upon which
the doctrines of Shahādah and Taqīyyah rely. As discussed before, Shī‘ah theologians
strived to achieve a balance between Shī‘ī “ideals” and the practical concerns. On the one
hand, the story of Ḥusayn in Karbalā seemed to suggest fulfilling one’s –religious– duties
regardless of worldly consequences. As a result, the doctrine of Shahādah highlighted the
“metaphysical dimension” of human existence in which death and physical insecurity

Professor Mohsen Kadivar during September 2010. See also Mohsen Kadivar’s articles on various aspects
of “Muntaẓirī school of thought” on www.kadivar.com [retrieved on February 29, 2012].
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The Arabic words Wilāyah and Walāyah come from the Arabic root w-l-y (i.e. )یول. According to
Wehr’s Arabic-English Dictionary, w-l-y means, inter alia, “to be near”; “to be a friend”; “to be in charge”;
“to rule”; “to have authority”; “to be a patron”; “to assume the responsibility”; and “to follow in
succession.” The word Wilāyah in particular means “sovereign power,” “rule,” and “authority.” The word
Walāyah –and its other common form, Walā’– means “to be a friend,” “friendship,” “guardianship,”
“curatorship,” as well as “devotion,” “loyalty,” and “clientage.” In addition, both Wilāyah and Walāyah
mean “to be in charge” and “to have authority.” The word Walāyah appears in the Qur’ān in the verse 8:72
where it means “friendship” or “protection,” and in the verse 18:44 where it means “protection.” The word
Wilāyah does not appear in the Qur’ān. Other derivatives of the root w-l-y –especially the word Walī
meaning someone who possesses Wilāyah or Walāyah– appear in the Qur’ān quite a number of times [see,
for instance, 2:107, 120, 257, 282; 3:28, 68, 122, 175; 4:45, 75, 76, 89, 119, 123, 139, 144, 173; 5:51, 55,
57, 81, 107; 6:14, 51, 70, 121, 127, 128; 7:3, 27, 30, 155, 196; 8:34, 40, 72, 73, 75; 9:23, 71, 74; 10:62;
11:20, 113; 12:101; 13:16, 37; 16:63; 17:33, 97, 111; 18:17, 26, 50, 102; 19:5, 45, 70; 22:13, 78; 25:18;
27:49; 29:22, 41; 32:4; 33:6, 17, 65; 34:41; 39:3; 41:31, 34; 42:6, 8, 9, 28, 31, 44, 46; 44:41; 45:10, 19;
46:32; 47:11, 20; 48:22; 60:1; and 62:6]. As will be further elaborated upon, in Shī‘ah theology, Wilāyah
and Walāyah respectively refer to the exoteric and esoteric aspects of the “metaphysical structure” of the
universe around which the world is organized, and through which the Grace of God is believed to be
bestowed upon man.
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appeared trivial. The doctrine broadened the meaning of survival to encompass the
“blissful and eternal state” of those who dismiss the fear of death for a “holy cause.” On
the other hand, the same events of Karbalā gave birth to a cautious “pragmatism,” which
emphasized the necessity of protecting an “invaluable yet vulnerable community.” The
fate of Ḥusayn reminded early Shī‘ah Muslims that the only alternative to recklessness
and oblivion might be extinction. What happened to the Shī‘ah Imāms who followed
Ḥusayn only added to this sense of vigilance. Even though most if not all of these Imāms
were politically cautious528 and avoided the type of open political encounter that Ḥusayn
had had, they ended up being imprisoned and/or poisoned.529 Consequently, the Shī‘ah
Imāms condoned certain measures of prudence in order to protect the survival of the
Shī‘ah community and that of Shī‘ah individuals. At the same time, none of the Shī‘ah
Imāms –and indeed no single Shī‘ah theologian or jurist throughout Shī‘ah history– has
failed to praise Ḥusayn and his “heroic deeds” in Karbalā as an ultimate example of
religious sacrifice –and “utmost salvation.”
In certain ways the above tension between the “ideals” and the reality reminds
one of a similar dynamic within Hinduism. While dharma emphasizes one’s
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For a detailed discussion of “politics of Taqīyyah” and the specific manifestations of such a politics in
the lives of the Shī‘ah Imāms, see the preceding Chapter.
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As discussed in Chapter IV, the extent of political engagement by the Shī‘ah Imāms depended upon their
socioeconomic settings as well as their characters. While ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī, Mūsā ibn
Ja‘far, and arguably ‘Alī ibn Mūsā were politically more active, the rest were rather “quietists,” e.g. ‘Alī
ibn Ḥusayn, Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī (the fifth Imām), or Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad, and/or under considerable
restrictions by the state, e.g. Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī (the ninth Imām), ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad, and Ḥasan ibn
‘Alī. The second Imām, Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī, chose the course of political “quietism” following his short-lived
tenure as the caliph following the assassination of his father. This tradition of political “quietism” has
survived to this day as one may observe it in the behavior of many senior Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā residing in Najaf,
Iraq. Prior to the Islamic Revelation of 1979 in Iran, political “quietism” was also the mainstream approach
among most senior Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā living in Qum, Iran.
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responsibilities towards society –and towards the world–, moksha invites the believer to
the “ultimate liberation of the soul.”530 Similarly, Shī‘ah Muslims were urged to pay
attention to their precarious situation as a community and to fulfill their responsibilities
towards that community. At the same time, they were encouraged to view Ḥusayn’s fate
as salvation and the “liberation of the soul” par excellence. Similar to Hinduism,
therefore, it was necessary for Shī‘ah theologians to reconcile powerful implications of
martyrdom and the demands of preservation. The implicit solution was based on the
notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah.
Wilāyah and Walāyah are two closely related concepts in Muslim theology.531 The
two notions are of particular significance among two overlapping groups of Muslims,
namely Shī‘ah Muslims and Shī‘ah and Sunnī Ṣūfīs.532 In the field of Islamic Studies,
there has been some discussion about the delicate differences between the two terms
Wilāyah and Walāyah. The discussion aims at clarifying the meanings of the two terms
based on an ancient tradition of etymological discussions on Wilāyah and Walāyah
among the Ṣūfīs.533 An extensive etymological discussion, however, is beyond the scope
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See Kinsely, David R. (1993). Hinduism: A Cultural Perspective. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
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In fact, the two terms Wilāyah and Walāyah have been often used interchangeably by scholars of Islam
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For more discussion of the similarities between Shī‘ah Islam and Taṣawwuf, i.e. the Ṣūfī traditions, see
various works by Henry Corbin including Corbin, Henry. (1978). The Man of Light in Iranian Sufism.
London: Shambhala; and Corbin, Henry. (1986). Temple and Contemplation. London: Routledge.
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See, for instance, Cornell, Vincent J. (1998). Realm of the Saints: Power and Authority in Moroccan
Sufism. Austin: University of Texas Press. Cornell uses other forms of the two terms, i.e. Wilayat and
Walayat, as well [see Ibid. p. xix]. See also Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. pp. 45-6.
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of this dissertation. Suffice to say that Wilāyah and Walāyah respectively refer to the
exoteric and esoteric aspects of a particular ontology adopted by both Shī‘ah Muslims
and Ṣūfīs. Esoterically, Walāyah refers to a metaphysical cosmology.534 It projects a
spiritual hierarchy of the world or a metaphysical “system” through which the Grace of
God is bestowed upon men.535 Within this context, the term Walāyah implies closeness to
the “Absolute.” The closer one gets to the “Foundation of all existence,” the more
powerful one becomes spiritually and metaphysically speaking. According to the Ṣūfī
doctrines, this may result in one’s turning into a channel of Divine Grace and that of
Divine Providence.536 That is why Ṣūfī saints are traditionally called “Walīs of God,”
which means, inter alia, “friends of God.” This terminology is believed to be sanctioned
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For the related notion of Barakah, or “spiritual blessings [emanated from saints],” see Nasr, Seyyed
Hossein. Sufi Essays; and Schuon, Frithjof. Sufism: Veil and Quintessence.
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by the Qur’ān.537 In Shī‘ah Islam, Walāyah refers to a “type of existential authority and
domination [over other beings] of an extraordinary nature.”538 Walāyah is an embedded
feature of the “esoteric structure” of the world. This “esoteric structure,” however, is
accompanied by an exoteric manifestation, namely Wilāyah. Wilāyah refers to the
structure of external authority that comes from the possession of Walāyah. In other
words, the closer one gets to God, the higher becomes one’s spiritual status and this, in
turn, may lead to external authority. Wilāyah, therefore, is associated with more outward
meanings such as guardianship, protection, and eventually political authority.
While according to Muslim theology, the ultimate Wilāyah lies with God, His
Wilāyah could be manifested among humankind as well. In Shī‘ah Islam, certain
individuals are believed to have been granted the status of Walī in the sense of being the
vessels of the Divine (exoteric) Wilāyah. To Shī‘ah Muslims, these individuals include
the Prophet and the Imāms, i.e. ‘Alī and his eleven descendants, who are the bearers of
not only Wilāyah but also the esoteric Walāyah.539 “The [Shī‘ī] imamate,” Muṭahharī
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As discussed before, the word Walī comes from the same root of w-l-y. Walī appears in the Qur’ān in
numerous places in both single and plural forms. See above.
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See Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā. (2010). Walā’-hā wa Wilāyat-hā. Tehran: Ṣadrā Publications. p. 75.
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For an authoritative account of Walāyah –and Wilāyah– in Shī‘ah Islam, see Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Sayyid
Muḥammad Ḥusayn. Shi‘ite Islam. Ṭabāṭabā’ī believes that the Qur’ānic term “Imām” refers to the bearer
of Walāyah who is ultimately responsible for all the “spiritual guidance” in the world [see the verse 2:124
of the Qur’ān and Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā. Walā’-hā wa Wilāyat-hā. p. 97]. In fact, in one of the classical
collections of Shī‘ī Ḥadīths, i.e. Uṣūl al-Kāfī, there is a section under the title of the “Imāms as the Light of
God” referring to their functions as the guides for men [see Abū Ja‘far Thiqat al-Islām Kuliynī, Uṣūl alKāfī, Vol. 1, pp. 194-5].
Also, for an example of the Shī‘ī Ṣūfī literature, see Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn. (2003).
Kernel of the Kernel. Trans. M. H. Faghfoory. Albany: State University of New York Press. See also Nasr,
Seyyed Hossein. (1985). Ideals and Realities of Islam. London: George Allen & Unwin. Note that an
important dimension of the Imāms’ Walāyah is their “penetrating knowledge.” Mainstream Shī‘ah sources
argue that the Imām’s knowledge, or ‘Ilm al-Imām, is of esoteric essence and, thus, extraordinary. See, for
instance, Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Muẓaffar, ‘Ilm al-Imām. This “extraordinary knowledge” of the
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writes, “is a type of Wilāyah, for it entails a certain degree of right to domination over,
expedient administration of, and intervention in the affairs of the people.”540
Similar to the doctrines of Shahādah and Taqīyyah, the notions of Wilāyah and
Walāyah in Shī‘ah Islam have their roots in the Qur’ān. As indicated before, the word
Walī and its plural form Awlīyā’ appear many times in the Qur’ān. Several verses,
however, are of particular importance when it comes to these two notions. Verse 9:71, for
instance, implies that there is a hierarchy among the “believers” for some have “Wilāyah
over the others.” Verse 5:55 declares that the bearers of Wilāyah and Walāyah are God,
the Prophet, and those believers who “perform the prayers, and pay the alms while they
are bowing down [in praying to God].” The verse is sometimes called the “verse of
Wilāyah”541 by Shī‘ah writers and there is a consensus among many Shī‘ah
commentators that the latter part of the verse refers to ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, the first

Imāms bring the Shī‘ī doctrine of imamate close to the Ṣūfī notion of al-Insān al-Kāmil, i.e. “the universal
or the perfect man.” See Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. (2007). The Essentials Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Bloomington:
World Wisdom. pp. 65-72. For more on the philosophical-mystical mixture of Shī‘ī and Ṣūfī Islams and the
resulting notion of “Wilāyah al-Takwīnī,” see Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab dar Farāyand
Takāmul. pp. 105-6. It must be added that the concept of the Imām’s “extraordinary knowledge” did not go
undisputed within the Shī‘ah community as a group of early Shī‘ah scholars challenged it. These scholars
argued that the Imāms were “extremely pious and knowledgeable” individuals but denied most of the
claims regarding their supernatural capabilities. This school of Shī‘ī thought, sometimes derogatorily called
Muqaṣṣirah or “those who have failed [in appreciating the true status of the Imāms],” seems to have been
marginalized throughout history. For an extensive discussion see Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab
dar Farāyand Takāmul. Especially, see pp. 58-107.
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See Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā. Walā’-hā wa Wilāyat-hā. p. 65. See also Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, ‘Uyūn Akhbār alRidhā, Vol. 2, pp. 195-200.
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Besides these verses, Shī‘ah scholars have often referred to the verses 2:124, 207, 257, 269; 3:61; 4:59;
5:3, 67; 7:44; 8:62; 9:3; 9:19-22, 100, 119; 13:7, 43; 19:96; 21:73; 32:24; 33:33; 39:32-4; 42:23; 56:10-2;
66:4; 69:11-2; 76:5-10; and 98:7-8 to establish their claim that after the Prophet, it was ‘Alī who possessed
Wilāyah and Walāyah. See Shaykh Makārim al-Shirāzī, Āyāt Wilāyat dar Qur’ān.
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Imām.542 Therefore, they argue that the status of Wilāyah and Walāyah was transmitted
from the Prophet to ‘Alī.
In terms of the “Ḥadīth foundation” of Wilāyah and Walāyah, Shī‘ah sources
report several Prophetic traditions. The two traditions frequently quoted are the so-called
“Ḥadīth of Wilāyah” and “Ḥadīth of Ghadīr al-Khum.” Both traditions have been
reported by Shī‘ah and Sunnī sources, albeit with slight differences. In regard to these
traditions, the main distinction between the Shī‘ahs and the Sunnīs lies in their different
understandings of the implications of the two Ḥadīths. According to the “Ḥadīth of
Wilāyah,” the Prophet has declared that “‘Alī will be the Walī of every believer after me
[i.e. the Prophet].”543 Sunnī commentators view this narration as a special praise of ‘Alī
by the Prophet in response to some criticism raised against ‘Alī.544 Shī‘ah commentators,
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See, for instance, Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, al-Tibyān fī Tafsīr al-Qur‘ān, Vol. 3, p. 561; and ‘Allāmih Ṭabāṭabā’ī,
al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, Vol. 6, pp. 5-25. In his rather long commentary upon the verse, ‘Allāmih
Ṭabāṭabā’ī articulates the mainstream Shī‘ī understanding of Wilāyah and Walāyah based on the Qur’ānic
verses as well as the Shī‘ah body of Ḥadīth. Note that ‘Allāmih Ṭabāṭabā’ī uses the term Wilāyah alTakwīn, or “Wilāyah of Formation or Origination,” to refer to what is called Walāyah in this dissertation
[see Ibid. Vol. 6, p. 13]. See also Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī, Kitāb al-Iḥtijāj, Vol. 1, p. 161; and Ibid. Vol. 1, p.
197. Several Sunnī commentators have also reported that the above verse was first revealed in reference to
‘Alī [see, for instance, Sa‘d al-Dīn Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid fī ‘Ilm al-Kalām, Vol. 2, pp. 288-9; Mīr
Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī, Sharḥ al-Mawāqif, Vol. 8, p. 360; and ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Abī Bakr al-Suyūṭī, alDurr al-Manthūr fīl-Tafsīr bil-Ma’thūr, Vol. 2, p. 294. See also Qāḍī ‘Aḍid al-Dīn Ījī, al-Mawāqif fī ‘Ilm alKalām; and Maḥmūd al-Ālūsī, Rūḥ al-Ma‘ānī fi Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Aẓīm wal-Sab‘ al-Mathānī]. For
related reports, see Abū al-Qāsim Zamakhsharī, al-Kashshāf ‘an Ḥaqā’iq al-Tanzīl wa ‘Uyūn al-Aqāwīl fi
Wujūh al-Ta’wīl, Vol. 1, p. 623; and Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, Tafsīr al-Kabīr, Vol. 12, p. 26.
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This Ḥadīth has been reported in various sources including Muḥammad al-Tirmadhī, al-Ṣaḥīḥ, Vol. 5,
pp. 296-7; Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, al-Musnad, Vol. 4, pp. 437-8; ‘Alā al-Dīn ‘Alī al-Hindī, Kanz al-‘Ummāl fī
Sunan al-Aqwāl wal-Af‘āl, Vol. 11, p. 608. See also Muḥammad ibn Ismā‘īl al-Bukhārī, al-Ṣaḥīḥ, Vol. 5, p.
85.
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According to Sunnī sources, quite a number of the praises of ‘Alī attributed to the Prophet were issued in
defense of the former against various criticisms. This indicates that even at the time of the Prophet, some
tension existed between ‘Alī and some of his fellow disciples. In fact, ‘Alī appears to be a rather polarizing
figure in the early history of Islam. Often, a small group of prominent disciples including Salmān al-Fārsī,
Abūdhar al-Ghifārī, and Miqdād ibn Aswad are cited as close friends of ‘Alī [see Muḥammad al-Tirmadhī,
al-Ṣaḥīḥ, Vol. 5, p. 299]. For a Shī‘ī account of ‘Alī’s character, see Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā. (1989). Jādhibih
wa Dāfi‘ih ‘Alī. Tehran: Ṣadrā Publications. See also Muḥammad al-Tirmadhī, al-Ṣaḥīḥ, Vol. 5, pp. 296-
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in contrast, interpret the tradition as a clear indication that ‘Alī was declared as the future
bearer of the Prophetic Wilāyah and Walāyah.545
“Ḥadīth of Ghadīr al-Khum” refers to another Prophetic tradition reported by both
Sunnī and Shī‘ah sources.546 The Ḥadīth is arguably the most frequently quoted Ḥadīth
by the Shī‘ah sources in regard to their argument about ‘Alī’s Wilāyah and Walāyah.
According to the narration, in the year 632 C.E., the Prophet performed his last
pilgrimage to Mecca –often called the “Farewell Pilgrimage.”547 He was accompanied by
a large number of Muslims from various regions of the Arabian Peninsula. After the
conclusion of the rituals and before the many caravans departed for their hometowns, the
Prophet summoned all to gather in a place called Ghadīr al-Khum, the Pond of Khum,
and gave a sermon. Then, according to Shī‘ah sources, he raised the hand of ‘Alī and
declared that “to whomever I have been the Mawlā[548], ‘Alī here is to be his Mawlā.”549

306. The fact that ‘Alī had no strong tribal support within Quraysh was also a factor in the emergence of
the forces against him, which eventually marginalized ‘Alī after the Prophet died. See the preceding
Chapter for more discussion.
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See for instance, Ayatollah Muntaẓirī, Niẓām al-Ḥukm fīl-Islām, p. 36; and al-Sayyid al-Mar‘ashī, Sharḥ
Iḥqāq al-Ḥaqq, Vol. 15, pp. 92-113. See also Muḥammad al-Riyshahrī, Mūsū‘ah al-Imām ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib
fil-Kitāb wal-Sunnah wal-Tārīkh, Vol. 2, pp. 25-8; Ibid. Vol. 2, pp. 31-7; and, in particular, Ibid. Vol. 2, pp.
196-228.
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See, for instance, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, al-Musnad, Vol. 1, p. 119; Ibid. Vol. 4, p. 370; Ibid. Vol. 5, p. 419;
Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah wal-Nihāyah, Vol. 9, p. 194; Abū ‘Abdullāh ibn Mājah, Sunan ibn Mājah, Vol. 1, pp.
43-5; and Muḥammad al-Tirmadhī, al-Ṣaḥīḥ, Vol. 5, p. 297. Numerous Shī‘ah sources have reported the
Ḥadīth as well. For the Shī‘ah version of the “Sermon of Ghadīr al-Khum” see ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥar alAnwār, Vol. 37, pp. 204-217.
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For more information on the “Farewell Pilgrimage,” see Muḥammad ibn Ismā‘īl al-Bukhārī, al-Ṣaḥīḥ,
Vol. 5, pp. 123-5; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah wal-Nihāyah, Vol. 5, pp. 125-227; and Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb,
Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī, Vol. 2, pp. 109-12.
548

Similar to the word Walī, Mawlā implies “bearer of Wilāyah and Walāyah.” Walī is sometimes
associated with Walāyah and Mawlā with Wilāyah. Such associations, however, are not clear-cut and both
terms can imply either Wilāyah or Walāyah. For a mainstream Shī‘ī discussion of the word Mawlā in this
Ḥadīth, see ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥar al-Anwār, Vol. 37, pp. 237-253.
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The word Mawlā comes from the same Arabic root w-l-y, from which the terms Wilāyah
and Walāyah are derived. Therefore, Shī‘ah writers have generally interpreted the
“Ḥadīth of Ghadīr al-Khum” as the official announcement that ‘Alī would be the bearer
of Wilāyah and Walāyah after the Prophet.550 They have understood the term Mawlā in its
more literal sense of the “ruler” or the “patron.” The Shī‘ī interpretation rests upon
several Shī‘ī premises. First is the Shī‘ī emphasis on the principle of Divine Justice that,
according to Shī‘ah Islam, has been manifested in the sacred hierarchies of Wilāyah and
Walāyah. The Muslim doctrine of the “Seal of Prophecy,”551 therefore, did not mean that
God would leave Muslims without a Mawlā after the prophets, Shī‘ahs argued. Such an
“abandoning of mankind” would have contradicted the Divine Justice and the Divine
Providence for His devotees.552 According to Shī‘ahs, this is why the Prophet made such
an announcement in the Valley of Khum just months before his death. It was to declare
the “continuation of the Divine Grace” through Wilāyah and Walāyah in the person of
‘Alī. In the Shī‘ī version of the “Farewell Sermon,” furthermore, the Prophet goes on to
compare ‘Alī’s status to himself as identical to that of Aaron to Moses.553 The
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See ‘Allāmih Amīnī, al-Ghadīr; ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥar al-Anwār, Vol. 37, pp. 126-253; Aḥmad ibn Abī
Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī, Vol. 2, p. 112; al-Sayyid al-Mar‘ashī, Sharḥ Iḥqāq al-Ḥaqq, Vol. 21, pp. 21-121;
and Muḥammad al-Riyshahrī, Mūsū‘ah al-Imām ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib fil-Kitāb wal-Sunnah wal-Tārīkh Vol. 2,
pp. 251-386. See also Muḥammad al-Tirmadhī, al-Ṣaḥīḥ, Vol. 5, p. 297.
550

See, for instance, Muḥammad al-Riyshahrī, Mūsū‘ah al-Imām ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib fil-Kitāb wal-Sunnah
wal-Tārīkh Vol. 2, pp. 251-386.
551

Based on the Qur’ānic verses, Muslims believe that the Prophet was the last of the chain of the prophets
sent by God. This belief is usually referred to as the “Seal of Prophecy” for in the verse 33:40 the Prophet is
called Khātam al-Nabīyīn, or “the seal of the prophets.”
552

See, for instance, See Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā. Walā’-hā wa Wilāyat-hā. pp. 67-8.
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See ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥar al-Anwār, Vol. 37, pp. 139-40; and Ibid. Vol. 37, p. 206. Sunnī sources have
also reported such comparisons made by the Prophet, although without mentioning whether or not it

194

comparison, according to Shī‘ah Muslims, is an indication that the Prophet transmitted
his Wilāyah to ‘Alī in the fullest extent possible in Ghadīr al-Khum.554 By doing so, the
Prophet guaranteed that the world would not be devoid of a Walī after his death.
Secondly, Shī‘ah jurists have argued that the “fate of the Ummah” was so important to
the Prophet that he could have not simply ignored the issue of his political succession
during his lifetime.555 To these jurists, the Prophet did address that question in Ghadīr alKhum.556
Sunnī commentators, on the other hand, have interpreted the Ḥadīth of Ghadīr alKhum as yet another special praise of ‘Alī by the Prophet. In fact this narration along
with several other Prophetic traditions has led to the venerated status of ‘Alī among Sunnī
happened during the “Farewell Pilgrimage.” See, for instance, Muḥammad al-Tirmadhī, al-Ṣaḥīḥ, Vol. 5, p.
304; and Abū ‘Abdullāh ibn Mājah, Sunan ibn Mājah, Vol. 1, p. 45.
554

One of the explicit Shī‘ī accounts of ‘Alī’s Wilāyah and Walāyah in Ghadīr al-Khum is reported by
Shaykh al-Ṭūsī. According to Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, in one of the anniversaries of the day of Ghadīr al-Khum,
‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib gave a sermon. In the sermon, ‘Alī articulated a Shī‘ī account of the ontology of Wilāyah
and Walāyah in relation to the events of Ghadīr al-Khum. He referred to a “selected group of people” after
the Prophet whom God had chosen to be “the callers to the Truth and the guides to God.” These people
were, according to him, “God’s validating proof,” or Ḥujjat. He then asserted the Walāyah of these
“selected devotees to God” by declaring that “God had made them witness to His creation [or to His
people]; and has transferred His Walāyah to them on whatever of His affairs He has desired so.” See
Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Mīṣbāḥ al-Mutahajjid, pp. 752-7.
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For various Shī‘ī articulations of these arguments, see al-Shaykh Kāshif al-Ghiṭā’, Aṣl al-Shī‘ah wa
Uṣūlahā, Vol. pp. 221-31; al-Sayyid al-Ḥusaynī al-Mīlānī, al-Imāmah fī Ahamm al-Kutub al-Kalāmīyyah
wa ‘Aqīdah al-Imāmīyyah –in particular pp. 43-56; and Shaykh Muḥammad Riḍā al-Muẓaffar, ‘Aqā’id alImāmīyyah, pp. 65-76.
556

It must be mentioned that an important genre of writings by prominent Shī‘ah theologians deal with the
question of Wilāyah and Walāyah of ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib. The genre of writings investigates the Qur’ānic and
Ḥadīth foundations of this Shī‘ī argument. This is for ‘Alī’s Wilāyah and Walāyah is the bedrock of the
whole Shī‘ī ontology of Wilāyah and Walāyah. It is also the basis for their belief that the metaphysical
hierarchy of Wilāyah and Walāyah is an essential feature of the “created world”; and that such hierarchy did
not cease to exist after the Prophet died. The continuation of Wilāyah and Walāyah after the Prophet was
for the simple reason that the world, according to Shī‘ah theology, cannot continue to exist without Divine
Wilāyah and Walāyah channeled through the Walī(s). Arguably the most well-known example of this genre
of Shī‘ī writing is the multi-volume al-Ghadīr by ‘Allāmih Amīnī (d. 1970). See also al-Sayyid alMar‘ashī, Sharḥ Iḥqāq al-Ḥaqq; and Muḥammad al-Riyshahrī, Mūsū‘ah al-Imām ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib filKitāb wal-Sunnah wal-Tārīkh.
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Muslims. They have understood the word Mawlā to imply “friend”; and the likening of
‘Ali to the Prophet as Mawlā of every Muslim was to deflect some of the critiques against
the former.557 In fact, one of the mainstream Muslim biographers of the Prophet, Ibn
Hishām, reports that during the “Farewell Pilgrimage,” some of the ‘Alī’s companions
complained to the Prophet about ‘Alī’s strict manners. The Prophet then dismissed the
complaints and praised ‘Ali for his “strict adherence to Islam.” The incident is, therefore,
taken as a further indication that the word Mawlā in the above Ḥadīth refers to a
Prophetic command to befriend ‘Alī and to guard him against future criticisms.558 In
addition, Sunnī writers have argued that had the Prophet meant ‘Alī to be his successor,
he would have announced such an important decision more clearly and in a number of
occasions prior to his death.559
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See, for instance, Mīr Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī, Sharḥ al-Mawāqif al-Ījī, Vol. 8, pp. 359-61.
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See Ibn Hishām, Sīrah al-Nabawīyyah, Vol. 4, pp. 1021-2. Note that Ibn Hishām does not report the
“Ḥadīth of Ghadīr al-Khum” in his version of the “Farewell Sermon,” which was apparently delivered right
after the abovementioned dispute between ‘Alī and others.
559

For a mainstream Sunnī response to Shī‘ī arguments regarding the “verse of Wilāyah” and the “Ḥadīth
of Ghadīr al-Khum” see Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, Tafsīr al-Kabīr, Vol. 12, pp. 25-31. Note that there is, arguably,
another interpretation distinct from the mainstream Shī‘ī and from the mainstream Sunnī accounts of the
“Ḥadīth of Ghadīr al-Khum.” This belongs to Sunnī Ṣūfī Muslims. While Shī‘ah Muslims believe that in
Ghadīr al-Khum, ‘Alī became the bearer of the Prophetic Wīlayah, i.e. external and exoteric authority, and
Walāyah, i.e. esoteric and spiritual authority, these Sunnī Ṣūfī commentators have argued that it was the
latter authority, i.e. Walāyah, that was transmitted to ‘Alī. There is no wonder, therefore, that the majority
of traditional Ṣūfī orders have their Silsilahs, or “spiritual genealogy,” going back to the Prophet through
‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib [see Dakake, Maria M. (2007). The Charismatic Community: Shi‘ite Identity in Early
Islam. Albany: State University of New York Press. pp. 33-48]. The remaining few have Abū Bakr, the first
Sunnī caliph, as their spiritual patriarch after the Prophet. A few Ṣūfī orders, e.g. the North African Shādhilī
Order, have both ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib and Abū Bakr in their Silsilah. Mainstream Sunnī commentators, on the
other hand, reject that the “Ḥadīth of Ghadīr al-Khum” implies any internal or external authority being
transmitted to ‘Alī.
Note that the “Ḥadīth foundation” of Wilāyah and Walāyah in Shī‘ah Islam goes beyond these two
Prophetic traditions. The Shī‘ah Imāms themselves produced an important body of teachings regarding
Wilāyah and Walāyah. As mentioned before, two of the more important Ḥadīths in this regard are attributed
to the eighth Imām, ‘Alī ibn Mūsā. These are the “Ḥadīth of the Golden Chain” and the “Ḥadīth of the
Fortress of Wilāyah.” See the preceding Chapter as well as Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, ‘Uyūn Akhbār al-Ridhā, Vol.
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It must be underlined that the notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah exist in Sunnī
Islam as well, and especially within the metaphysical doctrines of various Ṣūfī orders in
the Sunnī world.560 The main difference between Ṣūfī Sunnīs and Shī‘ah Muslims in this
regard is that the status of the Shī‘ah Imāms are less highlighted by the former group.
Sunnī Ṣūfīs do believe that, following the death of the Prophet, there have been and will
always be certain number of living saints who would carry the status of Walāyah. In fact,
many Sunnī Ṣūfī orders incorporated the names of the Shī‘ah Imāms within the ranks of
their venerated saints and Shaykhs.561 In contrast, Shī‘ah Muslims believe that the status
of the Imāms are considerably higher than those of other Muslim saints. In fact, the
mainstream Shī‘ī belief holds that the spiritual status of the Imāms is the “highest
achievable” rank after the “Seal of Prophecy.” While acknowledging the significance of
non-Imām Awlīyā’ (or “possessors of Walāyah), Shī‘ah Muslims considered them
decisively inferior to the Imāms and, in fact, indebted to the Imāms’ Walāyah for
bestowing upon the saints their spiritual status.562 In any case, the importance of Walāyah
in Taṣawwuf did not translate to its significance in Sunnī theology for in general

1, pp. 143-5; Ibid. Vol. 1, p. 146; and ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 49, pp.120-3.
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Henry Corbin believes that a common core of Taṣawwuf and Shī‘ah Islam is the notion of Walāyah. See
Corbin, Henry. The Man of Light in Iranian Sufism. See also Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā. Walā’-hā wa Wilāyat-hā.
p. 85. For the discussion of Walāyah and Wilāyah in Sunnī Ṣūfī traditions, see Chodkiewicz, Michel.
(1993). Seal of the Saints: Prophethood and Sainthood in the Doctrine of Ibn ‘Arabī. Cambridge: The
Islamic Text Society. See pp. 47-59 in particular. See also various works of the prominent Sunnī Ṣūfī, Ibn
‘Arabī especially Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam and Futūḥāt al-Makkīyyah, as well as the excellent summary of the
notion of Walāyah by Hermann Landolt in Encyclopedia of Religion [see Eliade, Mircea. (Ed.). (1987).
Encyclopedia of Religion. New York: Macmillan. Vol. 15, pp. 316-22].
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In many Sunnī Ṣūfī Silsilahs one may find the names of all or some of the first eight Shī‘ah Imāms.
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In addition, there is arguably the middle group of Shī‘ah Ṣūfīs. Their position lies somewhere between
that of mainstream Shī‘ī beliefs and the position of Sunnī Ṣūfīs. While venerating the Imāms as supreme
saints, Shī‘ah Ṣūfīs, in general, have paid more tribute to non-Imām saints of Sunnī or Shī‘ī origin.
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Taṣawwuf has not been the mainstream interpretation of Islam in the Sunnī world.
Moreover, the notion of Wilāyah and external “sacred” authority is generally less
highlighted in Taṣawwuf compared to Shī‘ah Islam. This is yet another reason why the
ontology of Wilāyah and Walāyah remains an important point of distinction between
Sunnī Islam and Shī‘ah Islam.
Besides their theological implications, Wilāyah and Walāyah shaped the minority
Shī‘ah Muslims’ self-perception in important ways. While Sunnī Muslims viewed
themselves as the architects and the guardians of Muslim civilizations, early Shī‘ah
Muslims tended to see themselves as the guardians of Islam’s “Sacred secrets,” and above
all Wilāyah and Walāyah.563 The geographical expansion of the Muslim world to North
Africa, the Levant, Mediterranean Europe, South, East and Central Asia was, for the most
part, due to the campaigns of the Sunnī caliphs. The Umayyad dynasty laid the material
foundations for the rise of Muslim civilizations, which culminated in the “Golden Age”
during the Abbasid caliphate. It was under the patronage of Sunnī Abbasid caliphs that
Baghdad became one of the prominent centers of education and arts in the eighth century.
Later on, it was the Sunnī Ottomans who championed the so-called “Muslim cause” in
the face of rising Europe into the modern times. The fact that many early Western
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Along with ‘Uthmān ibn Maẓ‘ūn and Salmān al-Fārsī, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib was among the disciples of the
Prophet who appear to have been particularly interested in the esoteric aspects of Islam along with its
exoteric teachings. In addition, ‘Alī appears to have been an essential figure among the disciples for his
contribution to Muslim mysticism. His rather different understanding of the Prophet’s life and message is
evident when one compares the reported body of traditions and sayings by ‘Alī with that of other disciples.
Some of the extremely mystical Shī‘ī prayers such as “The Sha‘bānīyyah Supplication,” or Munājāt, “The
Prayer of Kumayl,” “The Supplication of the Kūfah Mosque,” and “The Prayer of the Morning,” or Ṣabāḥ,
belong to ‘Alī. See ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Nahj al-Balāghah; and Shah-Kazemi, Reza. Justice and
Remembrance. For an interesting account of the mystical –and rather obscure– disciple, ‘Uthmān ibn
Maẓ‘ūn, see ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Nahj al-Balāghah, Ḥikmah 289. For an insightful discussion of association
between the Shī‘ah minority status and the “Truth” of their beliefs, see Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic
Political Thoughts. pp. 18-21.
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scholars equated Islam with Sunnī Islam is an indication of how powerful the role of
Sunnī Muslims had been in shaping the image of Islam in the West. Similar arguments
may be put forward when it comes to the South and East Asia. The above argument about
the role played by Sunnī Muslims is not to deny the important contributions of the Shī‘ah
communities and the Shī‘ah “pious merchants”564 in the spread of Islam in these regions.
To this day, however, the overwhelming majority of Muslims in the South, East, and
Central Asia are Sunnī. Throughout centuries, Sunnī Muslims expanded and protected the
borders of the Muslim world. Brilliant empire builders, they tapped into the reservoir of
scholars, architects, and artists from different parts of this multi-ethnic world including
Persians, Turks, North Africans, Andalusians, Chinese, South and East Asians. They
enriched the intellectual tapestry of Muslim civilization as patrons of the arts and
sciences. Once again, this is not to dismiss the essential contributions of many Shī‘ah
scholars, scientists, Ṣūfīs, poets, and theologians in the rise of Muslim civilizations; nor
to deny the noticeable cases of Shī‘ī “sub-civilizations” such as the Safavid Persia565 or
the Fāṭimid Egypt566. The point is that, for the most part of the history and over the
greater part of Muslim geography, it was the Sunnī rulers, caliphs, and sultans who
functioned as the builders and protectors of Muslim civilizations.
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F. Rajaee, personal communication, July 7, 2011. See also Nasr. Seyyed Hossein. (2003). Islam:
Religion, History and Civilization. New York: HarperCollins. p. 142.
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In recent years, there has been a new scholarly interest in important civilizational achievements of the
Safavid. See, for instance, Newman, Andrew J. (2006). Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a Persian Empire. New
York: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd.
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See Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. pp. 281-314.
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Meanwhile, Shī‘ah Muslims assumed the position of the bearers of the “Sacred
Knowledge,” or the “Heart of Islam.”567 Long before they rose to power in any quarter of
the Muslim world, Shī‘ah Muslims compensated for their social inferiority and material
weakness by a firm belief in their central “metaphysical role” as a community, a chosen
people. They believed that the majority of Muslims had digressed from the “Truths” of
Wilāyah and Walāyah, and that they had forgotten the sacred “spiritual structure” the
Prophet meant to reveal. Shī‘ah Muslims took it, therefore, as their responsibility to
protect the institution of Wilāyah and Walāyah manifested, they believed, in the persons
of the Imāms.568 The esoteric dimension of Wilāyah-Walāyah ontology proved to be a
suitable match for the socioeconomic setting of a minority community bereft of hopes for
any external social progress. It is also in this context that one can understand why many
prominent Shī‘ah jurists have used the term Biyḍih Islām when referring to the protection
of the Shī‘ah community and later on in reference to Shī‘ī states.569 The word Biyḍih,
literally meaning egg, implies the essence or foundation; and for centuries, the Shī‘ah
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This term is borrowed from Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. (2002). The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for
Humanity. New York: HarperCollins. See pages 63, 67, and 225-6 in particular. In this regard, Hamid
Enayat writes “[e]soterism is closely intertwined with Shī‘ī theosophy, which explains the rationale of
Shī‘īsm as being merely the awareness and guardianship of the secret truth of Islam” [Enayat, Hamid.
Modern Islamic Political Thoughts. p. 22]. Enayat also quotes Henry Corbin’s characterization of Shī‘ah
Islam as “the sanctuary of Islamic esoterism” [Ibid.].
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See Dakake, Maria M. The Charismatic Community for an extensive discussion of esoteric Walāyah in
early Shī‘ah Islam.

569

This term can be found in the works of many later Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā. In modern times, the term was
famously used in ‘Allāmih Nā’īnī’s influential Tanbīh al-Ummah wa Tanzīh al-Millah. As indicated in
Chapter II, the book was written prior to the Constitutional Revolution of 1905 in Persia and soon became
the classic pro-Constitution document from a Shī‘ī perspective. The notion of protecting the Biyḍih Islām,
i.e. “the essence or the foundation of Islam,” was employed by both pro-Constitution and anti-Constitution
‘Ulamā in their efforts to religiously articulate and justify their positions. The extent of its use has rendered
the notion of “protecting the Shī‘ah community” a working “jurisdictional principle,” i.e. Qā‘idah al-Fiqhī,
in Shī‘ah Islam. This “working principle” has been further reinforced by the doctrine of Taqīyyah as
discussed in the preceding Chapter. See also Ayatollah Khomeini, Taḥrīr al-Wasīlah, Vol. 1, pp. 485-6.
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‘Ulamā have argued that protection of the Shī‘ah community570 is “religiously
mandatory,” or al-Wājib, for it has been identified with “protecting the essence of
Islam.”571
Strategic Implications
With regard to Shī‘ī strategic cultures, Wilāyah and Walāyah created a paradigm
that allowed the doctrines of Shahādah and Taqīyyah to coexist, for Wilāyah and Walāyah
projected the Shī‘ah community as a “special community.” The notion implied that the
community may undertake extraordinary measures such as expediency, secrecy, and
concealment during episodes of terror. Such was the case, according to Shī‘ah
historiographies, during the lives of most of the Shī‘ah Imāms. There are, however, other
times when the Shī‘ah community must or may disregard prudence and political
calculations for the sake of “upholding justice.” Such was, according to mainstream Shī‘ī
beliefs, the lesson of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom. As discussed in Chapter III, however, for the
Shī‘ah community to choose Shahādah over Taqīyyah, the permission of the legitimate
bearer of Wilāyah and Walāyah became a necessity. As a result, Twelver Shī‘ah Muslims
historically chose sociopolitical prudence as their modus vivendi.
Meanwhile, the impacts of Wilāyah and Walāyah on Shī‘ī strategic cultures went
beyond mere accommodation of Shahādah and Taqīyyah. The two notions have also had
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It must be mentioned that in the works of many Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā, the two terms “Shī‘ah” and “Islām” have
been used interchangeably, for the main audience of these works were the Shī‘ahs and any such distinction
deemed unnecessary.
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Note that the above perception has its root in Shī‘ah Ḥadīths. For instance, the fifth Shī‘ah Imām is
reported to have said that “[t]he foundations of Islam are five: the daily prayers, the alms giving, the fasting
[in Ramadan], the pilgrimage [to Mecca], and Wilāyah.” He then declares that the most essential of the five
“foundations” is Wilāyah [see al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 1,
p. 7].
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some direct impacts upon Shī‘ī strategic discourses and practices. Above all, Wilāyah and
Walāyah served the community by strengthening the sense of internal unity. It goes
without saying that for a minority strategic culture, strong bonds of unity become of
significance. The more doctrinal versions of Wilāyah and Walāyah emphasized precisely
such bonds of friendship and trust within the community. They also warned against
developing similar bonds with people outside the community. Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, one of
the chief Shī‘ah thinkers of the past century, points to this particular function of Wilāyah
and Walāyah in his short treatise on the subject.572 He argues that, based on the Qur’ānic
verses, there are two types of Wilāyah, namely “positive and negative.”573 A “negative
Wilāyah,” which is rejected in the Qur’ān, refers to the external authority of an
illegitimate and thus unjust ruler. In the verse 4:144, for instance, the believers are
warned against “taking non-believers as their Walīs.”574 According to Muṭahharī, the
verse does not mean that “Muslims should not be kind to non-Muslims or that they
should not treat non-Muslims benevolently.” Instead, it means that they should not
“accept the Wilāyah of non-Muslims and should not consider non-Muslims as one of
themselves.”575 In his formulation of Wilāyah, therefore, Muṭahharī binds the notion of
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See Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā. Walā’-hā wa Wilāyat-hā. Note that Muṭahharī uses the term Wilā’ Zi‘āmat, or
“Wilayah of Leadership or Lordship,” to refer to what is called Wilāyah in this dissertation [see Ibid. p. 66];
and he employs the term Wilā’ Taṣarruf, or “Wilāyah of Custodian Intervention,” to refer to what is called
Walāyah in this dissertation [see Ibid. p. 75].
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See Ibid. pp. 16-7.
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A similar theme can be found in the verses 60:1 and 60:2 of the Qur’ān.
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Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā. Walā’-hā wa Wilāyat-hā. pp. 21-2. Muṭahharī goes on to claim that “the enemies of
Islam always try to transform negative Wilāyah into positive Wilāyah [and vice versa…], that is all their
efforts aim at fostering intimately close relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims while creating
inimical relations among Muslims themselves” [Ibid. p. 35]. This imagery is further fortified in Shī‘ī
popular culture through various Shī‘ī supererogatory prayers. In one of the commonest of these prayers, i.e.

202

internal unity to that of strict and uncompromising boundaries between the “self” and the
“other.”576 Later on, this self-other bifurcation obtained a sophisticated dynamic with the
consolidation of the doctrine of Taqīyyah in the practice of Shī‘ah Muslims.
On the other hand, Wilāyah and Walāyah instilled a sense of “metaphysical
security” among the Shī‘ah Muslims. As custodians of the “Divine Sacred Wilāyah,” the
Shī‘ah community found a sense of purpose and a “calling” to bear with external
difficulties. This particular function of Wilāyah and Walāyah aligned with that of the
doctrine of Shahādah, for the latter doctrine also belittled physical pain and external
suffering for the sake of a higher vocation. The “metaphysical security” was further
fortified by the often quoted “Ḥadīth of the Fortress, or Ḥiṣn, of Wilāyah.” In the Ḥadīth,
the eighth Shī‘ah Imām likened the “Wilāyah of ‘Alī” with a fortress guarding its
inhabitants “against the Divine Wrath,”577 which, needless to say, implied a sense of
utmost security.
Furthermore, the discourse of Wilāyah and Walāyah socialized the Shī‘ah
community with a powerful sense of authority and hierarchy. Again, the hierarchical
structure was of strategic significance for the survival of a persecuted community as the
Shī‘ahs were during the early centuries of Islam. The Imāms were revered as the persons
of supreme authority at the center of the community. They were not only the external

Du‘ā al-Iftitāḥ, Shī‘ahs lament to God about “the absence of their Walī, the multitude of their enemy, the
fewness of their numbers, and the severity of the calamities upon them.” Here, the notion of Wilāyah and
that of Walī are tied to concerns about the protection of a persecuted minority community.
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See Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics. pp. 224-32. See also ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib,
Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 27 for the notion of “unity based upon the Truth” and its significance according
to the Shī‘ah patriarch.
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See Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, ‘Uyūn Akhbār al-Ridhā, Vol. 1, p. 146.
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head of the community but also, due to their esoteric position in the “metaphysical
hierarchy” of the world, the Divine Ḥujjat.578 The status meant that an immense power
was associated with the office of the Imāms. Naturally, this exoteric and esoteric
authority of the office of the Imāms created a number of challenges. The transition from
one Imām to the next, for instance, became problematic from time to time, for several
people claimed to be the next bearer of Wilāyah and Walāyah. As a result, a number of
divisions took place in the Shī‘ah community based on different chains of the bearers of
Wilāyah and Walāyah. The most prominent cases of such divisions include the
Kīsānīyyah who believed Muḥammad ibn Ḥanafīyyah to be the fourth Imām; the Zaydīs
who followed Zayd ibn ‘Alī and Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdullāh instead of Ja‘far ibn
Muḥammad; the Ismā‘īlīs who believed ‘Ismā‘īl ibn Ja‘far to be the seventh Imām; and
Ja‘farīyyah who believed Ja‘far ibn ‘Alī to be the twelfth Imām.579 One after another,
these groups broke away from the Twelver Imāmīyyah, who constitute the majority of the
Shī‘ah Muslims today.
Besides the divisions that occurred as a result of disagreements about who the
next Imām would be, the high authority of Wilāyah and Walāyah caused difficulties even
within the Twelver Shī‘ah community. Shī‘ah sources report that the members of the
community sometimes challenged the living Imām’s decisions or even defied his specific
commands especially during the imamate of the last Imāms.580 Some of these challengers
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See Dakake, Maria M. The Charismatic Community.
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See Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab dar Farāyand Takāmul. pp. 111-67; Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh
Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. pp. 295-334; Abū al-Fatḥ Shahristānī, al-Milal wal-Niḥal, Vol. 1, pp. 146189; and Ibid.Vol. 1, pp. 191-7.
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See Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab dar Farāyand Takāmul. pp. 114-42. See also Abū al-Ḥasan
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were in fact prominent Shī‘ah disciples praised by the Imāms on some other occasions.581
It seems that this less than ideal relationship between the Imāms and the community was
tolerated for the most part. In several Ḥadīths, however, the Imāms indicate that “true
Shī‘ahs” are rare.582 These Ḥadīths might be, inter alia, an indication that the Shī‘ah
community did not always fully observed the implications of the doctrine of Wilāyah and
Walāyah.
Towards the end of the chain of the Imāms, the internal challenges against the
authority of the Imām heightened. The internal defiance culminated during the imamate
of the eleventh Imām, Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī. In fact, he is reported to have complained that
more than any of his forefathers, i.e. the previous Shī‘ah Imāms, he and his imamate has
been doubted and defied by the Shī‘ah community.583 It is with regard to these rising

ibn Bābawayh al-Qumī, al-Imāmah wal-Tabṣirah, pp. 60-77; Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Kitāb al-Ghaybah, pp. 18-70;
Ibid. pp. 192-9; Ibid. pp. 218-28; Ibid. pp. 351-2; Abū Ja‘far Thiqat al-Islām Kuliynī, Uṣūl al-Kāfī, Vol. 1,
pp. 320-4; Ibid. Vol. 1, p. 411; Ibid. Vol. 1, p. 511; ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥar al-Anwār, Vol. 26, p. 15;
Ḥusayn ibn Ḥamdān al-Khaṣībī, al-Hidāyah al-Kubrā, pp. 295-6; Ibid. p. 385; Shahīd al-Thānī, Ḥaqā’iq
al-Imān, pp. 150-1; Ibn Shahr Āshūb, Manāqib Āl Abī Ṭālib, Vol. 3, p. 354; al-Qāḍī Nu‘mān al-Maghribī,
Sharḥ al-Akhbār, Vol. 3, p. 312; Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab dar Farāyand Takāmul. pp. 51-2;
and Ibid. pp. 89-90 for various intra-Shī‘ah disputes, uncertainties, and disagreement as well as several
examples of Shī‘ahs challenging or defying the authority of their Imāms –or demanding the Imāms’
explanation for their actions. For similar reports, see also Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, Kamāl al-Dīn wa Tamām alNi‘mah; and Shaykh al-Kashī, Rijāl al-Kashī.
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challenges against the authority of the Imāms that the doctrine of the “hidden –twelfth–
Imām”584 becomes of strategic significance. The doctrine spared the Shī‘ah community
the type of bickering and internal strife that plagued other branches of Shī‘ah Islam. As a
result, it prevented further division and weakening of the Twelver community in the long
run.585 The strategic effects of the doctrine of the “hidden Imām” becomes more evident
when one considers the ill fate of the Ismā‘īlī Fāṭimid dynasty in North Africa, that of
Nizārī Ismā‘īlīs under the leadership of Ḥasan al-Ṣabbāḥ586 in Persia, or that of the
Zaydīs.587 These other branches of Shī‘ah Islam had to deal with the destructive dynamics
of transition from one Imām to the next as well as the internal challenges to the “supreme
authority” of the living Imām.588 For Twelver Shī‘ahs, such destructive dynamics were
averted by the belief in the indirect yet supreme authority of the “hidden Imām.” It
584

See the following section of the Chapter for more discussion. Modarresi Tabatabaii reports a
controversial statement attributed to the prominent Shī‘ah scholar, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (d. 1274 C.E.),
declaring ‘adamahu minnā –i.e. “his [i.e. the twelfth Imām’s] absence is because of us [i.e. the Shī‘ahs’
failing to behave towards their Imāms properly]” [see Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab dar
Farāyand Takāmul. p. 135]. The mainstream Shī‘ī belief holds that the absence of the twelfth Imām was
mainly due to the mounting pressure raised against them by the Sunnī caliphate.
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created, in other words, an authority that would be impossible to be challenged. It also
shifted the meaning of the authority of the Imām from outward Wilāyah towards inward,
and more mystical, Walāyah. The doctrine of the “hidden Imām” may appear
counterintuitive to non-Shī‘ahs yet it has been among the central strategic doctrines that
guaranteed the long-term viability of the Twelver Shī‘ah community.589
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Before turning to a discussion of Shī‘ah eschatology, it is worth briefly reviewing one of the modern
manifestations of Wilāyah and Walāyah in Shī‘ah politics. This is the theory of Wilāyat Faqīh, or
“Guardianship or Supervision of Jurist,” as formulated by Ayatollah Khomeini. The basic tenet of the
theory has been generally accepted by prominent Shī‘ah jurists throughout history. The mainstream version
of the theory of Wilāyat Faqīh is as follows. The Shī‘ah Imāms possess both Wilāyah, or external authority,
and Walāyah, or mystical authority, to the greatest extent possible for a human being after the age of the
prophets. In the absence of the Imāms, the theory maintains that Shī‘ah Fuqahā are entitled to a limited
scope of Wilāyah, i.e. certain aspects of the Imāms’ outward authority. The limited Wilāyah of Fuqahā
allows them, in the absence of the Imāms, to have the final word in certain affairs of the Shī‘ah community
including financial issues and judicial disputes. Most of the prominent Shī‘ah Fuqahā, including Mullā
Aḥmad Narāqī, Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī, Ja‘far Kāshif al-Ghiṭā’, Shaykh al-Anṣārī, and ‘Allāmih Nā’īnī,
accept the authority of jurists in the absence of the Imāms. In two aspects Ayatollah Khomeini’s articulation
and implementation of the theory Wilāyat Faqīh are distinct from the mainstream version. The first
distinction is the extent to which the Imāms’ Wilāyah is transmitted to the jurist according to Ayatollah
Khomeini’s theory of Wilāyat Faqīh. The second distinction is the implicit inclusion of Walāyah in
Ayatollah Khomeini’s practice of Wilāyat Faqīh. In regard to the first distinction, Ayatollah Khomeini
brought the theory to its logical extreme and argued that jurist’s external authority was identical to that of
the Imāms. He also urged the Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā to fulfill their “religious duty” by engaging in politics and by
“applying their Wilāyah.” As such, Ayatollah Khomeini’s articulation of Wilāyat Faqīh was a departure
from the politically “quietist” tradition of most Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā throughout history. See Ayatollah Khomeini,
Ḥukūmah al-Islāmīyyah. See also Ayatollah Muntaẓirī, Dīrāsāt fī Wilāyah al-Faqīh; Ayatollah Muntaẓirī,
Niẓām al-Ḥukm fīl-Islām; Sachedina, Abdulaziz A. (1988). The Just Ruler in Shi‘ite Islam: The
Comprehensive Authority of the Jurist in Imamite Jurisprudence. Oxford: Oxford University Press; and
Hamid Enayat’s chapter in Piscatori, James P. (Ed.). (1983). Islam in the Political Process. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
In addition to his generous expansion of jurist’s Wilāyah, the way Ayatollah Khomeini implemented the
theory in Iran diverged from traditional Shī‘ī understanding too. The official discourse of Wilāyat Faqīh in
Iran implicitly incorporated the notion of Walāyah. The resulting discourse was similar to that about the
status of the Safavid Shahs. These Shahs, too, claimed both Wilāyah and Walāyah. In the case of the
Safavid, however, only the Shah’s Wilāyah was justified through Shī‘ī discourses. The Shahs’ Walāyah
essentially came from Taṣawwuf and the fact that the Safavid Shah was, at the same time, the head of the
Ṣafawīyyah Ṣūfī Order. In contrast, Ayatollah Khomeini’s practice of Wilāyat Faqīh was essentially Shī‘ī in
all its aspects. In fact, prior to the Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini was a well-established teacher of Shī‘ī
mysticism and Shī‘ah theosophy in Qum seminary. He was an avowed admirer of Muslim mystics and
theosophers such as Suhrawardī (d. 1191 C.E.), Ibn ‘Arabī, and Mullā Ṣadrā. It is not surprising therefore
that Ayatollah Khomeini’s approach towards Wilāyat Faqīh had a strong mystical undertone in which the
Ayatollah implicitly exerts a form of mystical and inner authority, or Walāyah. This brought his status yet
closer to that of the Shī‘ah Imāms as the “masters of both inner and outer worlds.” Living in the
neighborhood of Jamārān in Tehran, Ayatollah Khomeini used to be called by his devout followers as the
Pīr-i Jamārān, i.e. Pīr of Jamārān. Pīr is the Farsi term for a Ṣūfī Shaykh and implies the person’s spiritual
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A Note on Shī‘ah Eschatology
As Christian eschatology was established around the person of Jesus, Shī‘ah
eschatology has been essentially developed around the person of Muḥammad al-Mahdī,
the twelfth Shī‘ah Imām. The similarity has sometimes led to (mis)understanding Shī‘ah
eschatology in the light of Christian notions, for it is more convenient to explain Shī‘ah
eschatology through the familiar prism of Christianity. A genre of Western studies on the
subject, therefore, have tried to identify the “Shī‘ī equivalents” to Christians notions such
as Armageddon and the anti-Christ. Such analogies, however, fail to understand Shī‘ah
eschatology within the larger edifice of Shī‘ah theology. It must be emphasized that
historically, Shī‘ah eschatology has not been a driving force in Shī‘ī strategic cultures.
The purpose of this section is, therefore, to address some of the common
misunderstandings regarding this eschatology and its interaction with strategy.590
Two particular misunderstandings need to be addressed here. The first is related to
the significance of Shī‘ah eschatology in the overall structure of mainstream Shī‘ah
theology. The second is related to the distinctly Shī‘ī character of this eschatology, which
authority. Both in discourse and practice, therefore, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Wilāyat Faqīh was shaped by
Wilāyah and Walāyah. The same jurisdictional-mystical formulation of Wilāyat Faqīh continued after
Ayatollah Khomeini’s death. In contrast to this mystical understanding of the theory of Wilāyat Faqīh,
Ayatollah Muntaẓirī’s articulation of the theory remained strictly legal and jurisprudential as he avoided
any reference to the mystical or metaphysical authorities of the jurist in charge. See Mirtaheri, S. Amir.
(November 2009). Republic of ‘Urafā: The Mystical Dimension of Iranian Politics. Middle East Studies
Association Annual Meeting. Boston; Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. pp. 395-415;
and Matthee, Rudi. Persia in Crisis.
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In fact, as Mesbahi argues, mainstream Shī‘ah eschatology has been essentially “non-activist” and has
been built around the notion of “passive waiting” for the coming of the “hidden Imām.” This is why
historically, “more Mahdīism has generally meant more quietism in Shī‘ah Islam” [M. Mesbahi, personal
communication, March 9, 2012]. This brings Shī‘ah eschatology close to prudence-driven modus vivendi of
Shī‘ah Muslims based on the doctrine of Taqīyyah –at least in the discourses of the mainstream Shī‘ah
‘Ulamā. Although some non-‘Ulamā Shī‘ah “activists” of modern times such as ‘Alī Sharī‘atī tried to
transform passive Shī‘ah eschatology into an “activist” and “volunteerist” doctrine by dismissing the long
tradition of Shī‘ī theological discourses on the subject.
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renders it a fitting module of Shī‘ī system of thought. Shī‘ah eschatology, in other words,
is an organic extension of the Shī‘ī belief system based on the experience of a minority
community. At the same time, its distinct Shī‘ī character means that Shī‘ah eschatology
cannot be properly understood unless one understands some of the foundational Shī‘ī
concepts. Two such concepts are of particular relevance here, namely the notion of
Wilāyah-Walāyah and the principle of justice. The following discussion of Shī‘ah
eschatology, therefore, rests upon the discussion of justice in Chapter III as well as that of
Wilāyah and Walāyah in this Chapter. Before further exploring the common
misunderstandings of Shī‘ah eschatology, it is useful to briefly review the main premises
of this eschatology.
According to Shī‘ah historiographies, the last Shī‘ah Imāms and especially those
who succeeded the eighth Imām591 were under mounting social and political pressure by
the Abbasid caliphate. Given the antagonistic relationship between the Abbasid and the
‘Alawīs (or Shī‘ahs), it is reasonable to believe that these last Imāms lived under the
surveillance of the authorities and that their contacts with their followers became
increasingly restricted. Such a restriction considerably truncated the ability of the Imāms
to effectively function as the leaders of the community. The limited direct access to the
Imāms was partially compensated by the network of Shī‘ī delegates and representatives
first organized by the seventh Imām. Towards the imamate of the tenth and the eleventh
Imāms, these delegates assumed a central role in administering the affairs of the
community.592 The representatives were usually responsible for addressing the financial
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These include Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī, ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad, and Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī.
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See Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab dar Farāyand Takāmul.
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and sometimes educational needs of the community. Few of these early representatives,
however, were Shī‘ah scholars capable of spreading the teachings of Imāms or answering
religious questions by the community.593 Most of the representatives were chosen from
trusted Shī‘ah elites in various places; and they were primarily responsible for the
financial transactions of the community and especially for the collection of religious
alms.594 The network of financial and religious representatives was to serve as a model
for handling the internal affairs of the dispersed Shī‘ah community in the centuries to
come.
According to Shī‘ah sources, the repression of the community and the restrictions
imposed on the Imām heightened during the imamate of the eleventh Imām. For a long
period, he was put under house watch in the city of Sāmarrā, then a military stronghold of
the Abbasid caliphate.595 According to Shī‘ah historiographies, his contemporary Abbasid
caliphs were determined to kill any son of his so that they would solve their “‘Alawī
problem” once and for all. The headless Shī‘ah community, then, was doomed to perish.
This bleak fate was averted, Shī‘ahs believe, by the miraculous continuation of Wilāyah
and Walāyah in the person of Muḥammad al-Mahdī, the only son of Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī who
593

See Ibid. pp. 49-50.
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The alms-giving duty in Shī‘ah Islam includes Zakāt and Khums. Paying Zakāt is the common practice
among both Shī‘ah and Sunnī Muslims. Paying Khums, however, is a distinctly Shī‘ī practice in which
each Shī‘ah Muslim has to pay a fifth of his overall profit at the end of the year to the Imām or his
representatives. According to Modarresi Tabatabaii, the early Shī‘ah Imāms did not demand their followers
to pay Khums. During the imamate of the ninth Imām, however, the practice of paying Khums to the office
of the Imām became a routine Shī‘ī duty [see Ibid. pp. 44-5; and Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Tahdhīb al-Aḥkām, Vol.
4, p. 141]. During the age of Occultation when there is no access to the Imām, qualified Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā
collect Zakāt and Khums “on behalf of the hidden Imām.”
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See, for instance, Ibn Shahr Āshūb, Manāqib Āl Abī Ṭālib, Vol. 3, pp. 522-41. The confinement in a
military center became such a determining characteristic of the eleventh Imām’s imamate that brought him
the epithet al-‘Askarī meaning the “one who is affiliated with military.”
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“was born under a veil of secrecy.”596 Muḥammad al-Mahdī’s birth is believed to have
been carefully concealed from the outside world and even from the majority of the Shī‘ah
community in order to protect the life of the young Imām.597
Upon the death of his father, however, it was no longer possible to conceal
Muḥammad al-Mahdī’s existence. The problem was solved in an extraordinary fashion,
namely by Occultation of Muḥammad al-Mahdī in 874 C.E. The Occultation continues to
this day and it is believed that the “hidden Imām,” or al-Imām al-Ghā’ib, continues to
direct the affairs of the “chosen community” in indirect and mystical ways. The situation
is believed to last until the end of days when the “return of Muḥammad al-Mahdī” ushers
in the final phase of man’s life on earth. The “return” also brings the Shī‘ī belief in
imamate and indeed in Wilāyah and Walāyah into direct association with Shī‘ah
eschatology.598
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For mainstream Shī‘ī accounts of Muḥammad al-Mahdī, the conditions surrounding his alleged birth,
and the doctrine of the “hidden Imām,” see Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Kitāb al-Ghaybah; and Shaykh al-Mufīd,
Rasā’il fīl-Ghaybah.
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As mentioned before, there existed rather widespread uncertainties within the Shī‘ah community at the
time regarding the existence of Muḥammad al-Mahdī. Later on, however, the overwhelming majority of
Shī‘ah Muslims accepted the accuracy of the few reports of his birth and his Occultation. Shī‘ah Muslims
also substantiated their claim by resorting to several Ḥadīths attributed to the Prophet and to other Shī‘ah
Imāms prophesying the coming of Muḥammad al-Mahdī, the circumstances of his birth, and his imamate
till the end of days [see for instance Ibid.]. For more information on the early debates about the existence of
Muḥammad al-Mahdī among Shī‘ah Muslims, see Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Crisis and Consolidation
in the Formative Period of Shi’ite Islam. The book is arguably the most informative work available in
English on the early history of Shī‘ah Islam.
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In Sunnī eschatology, it is believed that a descendant of the Prophet named Muḥammad will appear at
the end of history. Some Sunnī sources have also identified this descendant as al-Mahdī. See, for instance,
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. Islam: Religion, History and Civilization. pp. 73-4. See also Abū ‘Abdullāh ibn
Mājah, Sunan ibn Mājah, Vol. 2, pp. 1366-8; Ibn al-Ash‘ath al-Sajistānī, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, Vol. 2, pp. 30911; Muḥammad al-Tirmadhī, al-Ṣaḥīḥ, Vol. 3, p. 344; and Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab dar
Farāyand Takāmul. pp. 173-4.
For more general information on Shī‘ah eschatology, see Sachedina, Abdulaziz A. Islamic Messianism;
Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Crisis and Consolidation in the Formative Period of Shi‘ite Islam; and
chapter 2 in Nasr, S. H. et al (Eds.). Expectation of the Millennium.
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In fact, proper understanding of the Shī‘ī doctrine of the “hidden Imām” hinges
upon paying attention to the implications of the Wilāyah and Walāyah ontology in Shī‘ah
Islam. Similar to Ṣūfīs, Shī‘ah Muslims believe that the earth would never be depleted of
Awlīyā’, or those possessing the status of Wilāyah and Walāyah and those channeling the
Grace of God upon mankind.599 Therefore, the doctrine of the “hidden Imām” for Shī‘ah
Muslims goes beyond providing the community with a sacred, albeit unseen, patron. The
“hidden Imām” is believed to be the very reason for the continuation of the Grace of God
upon earth. Without him, in other words, the whole “metaphysical structure” of the
universe would, it is believed, collapse.600 That is why Muḥammad al-Mahdī’s eventual
death after his reappearance ushers in the final chapter of the history and the beginning of
the Day of Judgment, for once he is gone, there will no longer exist any channel of
Wilāyah and Walāyah to hold the universe in place.
Following the “Occultation of the Imām,” the already existing network of Shī‘ah
scholars and financial agents gradually took upon themselves to organize the community.
Similar to the painful socialization that the early Christians underwent after Crucifixion,
early Shī‘ah Muslims slowly and reluctantly lost their hope in the immanent reappearance
of Muḥammad al-Mahdī.601 As indicated before, it was the later Shī‘ah scholars who
developed an elaborate theological structure to explain the type of relationship the
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According to some Ṣūfī traditions, the number of these –often unidentified– Awlīyā’ at any time is fixed
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selected by God who receives Divine guidance in one way or another. These men are sometimes called alAbdāl and are believed to be responsible for “preserving the cosmic order” [see the entry for “Badal” by R.
A. Nicholson in 1993 reprint of E. J. Brill’s First Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. IX, p. 35].
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“hidden Imām” held with the community during Occultation.602 The latter point relates to
one of the misunderstandings that one may find in Western studies of Shī‘ah eschatology,
namely the place of this eschatology in the overall system of Shī‘ah theology.
Even though all of the prominent Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā believe in the abovementioned
association of Shī‘ah eschatology and the twelfth Imām, historically, the Shī‘ah religious
establishment has not been comfortable with extensive or “activist” discussion of
eschatological subjects. The cautious approach is arguably the result of several bitter
experiences throughout the history of Shī‘ah Islam when false claims of Muḥammad alMahdī’s reappearance rendered the community riven and bewildered. The most famous
episode of such traumatic confusions happened in 1844 C.E. when Sayyid ‘Alī
Muḥammad Shīrāzī claimed to be Muḥammad al-Mahdī and took the title Bāb, or the
“gate.” Even though Bāb was imprisoned, tried, and eventually executed in 1850 C.E.,
the Shī‘ah religious establishment of the time could not contain the “Bābī Movement.”
Unlike previous messianic movements in the Shī‘ah history, the Bābī Movement broke
away from Islam and eventually gave birth to the Bahā’ism, which was established by
Bahā’allāh, a follower of Bāb.603 As a result of this traumatic rupture based on Shī‘ah
eschatology, Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā grew extra cautious about excessive discussion of
Muḥammad al-Mahdī especially by non-‘Ulamā. To further justify this caution, they
often quote Shī‘ah Ḥadīths that urges Shī‘ah Muslims to reject those who claim to know
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the exact time of the reappearance of Muḥammad al-Mahdī.604 In fact, a universal fear
among traditional Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā has been the emergence of new eschatological
movements that divorce themselves from the religious establishments and seek “direct
contacts” with the “hidden Imām.”605 Such a course of action would mean circumvention
of the religious authority of the ‘Ulamā who function as the representatives of the
“hidden Imām.” The traditional ‘Ulamā, therefore, venerate Muḥammad al-Mahdī as the
“hidden leader of the community” –and indeed “that of the world”– while generally
avoiding extensive eschatological discussions.
One may also find another confusion regarding Shī‘ah eschatology in some of the
recent discussions of the subject, which relates to the chronology of the events at the end
of history according to this eschatology. Shī‘ah sources do not provide a definite account
of the end of history and its detailed events. Instead, the subject is often treated by
reporting a number of scattered and at times conflicting reports about what will happen
then.606 In particular, there is no clear equivalent to Christian “Armageddon” as an epic
battle between the forces of good and evil. To be sure, Muḥammad al-Mahdī has been
reported to engage in series of battles following his reappearance. These battles,
according to Shī‘ah eschatology, would be necessary to fulfill Muḥammad al-Mahdī’s

604

These Ḥadīths can be found in various Shī‘ah sources. See, for instance, Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Kitāb alGhaybah, pp. 397-414; Ibid. pp. 425-8; and Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Nu‘mānī, Kitāb al-Ghaybah, pp.
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mission on earth, namely to “restore justice.” In fact, the saliency of the Shī‘ī principle of
justice in Shī‘ah eschatology has been sometimes overlooked in the Western literature. As
a result, the distinctly Shī‘ī character of this eschatology in contrast to Sunnī eschatology
has been missed too.
One frequently quoted eschatological statement in various Shī‘ah texts, prayers,
and Ḥadīths states that Muḥammad al-Mahdī will reappear once the earth “has been filled
with injustice and cruelty.” In such a “desperate situation,” the statement continues,
Muḥammad al-Mahdī will rise to “fill the same earth with justice.”607 Similar to many
other Shī‘ī doctrines, therefore, Shī‘ah eschatology has been built around the principle of
justice. Once again, this is a reminder of the historical trajectory that the Shī‘ah
community has gone through as a persecuted minority. The promise of “restoration of
justice” by Muḥammad al-Mahdī offered the community a soothing hope for what lies in
their future.608 To be sure, it is believed that the “restoration of justice” by Muḥammad alMahdī is accompanied by the spread of “true Islam.”609 Yet, the notion of “true Islam”
607

The statement, yamla’uhā qisṭan wa ‘adlan kamā muli’ta ẓulman wa jawra, can be found in quite a
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seems to have been overshadowed by a justice-oriented language that, as Enayat writes,
projects a “link between the Return [of Muḥammad al-Mahdī] and the ultimate, global
sovereignty of the righteous and the oppressed.”610
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The historical trajectory of the Shī‘ah community combined with a Shī‘ī
understanding of Islam created a unique perspective on questions of identity, security, and
survival. As discussed in the preceding Chapters, the Shī‘ah Imāms provided the
community with a rich set of precedence. Their Ḥadīths as well as their actions indicated
a combination of “idealistic principled actions,” especially in the cases of ‘Alī and
Ḥusayn, as well as prudence and caution, especially in the cases of the Imāms who
followed Ḥusayn. Building upon this mixture and with an eye on the state of their
persecuted community, the early Shī‘ah jurists developed a complex theological edifice.
They combined a number of aspiring religious ideals with rational discourses of
expediency and vigilance. The uneasy mixture was in part possible due to the unique
Shī‘ah ontology of Wilāyah and Walāyah, for this ontology projected the Shī‘ah
community as a “special community” who were to guard the “heart of Islam” and,
therefore, the heart of the “final” message of God to humanity. Such a special status
entailed a religious necessity to protect this community. At the same time, this
“uniqueness” demanded special metaphors of religious ideals. While the doctrine of
Taqīyyah addressed the former necessity, the doctrine of Shahādah responded to the latter
need. At the same time, Taqīyyah and Shahādah constituted the theological backbone of
Shī‘ī strategic cultures and, by extension, the modern notion of national security for
various Shī‘ī political actors.
For analytical purposes, the doctrine of Shahādah is sometimes associated with
“idealism” in this dissertation while that of Taqīyyah is related to “realism.” It must be
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emphasized, however, that similar to any analytical simplification, the above bifurcation
is neither clear-cut nor exhaustive. The complexity of the Shī‘ī theological edifice simply
defies any such “reductionism,” as do most ancient theologies. The complexity becomes
more evident when one adds the notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah to the picture. Wilāyah
and Walāyah allowed the emergence of what one may call a Shī‘ī “transcendental
realism” for which Shahādah and Taqīyyah were but different manifestations. The
“transcendental” discourse allowed Shī‘ah jurists to avoid an otherwise uncomfortable
contradiction. The ostensibly “idealistic” doctrine of Shahādah appeared as “true
realism,” for if one adds the metaphysical dimension to one’s calculation of the chains of
causes and effects, one could dismiss physical pain.611 From a non-phenomenological
perspective, such an assertion might be received with skepticism. From a
phenomenological outlook, however, the implications of believing in the “metaphysical
structure” of the world come to the center of the inquiry. To a believer’s eyes, such a
structure is more than a faded attachment to the “real” reality of the material world.
Instead, it is understood as an integrated part of the reality or, if one closely follows the
metaphysical doctrines of most religions, even the reality itself.612
According to this perspective, even the doctrine of Taqīyyah reflects the
“transcendental realism,” for the ontology of Wilāyah and Walāyah projects the world as
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a single whole in which the material and the metaphysical are intertwined. The notion of
“single whole” is also in line with the doctrine of Unity in Islam, or al-Tawḥīd.
Welcoming the ideal of “sacrifice for justice,” or Shahādah, becomes as much a reflection
of “heeding the reality” as observing the imperatives of prudence, or Taqīyyah. In the
resulting paradigm, the seemingly contradictory doctrines accommodate a reality that is
at once mundane and transcendental, which is yet another reason for caution in
employing convenient notions such as “idealism” and “realism.”
Theological discussions often have concrete and practical implications. By
moving from questions of Political Theory into the realm of Strategic Studies,613 my
dissertation tries to better understand such implications. It is a fundamental assumption
here that Shī‘ī strategic thinking has some of its roots in Shī‘ah theology. This theology
has been the product of complex interactions between the understanding of Islam by
Shī‘ah’s “founding fathers” on the one hand and the Shī‘ah history on the other. We have
already discussed some distinct dimensions of the Shī‘ī understanding of Islam in
Chapter V. Therefore, it is worth briefly reviewing the overall picture of Shī‘ah history
here.
For analytical purposes, one can divide this history into two phases.614 First is the
“formative phase” of Shī‘ah Islam during which Shī‘ah Muslims were minorities living
under a non-Shī‘ah, Muslim political rule. The “formative phase” arguably stretches
about nine centuries from 632 C.E., i.e. the death of the Prophet, to the rise of the Safavid
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dynasty in Persia in 1501 C.E.615 The “formative phase” also witnessed the consequential
death of the Prophet’s grandson, Ḥusayn, in Karbalā in 680 C.E. The foundation of most
of the major themes in Shī‘ah theology was laid during this phase first by the Shī‘ah
Imāms and then by the Shī‘ah jurists. In particular, important Shī‘ī doctrines related to
security and survival were articulated in this phase and under the overwhelming influence
of being a minority.
The second phase of the Shī‘ah history began when Twelver Shī‘ahs rose to
power in a major political unit of the Muslim world, i.e. Persia. Safavid Persia has been
the beginning of the most viable Shī‘ī political rule in Muslim history.616 The second
phase itself may be divided into two periods. The first stretches from 1501 C.E. until
1979 when Shī‘ah Shahs were in power. During this period, Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā did not have
“direct” access to political power, although they often exerted indirect influence over
politics.617 In 1979, however, the Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā became the “bearer of political Wilāyah”
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in Iran. In both periods of the second phase, however, the Shī‘ī theological doctrines that
had been articulated in the “formative phase” survived.
During its formative centuries, Shī‘ah Islam was under considerable
socioeconomic pressures. Similar to many other minority groups, therefore, justice
became a central notion in Shī‘ah theology. In parallel, the physical insecurity of Shī‘ah
Muslims led to the emergence of survival strategies, or Taqīyyah, and survival metaphors,
e.g. Shahādah. As discussed in Chapter IV, Taqīyyah was sanctioned by Shī‘ah religious
authorities and provided Shī‘ah Muslims with a considerable flexibility aimed at survival.
It allowed Shī‘ah Muslims under a perceived threat of death or bodily injury to conceal
their beliefs. More importantly, the practice of Taqīyyah helped Shī‘ah Muslims to
internalize the notion of expediency and to feel religiously comfortable in observing it.
As discussed in Chapter IV, however, there have been legal and theological nuances
around the notion of Taqīyyah because of its considerable potential.
The more “idealistic” doctrine of Shahādah also emerged in this formative phase.
As discussed in Chapter III, Shī‘ī Shahādah also obtained a “mystical” flavor due to its
ultimately sacrificial imagery. In terms of perception of security and survival, the doctrine
projected utmost physical insecurity of death as utmost metaphysical security of
redemption. As a result, Shahādah may be considered as the central Shī‘ī metaphor of
security. In this metaphor, the insecurity of a “chosen” group of Muslims was
compensated by a narrative of “metaphysical security” manifested par excellence in the
story of the Prophet’s grandson, Ḥusayn, in Karbalā.
The narrative, itself, could be considered as a Constructivist articulation of human
security in which the “cosmic dimension” emerges as an essential element of human
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existence in this world. Ḥusayn became the embodiment of “moral and metaphysical
victory” despite his utter physical defeat, the slaughter of his companions, and the
imprisonment of his family. It was through his iconic martyrdom, the narrative maintains,
that Ḥusayn achieved the ultimate security through “immediate salvation.” The resulting
discourse of Shahādah held that physical and temporal pain was not comparable to the
reward that lies afterwards. It became a construction of security in which death, the usual
emblem of ultimate insecurity, was represented as the cradle of ultimate security. Such a
social construction was further strengthened by a social reality that denied Shī‘ah
Muslims an outlook of material security and prosperity. Deprived of security, Shī‘ah
Muslims took refuge in “metaphysical security.” As discussed in Chapter V, a similar
notion of “metaphysical security” emerged within the ontology of Wilāyah and Walāyah.
The two notions established a Shī‘ī version of “Special Providence.” They articulated
various channels through which the Grace of God is bestowed upon the Shī‘ah
community as well as the whole of humanity. The notions carried in themselves a theme
of invincibility and “determinism” towards the “eventual and guaranteed salvation,” for
deliverance was believed to be assured for those living under Divine Wilāyah and
Walāyah.
The interplay of justice, insecurity, and Shahādah also led to an often overlooked
difference between the Shī‘ī paradigm of Jihād and the Sunnī one. In Shī‘ah Islam, Jihād
implied fighting against “injustice.” In Sunnī Islam, it often referred to wars against
“infidels.” The difference is yet another example of the centrality of justice in Shī‘ī
discourses. In terms of Shī‘ī strategic cultures, this “justice-oriented” Jihād allowed
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Shī‘ah jurists to consider intra-Muslim wars as examples of Jihād more comfortably than
their Sunnī counterparts.
Even though the doctrine of Shahādah offers powerful potential for Shī‘ī strategic
cultures, its impacts should not be overstated. As Enayat argues, the doctrine has often
served the symbolic and spiritual needs of the Shī‘ah community throughout history.618 In
contrast, Shī‘ī strategic cultures have historically been dominated by prudent “quietism.”
As discussed in Chapter IV, political “quietism” has been the long-term consequence of
the rather nebulous doctrine of Taqīyyah, which provided Shī‘ah Muslims with a flexible
menu of options in dealing with security challenges. At the same time, a primary source
of insecurity for Shī‘ahs during the first historical phase was the Sunnī caliphate.
Therefore, an antagonism emerged in early Shī‘ah theology towards political power. As a
result, some scholars of Shī‘ah politics have focused on the “Theology of Discontent” in
Shī‘ah Islam.619 It is true that in Shī‘ah political theology, political power has sometimes
been deemed as essentially evil. It is also true that for centuries, mainstream Shī‘ah
theology considered any political rule as inherently inclined towards injustice unless
controlled and guided by the “infallible” Shī‘ah Imāms. Yet, it is incorrect to reduce the
complex system of strategic thinking among Shī‘ah Muslims to mere power rejection and
protest. The doctrine of Taqīyyah, for instance, is a notable example of sophisticated
approach taken by Shī‘ah Muslims towards political power and towards the state.620
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See Enayat, Hamid. (2010). Andīshih Sīyāsī dar Islām Mu‘āṣir. Tehran: Intishārāt Khārazmī. pp. 310-5.
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See Dabashi, Hamid. The Theology of Discontent.
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The anti-political-rule theme in Shī‘ah Islam, as Enayat writes, “does not mean that Shī‘īsm never
compromised with the powers that be. On the contrary, for the best part of their history, Shī‘ī theologians
and jurisconsults displayed an impressive ingenuity in devising practical arrangements with the rulers to
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The rapid change of status for Shī‘ah Muslims from a persecuted minority to a
majority in power in early Safavid period was not unproblematic. In a matter of decades,
the whole socio-religious scene of Persia was transformed.621 As one may expect, the
anti-political-power tendencies at the heart of Shī‘ah political theology created a number
of challenges for the nascent Shī‘ī state. A genre of studies in the field of Shī‘ah Studies
address this tension between a political theology rooted in minority status and the
political rule.622 The second period, therefore, was a dynamic one as Shī‘ah’s antipolitical-power and anti-state stances had to gradually embrace the emergence of Shī‘ī
political powers.
Despite the above tension at the heart of Shī‘ah political theology, Shī‘ī strategic
cultures continued to be developed around the triangle of Shahādah, Taqīyyah, and
Wilāyah-Walāyah. In particular, the practice of expediency at the core of Taqīyyah
proved to be essential in shaping the complex relationship between Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā and
the Shī‘ah courts. At the same time, a more or less national notion of security began to

ensure the safety and survival of their followers” [Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thoughts. p.
26].
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As Professor Richard Bulliet indicates, the roots of Shī‘ah Islam had been strong in Persia even before
the rise of the Safavid to power. This was, however, an “informal” version of Shī‘ah Islam revolving
around a “popular love for the Shī‘ah Imāms.” In fact, the rapid success of the Safavid in turning Persia
from Sunnī Islam to Shī‘ah Islam was arguably due to these pre-existing Shī‘ī sympathies among other
things [R. Bulliet, personal communication, March 5, 2010]. See also Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl
Duwlat dar Islām. pp. 411-4.
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This tension became clear to me through a number of interviews with Professor Mesbahi. As Mesbahi
argues, the accommodation of a Shī‘ī rule proved to be a long process. This was due to the deep
internalization of the anti-state Shī‘ah political theology and the notion of Ghaṣb, or usurpation [of the
legitimate authority of the Imāms]. For the most part, in fact, the fundamental antagonism towards political
power in the absence of the “infallible” Imāms remained intact while practical and “realistic”
accommodations of Shī‘ī rulers were justified on the ground of expediency. In times of political crisis, the
collective interest of the Shī‘ah community was invoked to provide the Shī‘ah Shahs with the necessary
support [M. Mesbahi, Lectures, Fall 2007, and M. Mesbahi, Interviews, Fall 2011].
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emerge, first against the Sunnī Ottomans, and secondly against Christian colonial powers
of Russian, British, and Portuguese origins. As discussed in Chapter II, the antiimperialist resistance also gave prominence to the Shī‘ī doctrine of Nafy-i Sabīl.
Eventually, however, the separation of political and religious authorities proved
unsustainable as the political power of the ‘Ulamā gradually increased. By the time of the
universal Marja‘īyah of Grand Ayatollah Burūjirdī (d. 1961 C.E.), the power accumulated
in the office of a Grand Marja’ was a political force waiting to be tapped into. The
situation eventually led to the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
The dynamics of power before and after the Revolution in Iran lie beyond the
scope of this dissertation.623 Yet, the strategic culture of the new political entity that
emerged after 1979 offers an interesting case of a Shī‘ī strategic culture. This modern
strategic culture too has its roots in the same theological triangle, namely Shahādah,
Taqīyyah, and Wilāyah-Walāyah. The foundational theory of the new state, or the theory
of Wilāyat Faqīh, was a manifestation of the Shī‘ī ontology of Wilāyah and Walāyah,
albeit an extreme one as discussed in Chapter V. Secondly, the doctrine of Taqīyyah was
manifested itself in religious articulation of raison d’état after 1979 and the extensive use
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Mesbahi argues that the rise of the Islamic Republic in Iran has been one of the important political
developments since the beginning of the “age of Occultation” in Shī‘ah Islam. The Revolution, he argues,
may be considered as the beginning of modern politics in the Shī‘ah world, for Ayatollah Khomeini was the
first Shī‘ah Faqīh to articulate an essentially Hobbesian notion of state and that of national security. The
significance of this development is more evident when one considers the broader crisis of modern nationstate in the Muslim world. Historically, it has not been without difficulty for Muslims to internalize the selfreferential character of modern nation-states, as well as its glorification in the modern ideology of
nationalism. In addition, the institution of modern state in the Muslim world initially emerged as the legacy
of colonialism. As such, it suffered from legitimacy deficiency from the beginning. The fact that modern
nation-state was a substitute for the “sacred institution of caliphate” further undermined its legitimacy in
the Sunnī world. Needless to say, the objection to the legitimacy of modern nation-state in the Shī‘ī world
has been yet stronger given the Shī‘ī anti-power political theology. It is in this context that Ayatollah
Khomeini’s religious formulation of raison d’état becomes of significance [M. Mesbahi, Interviews, Fall
2011. See also Piscatori, James. Islam in a World of Nation-States].
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of the notion of political expediency in justifying the survival of the state. In fact, the
state modernized the doctrine of Taqīyyah and even institutionalized it.624 As the state had
to tame the anti-power forces in Shī‘ah Islam, which has been the legacy of many past
centuries, the notion of Maṣlaḥah, or expediency, proved to be invaluable.
Finally, scholars such as Mesbahi have argued that it was the doctrine of
Shahādah that emerged as the “backbone of Iran’s national security during the Iran-Iraq
war in the 1980s.”625 The assessment is based on the acts of sacrifice that the Shī‘ī
doctrine of Shahādah could demand the community over limited periods of time. During
such times of crisis, the doctrine has been particularly powerful in shaping Shī‘ī strategic
behaviors. Over the long run, however, the doctrine of Shahādah has often had a
symbolic value for the community.626 Beyond the exceptional episodes of crisis, Taqīyyah
has been the modus vivendi of the community. Moreover, a consensus gradually emerged
among Shī‘ah jurists about the necessity of permission by a legitimate “bearer of
Wilāyah” to engage in non-defensive Jihād.627 This further diminished the immediate
relevance of the doctrine of Shahādah beyond the times of “defensive wars.”628 In any
case, it can be argued that Iranian modern strategic culture has employed both Shahādah

624

For instance, a government body called the “Expediency Council” was created with the responsibility
of, inter alia, identifying and protecting the strategic interests of the state.
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M. Mesbahi, Interviews, Spring 2010, and Mesbahi, Mohiaddin. Free and Confined.
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According to Enayat, this has been the case until modern times partly because of the dominance of the
doctrine of Taqīyyah in Shī‘ī strategic thoughts. See Enayat, Hamid. Andīshih Sīyāsī dar Islām Mu‘āṣir. pp.
314-5.
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See Chapter III.
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The rising importance of the doctrine of Shahādah in certain Shī‘ī discourses is a rather modern
phenomenon. See Enayat, Hamid. Andīshih Sīyāsī dar Islām Mu‘āṣir. pp. 322-34.
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and Taqīyyah thus far. Whether this strategic culture will be dominated by the Shī‘ī
modus vivendi of Taqīyyah or whether it will highlight Shahādah remains to be seen. The
layout of this strategic culture, nevertheless, shows how ancient theological notions of
Taqīyyah, Shahādah, and Wilāyah-Walāyah could serve as theological foundations for a
Shī‘ī strategic culture.
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